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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the symbiotic relationship between 
rhetoric and homiletics. The proposed interface between the 
two disciplines is metaphor. Contemporary research on 
metaphor in philosophy, rhetoric, sociology, and theology is 
employed to produce a rhetorical/metaphorical homiletics.
A deconstruction of classical homiletics traces the 
basic preaching model to a Cartesian philosophical starting 
point. The nature of the Christian scriptures as 
metaphorical and of Christian liturgy as symbolic is alien 
to the rational, objective homiletics. An examination of 
Christian worship as a rhetorical event includes the 
elements of the theory of rhetoric developed by Michel 
Foucault: discursive practices, rules, roles, knowledge, and 
power.
Through a new reading of classical sources, implicitly 
or explicitly impacting the homiletic tradition, a 
different, more positive role is suggested for rhetoric. 
Instead of viewing rhetoric as a tool of evil, the preacher 
is encouraged to accept the rhetorical nature of all 
preaching. On this reading homiletics is defined as a type 
of rhetoric and the preacher becomes a rhetor. Rhetoric is 
defined as contingency and probability in opposition to 
traditional Christian dogmas of certainty.
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In an extension of the rhetorical theories of Ernesto 
Grassi and Richard H. Brown, a rhetoric of folly is 
developed. By juxtaposing the views of Grassi and St. Paul 
concerning folly, a common goal of Christians and 
secularists is discovered. Both, while despairing of the 
rational paradigm, suggest folly as a way of survival. The 
characteristics of a rhetoric of folly are: identification, 
semantic speech, empathic communication, dialectical irony, 
and metaphor.
Metaphor, as a creative power, is presented as the 
major component in a rhetoric of folly. Rather than view 
metaphor as an element of style, this study resituates 
metaphor as an element of rhetorical invention. Metaphor is 
capable of redescribing reality, producing a new world, and 
creating credibility, community, and concepts by which 
Christians and secularists structure reality.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Christian preaching faces a perpetual crisis.1 
According to Cardinal Newman2 and Matthew Arnold3 
preaching can be seen as an attempted synthesis of two rival
moral and intellectual traditions: the secular or "Hellenic" 
tradition, and the sacred or "Hebraic" tradition.
Throughout the history of preaching the convergence of these
two traditions has been almost impossible to accomplish. 
Tertullian prescribed the polarities in his blunt question: 
"What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?"4 Arnold 
complains that there ought to be a happy balance between the 
two, "though it never is."5
Perhaps the most significant response to the crisis of 
the rival cultures embedded in Christian preaching was that 
of St. Augustine. Floyd Anderson argues that Augustine 
produced a synthesis of sacred doctrine and pagan knowledge, 
representing "probably the most successful synthesis of 
Hebraism and Hellenism in Western history. 116 Augustine 
joins eloquence to religion and provides in De doctrina 
Christiana two texts for the present study. The first text 
would eliminate existing differences between the sacred and 
the secular: "Every good and worthy Christian should 
understand that wherever they may find truth, it emanates
from their Lord."7 In the second text, Augustine urges 
preachers to " . . .  despoil pagan thought of the gold of 
wisdom and the silver of eloquence, as by God's command the 
Hebrews despoiled the Egyptians."8
Unfortunately, the Augustinian synthesis has not 
survived into the twentieth century. The most notable 
reconstruction of Augustine's rhetorical homiletics was that 
of Fenelon. Subsequent homiletic theorists have attempted 
to combine disparate elements of Hebraism and Hellenism 
without achieving the "happy balance" that Matthew Arnold 
thought desirable.
A partial result for contemporary preachers, saddled 
with the oral culture of the Hebrew prophets as well as the 
literate culture of Athens, is a crisis of rationality. I am 
using the term "rationality" in the sense that the 
autonomous consciousness of the thinker could account for 
any reality by the strict application of the methods of 
science and logic. The classical critiques of rationality 
have been expressed in the works of the "masters of 
suspicion," Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx. They called into 
serious question the naive rationalist claims of the Age of 
Enlightenment. Homiletic methodology, content in its own 
illusion of rationality, has failed to challenge or 
assimilate the charges made by the hermeneutics of 
suspicion.
The most frequent and most damaging charge by 
Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud has been expressed in a variety 
of ways: in Marxist terms, by the bourgeois intellectual's 
refusal to struggle against oppressive economic conditions; 
in Freudian terms, by the disclosure of subterranean forces 
of the unconscious motivating our supposed rationality; in 
the charges of Nietzsche that our primary task is not the 
development of a sincere rationalism, but the becoming of 
individuals.
A contemporary critique of the crisis of rationality by 
Richard J. Bernstein centers in what he calls "Cartesian 
anxiety." Cartesian anxiety is the assumption that only two 
options are available for those who inquire into matters of 
knowledge and action: either some ultimate ground for 
knowledge and action exists, some objective foundation, or 
we are beset by relativistic skepticism which ends in 
befuddled plurality. This opposition, argues Bernstein, 
includes the crisis of "rationality versus irrationality. 1,9 
Homiletic methodology has remained oblivious to the dilemma 
by choosing either a dogmatic rationalism or a charismatic 
irrationality.
An example of the impact of the Cartesian anxiety upon 
preaching can be seen in the way the literate world in which 
preachers perform has diluted the impact of oral 
communication. As W. Lance Haynes argues, "Focusing on
rhetoric solely through literate frameworks has long since 
led us to treat oral rhetoric as if it were written and 
performed--as if the rhetorical processes at work in oral 
composition and interaction differ little, if at all, from 
those of written thought and indeed, to then attempt the 
promulgation of an orally-performed version of literate 
rhetoric. 1,10 Classic homiletic theory, with its insistence 
on the use of propositional statements to be developed and 
defended, has produced a literate framework.
The rhetoric of oral literacy dominates theological 
study, at least that of the homiletics department, in the 
modern seminary. The preoccupation of homileticians with 
constructing sermons from a stock homiletic design 
(introduction, text, propositional topic, categorical 
points, and conclusion) suggests a dependency upon the 
technical restraints of literacy.
While homiletical methods are Hellenistic in nature, 
this very dependence upon literacy raises an additional 
problem. Haynes, drawing on the models of Walter Ong, 
suggests that we are experiencing the advent of the age of 
video literacy; he argues, "Video is impregnating modern 
civilization with rhetorical processes that cannot be 
optimally studied, taught, or used by traditional literate 
means."11 Applied to homiletics this suggests that aspects
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of oral culture are reintroduced to traditional literate 
homiletic methodology.
After all, classical rhetoric is the content of the 
Hellenism imbibed by preaching. The propositional sermon, 
so characteristic of homiletic design, involves the 
painstaking construction of proofs intended for sequential 
critical digestion. The whole process is that of classical 
rhetoric, and homiletics shows little inclination to change 
its ancient foundations. Sermon textbooks often employ 
edifice metaphors, for example, to indicate that sermons are 
built or constructed in a logical fashion.12 The process 
appears like gothic architecture, leading the audience 
through cognitive labor to construct cathedrals of 
definitional precision, decorated with pathos and ethos, and 
cemented with the mortar of linear logic. As Leland Griffin 
has shown, such metaphors are nineteenth century relics.13
In a survey of 120 preaching textbooks I discovered a 
preponderance of classical Greek and Latin rhetorical 
theory. For example, the foundational homiletical text of 
the twentieth century is On the Preparation and Delivery of 
Sermons. by John A. Broadus. A synopsis of Broadus' work 
demonstrates an adaptation of the Aristotelian theory of 
rhetoric and the Ciceronian canons of rhetoric--invention, 
disposition, delivery, style, and memory--to the particular 
needs of Christian preaching. Broadus includes a section on
argument which borrows extensively from Richard Whately, but 
cites no rhetorical theorists after him.
Since 1970 there have been some attempts to move beyond 
the old preaching method, but even the new models have 
ignored potential contributions by rhetorical theorists.
Some homileticians have adapted superficial elements of 
communication theory to preaching.14 Others suggest a 
story-telling model without including narrative theory in 
their methods.15
Two contemporary homileticians are possible exceptions 
to this critique: Fred Craddock, who starts from an 
existentialist position and argues for an inductive model of 
preaching,16 and David Buttrick, who presents what he calls 
a "patchwork phenomenological" approach.17 Craddock and 
Buttrick attempt to move preaching away from dependence on 
classical rhetoric. Their works are a step in the right 
direction, but still fall short of a synthesis of 
contemporary rhetoric and homiletics.
In general while rhetorical theory has moved beyond its 
classical roots and the study of knowledge and reality has 
revealed the shortcomings of a Cartesian dualism, preaching 
has continued to live in an isolated intellectual tower. It 
is as if the art of preaching has become a still-frame 
picture from the eighteenth century. Even as other 
disciplines have experienced reconstruction, now homiletic
theory is called to a similar task. I began by noting the 
dichotomy that prevails in homiletics. Perhaps a synthesis 
can be formed, a synthesis of wisdom and eloquence, a 
synthesis of orality and literacy, a synthesis of rhetoric 
and homiletics.
In this study I attempt a reconstruction of the 
Augustinian synthesis. My purpose is to begin developing a 
rhetorical homiletics: a union of form and content, wisdom 
and eloquence, sacred and secular. The major emphasis will 
be on contemporary rhetorical theory because rhetoric and 
homiletics are part of the same basic discipline. The need 
for a rhetorically-based homiletics arises in part from such 
historical and interpretative considerations already 
expressed, but at least one other rationale supports my 
attempt.
This rationale comes from what I consider common goals 
of preachers and rhetoricians; for example, solving human 
problems, preventing nuclear war, averting ecological 
disaster, or any one of dozens of other issues of public 
interest. The vital issues confronting our existence are of 
such magnitude that all potential alliances and syntheses 
for effecting a global community of peace and well-being 
demand consideration. As Haynes asserts, "Recognizing the 
extent to which humane behavior, once learned, need not be 
preceded by conscious deliberation paves the way toward
creation of a truly humane world society."18 From such a 
rhetorical base may rise "not a global village--after all, 
the prospect of village life thrills us not--but a global 
community."19 I am suggesting that the secular rhetorician 
and Christian preacher have in common a fundamental attitude 
which affirms the ultimate significance and final worth of 
our lives, here and now, in nature and in history. As David 
Tracy makes explicit, this common faith of "secularist and 
modern Christian is perhaps the most important insight 
needed. . . . " 20
Central to my argument is the contention that 
traditional homiletical methods have been influenced by 
science and reason. It is no accident that a rational, 
objective homiletic arose at the same time as scientific 
method inspired by Descarte's A Discourse on Method.
Rational homiletics parodies scientific procedure in which 
an object is isolated for study and a general deduction is 
followed by descriptive statements. Such a strictly 
rational method of preaching clashes with the metaphorical 
nature of religious thought and language. In other words, a 
rational method, based on a hermeneutics of God-given 
certain truth cannot cope with biblical language which is 
often figural, poetic, or narrative in form. As Hans Frei 
has demonstrated, the idea that texts contain themes, 
propositions, or principles was a response to skeptical
rationalism's charge that the Bible was a collection of 
irrational, embarrassing myths.21
To be clear, my objective is not to reject all 
traditional homiletical theory, much of which has been of 
practical import to preachers. I seek instead a 
deconstruction of homiletical methods and the potential for 
a new model. The theoretical content of my model will be 
that of contemporary rhetorical theory. As Cherwitz and 
Hikins point out, "homiletics is a subspecies of 
rhetoric. "22
Adopting rhetoric as a pivotal starting point and major 
content contributor to a theory of homiletics will not 
authorize rhetoric with the power to replace historical 
concerns of preachers, such as the inspiration of'the Bible, 
revelation from God, and questions of authority.23 These 
issues are better pursued in theological studies. I intend 
to apply contemporary rhetorical theory to homiletics with 
the goal of producing theoretical as well as pragmatic 
implications for preaching.
There are numerous perspectives in contemporary 
rhetorical theory which could contribute to homiletics: the 
epistemic, the argumentative, the fantasy-theme, the speech- 
act, the performative, and the narrative. Any of these 
perspectives are possible starting points for a rhetorical 
homiletics. Given the need to refute the rational paradigm
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of homiletics, and given the rhetorical, symbolic nature of 
religious thought and language, however, I offer an 
epistemic and metaphorical perspective. This perspective 
was chosen because it projects rhetoric as a way of 
knowing,24 presupposes that reality is "socially 
constructed,"25 and offers metaphor as the "boundary- 
violater," by which the unknown can become known and thus 
expand what counts as knowledge.
Rhetoric as epistemic departs from the traditional 
point of view of homiletics--that truth is certain, 
knowable, and communicable. Applied to homiletics, the 
epistemic nature of rhetoric offers potential for 
challenging the rational, objective method of preaching. 
Rhetoric as epistemic also elevates the art of preaching 
from its traditional managerial role of passing the truth 
from one person to another, and allows preaching to recreate 
reality through metaphor.
The Statement of the Problem
The increase in scholarly interest in metaphor has led 
to an immense explosion of meanings for the term metaphor. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine critically 
the concept of metaphor as it is used in rhetoric and 
philosophy, and apply these theories to a homiletical model. 
Since a comprehensive survey of all of twentieth century
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rhetoric, philosophy, and homiletics is impossible within 
the parameters of my study, I will concentrate on studies of 
metaphor in rhetoric and philosophy that consider the 
epistemic value of metaphor.
In this study I attempt to resituate metaphor from its 
status as a mere ornament of style to an essential role in 
the creation of knowledge. A survey of representative 
homiletics texts shows that metaphor has been primarily 
treated as a part of style. E. Eugene Hall and James L. 
Heflin surveyed many of the treatments of preaching and 
concluded, "Attention to figures of speech in treatments of 
preaching are less than extensive.1126 The problem is to 
see the preacher, not as a user of pretty words, but as a 
maker of new worlds through metaphor. The preacher comes to 
the arena of public debate to present his/her metaphorical 
worlds, not as the only reality, but as one way of defining 
the community, within the bounds of his/her religious 
commitments and interpretations.
Questions, therefore, need to be asked and answers 
attempted in a systematic way. Among the central questions 
related to the problem of metaphor in homiletics are:
1) What is the nature of the basic relationship between 
rhetoric and homiletics? 2) What is the theory of metaphor 
utilized in traditional homiletics? 3) What characteristics 
of rhetoric and philosophy will be most helpful in
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maintaining the assertion, "Metaphor has epistemic value for 
preaching"? 4) What insights from theories of metaphor can 
be applied to a homiletical model? 5) Can metaphor function 
as the thought of the sermon rather than the decoration of 
the sermon? While these questions suggest the parameters of 
the research problem, further explication of certain related 
problems is needed.
The Subproblems
The first subproblem is to examine the complex inter­
relationship of rhetoric with homiletics. Any preaching 
model proposing a dependence upon rhetorical theories will 
of necessity have to deal with the natural antipathy of 
Christian scholars to rhetoric. There has been little 
effort to bridge systematically the concern of homiletics 
and rhetoric or to explore fully and directly the way 
metaphor makes possible at least one interface between 
homiletics and rhetoric.
The second subproblem is to examine the concept of 
metaphor in representative rhetorical and philosophical 
studies of the twentieth century. The third subproblem is 
to examine the concept of metaphor in representative 
homiletics texts of the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. While theologians have incorporated much 
rhetorical theory of metaphor into their discussions of
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faith, little scholarly work has been done on metaphor in 
the area of homiletics. The fourth subproblem is to produce 
a rhetorical model for homiletics that has epistemological 
and practical value. The model includes contributions of 
rhetorical scholars in research other than that of metaphor.
The Delimitations 
The concept of metaphor, especially in its rhetorical 
nature, controls the investigation. No attempt is made to 
include every treatment of metaphor, because metaphor 
pervades discussion not only in the humanities but the 
sciences as well. Therefore, representative treatments of 
metaphor are selected; specifically the works of Ernesto 
Grassi, Paul Ricoeur, Max Black, Wayne Booth, Mark Johnson, 
and Richard H. Brown.
Further, no attempt is made to deal with every major 
homiletician of the twentieth century. In this study I 
evaluate the basic paradigms of homiletics. Certain works 
have been recognized by scholars in the history of preaching 
as the most influential homiletic textbooks. Specifically, 
the work of John A. Broadus, Andrew Blackwood, James W. Cox, 
and John Killinger will be studied as representatives of the 
classical homiletics paradigm.
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The Definition of Terms
The term "epistemology" is used in the broad sense to 
refer to how knowledge is acquired. Questions about the 
nature of epistemology depend on some stable notion of what 
it is. As I use the term it means a way of knowing, a way 
that extends the boundaries of religious knowing. The 
relationship between rhetoric and epistemology has been of 
interest to rhetorical theorists at least since Robert L. 
Scott's seminal article. Scott asserts, "In human affairs, 
then, rhetoric, perceived in the frame herein discussed, is 
a way of knowing; it is epistemic.1,27 Elaine Ognibene 
argues, "rhetoric can no longer be seen simply as a means of 
persuasion. It becomes instead the medium in which selves 
grow.1128
From a religious perspective, Wayne Booth's book,
Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent. recognizes that 
when belief is taken as dogma, there is no role for 
rhetoric, except the manipulative use by the superior, and 
argues for the creative role of assent.29 For rhetoric to 
be a rhetoric of assent, it must be viewed as epistemic. 
Given this definition of epistemic, preachers are asked to 
abandon certainty for ambiguity. Giving rhetoric a place of 
honor in the isolated kingdom of preaching can open 
homiletics to a demystification of its perceived task and 
help the preacher's advocacy of Christianity become more
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morally responsible. Then he might be able to have a 
positive role in fostering community and a viable civic 
life.
"Metaphor" refers to two active thoughts that remain in 
permanent tension with one another. As Paul Ricoeur 
insists, metaphor belongs to the semantics not the syntax of 
language.30 Rather than being defined as a figure of 
speech, a decorative use of language, metaphor is original 
language, prior to rational language; metaphor creates 
thought, redescribes reality, and remains always open-ended, 
indirect, ambiguous, and revolutionary. The distinctive 
features of metaphor can be summarized in the following way: 
a metaphor is an assertion or judgment of similarity and 
difference between two thoughts in permanent tension with 
one another, which redescribes reality in an open-ended way, 
but has structural as well as epistemic and effective power.
"Rhetoric" gets poor reviews from the homileticians. 
Among those unfamiliar with the history of preaching there 
exist a number of misconceptions about rhetoric. In 
homiletic textbooks one finds warnings against the dangers 
of rhetoric and rhetoric defined as style or oratory.31
The lack of a careful definition of rhetoric by 
homileticians is further evidence that preaching has failed 
to assimilate the resources of contemporary rhetoric. A 
typical definition of rhetoric from a popular homiletical
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work will indicate the seriousness of the definitional 
problem: "Rhetoric taught him to use his abilities . . . by
instructing him in the art of extemporization, appropriate 
expression, and moving appeal."32
Witness, in contrast, the following definitions of 
rhetoric offered by serious scholars across the centuries. 
Aristotle's definition still stands as paradigmatic for 
rhetorical theorists: "Rhetoric is the faculty of finding in 
any given situation the available means of persuasion. 1,33 
Francis Bacon gave a psychological perspective in defining 
rhetoric as the "application of reason to the imagination 
for the better moving of the will."34 For Kenneth Burke 
rhetoric is "the use of language as a symbolic means of 
inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to 
symbols."35 I. A. Richards, in an idealistic fervor 
assigns rhetoric to ". . . the study of misunderstanding and 
its remedies."36 Cherwitz and Hikins offer the following 
definition: "Rhetoric is the art of describing reality 
through language."37 All of these authors, and others who 
could be cited, agree that rhetoric is a serious 
philosophical subject that has evolved from a managerial 
role in the transmission of knowledge to a creative role in 
the generation of knowledge. In other words, there is an 
emergent consensus that rhetoric is epistemic.
In this study I am adopting and extending the 
definition of Gerard A. Hauser that rhetoric is "the 
management of symbols in order to coordinate social action." 
According to Hauser, "Rhetoric exists in the realm of the 
contingent not the certain."38 Because I am interested in 
how the study of rhetoric and of homiletics can be mutually 
informing, I have concentrated on the kind of language by 
which the preacher describes the world as it exists and 
redescribes a new world invaded by the presence of the 
kingdom of God.
"Homiletics" may be defined as the science of preparing 
and delivering a discourse based on scripture. In this 
study I work toward a homiletics which adapts contemporary 
rhetoric to the particular ends and demands of preaching. By 
homiletics I mean an ongoing conversation within which 
religious beliefs are advanced and supported, but which 
never attain the status of certainty. Contemporary 
rhetorical theory can clarify the communicative dimensions 
of homiletic discourse and establish new philosophical 
starting points for homiletics. Contemporary rhetorical 
theory can also demonstrate distinctive features of metaphor 
little explored by today's homiletical theorists.
18
The Significance of the Study
The concept of metaphor has emerged within the past 
four decades as a key category in rhetoric and philosophy, 
as well as other disciplines. One contribution of these 
studies is a developing consensus that metaphor can create a 
changed world-view or perspective. Metaphor can open 
avenues for multiple meanings of texts as well as 
alternative solutions to public problems. Such creative 
possibilities are significant for any preaching attempting 
to contribute to our survival. As Booth argues " . . .  the 
quality of any culture is in large part the quality of the 
metaphorists that it creates and sustains."39 Preaching 
which narrowly shuts out public debate by Christians 
deserves the criticism it often receives.
Among those unfamiliar with the history of homiletics 
there exists a host of criticisms about the subject and the 
phenomena associated with it. Not since Charles Dickens was 
giving preachers such a hard time in Pickwick Papers have 
Christian ministers appeared in sorrier plight. Is it 
because (as the Wakefield Master put it, c.1425) "Are we all 
hand-tamed by these gentry?" Preachers have often had a 
hard time of it. Jesus was called a devil, a drunkard, and 
considered crazy. Epicurean and Stoic philosophers in 
Athens called St. Paul a "cock sparrow." Augustine 
complained of his clergy as "a couple of unpretentious sheep
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dogs." Charlemagne sent for Alcuin to give ignorant 
preachers something worth hearing to say. Chaucer has a 
line on "shitey shepherds and their shitey sheep." Jonathan 
Swift flailed out at the Scottish divines for delivering 
"oracular belches to . . . panting disciples." Yet, that 
Charles Dickens version of Methodist preachers: unctuous, 
mewling, greedy; across two centuries it stings.
A second significance for this study lies in the 
observation of David Tracy that " . . .  all major religions 
are grounded in certain root metaphors."40 These root 
metaphors are frameworks for creating new meaning. The 
preacher's search for a hermeneutic of metaphor is "a 
groping, a tatonment: or one who is seeking to find one's 
way, to establish a sense of direction."41 In common with 
artists and scientists, preachers can use root metaphors to 
make experience significant.
A third significance for this study is the expansion of 
rhetorical theories of knowing and metaphor to another 
discipline--homiletics. Traditional homiletics has promoted 
a religious positivism which views the lexicon of Christian 
truth as certain and literal. In this fictive kingdom, the 
preaching of the Bible is factual and literal. While the 
presence of metaphor is not denied, biblical figures of 
speech are sacrificed on the altar of explanation and 
literal paraphrase. Under the reign of literalism, there is
20
little wonder that metaphor has been banished from the 
kingdom. I believe that the truncated art of homiletics can 
be restored to a place of honor in our society. "All 
serious study is, no doubt, life-justifying,"42 but there 
is potential for significance in a study that searches for 
the survival of the human race in the spoken arts of 
rhetoric and homiletics.
The Review of Related Literature
Two major bibliographical works, Warren A. Shibles' 
Metaphor: An Annotated Bibliography and History and volume 
17 of the Amsterdam Studies in the Theory and History of 
Linguistic Science, provide the basic introductory resources 
for the study of metaphor. These two sources list over 
9,500 entries. By necessity then only major writers in major 
periods who have exerted either a direct or indirect 
influence upon homiletical theory will be considered. The 
major portion of the review focuses on periodical literature 
relating to metaphor and to dissertations relevant to the 
epistemic nature of metaphor.
Due to the dependence of homiletics upon classical 
rhetoric, the theory of metaphor as developed by Plato, 
Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian will be considered. These 
foundational studies inform most theories of metaphor. 
Although Plato never formulated a theory of metaphor, his
21
negative assessment of rhetoric holds just as true for 
metaphor. Plato's attitude concerning metaphor has often 
been mirrored by homileticians. By this assertion I am not 
claiming a direct line from Plato to Christian writers, but 
I am saying that preachers have often produced a similar 
negative evaluation of rhetoric and metaphor. (This thesis 
will be developed in the discussion of the complex interface 
between rhetoric and homiletics.) The writing of Plato most 
pertinent to this study is Gorqias. In Gorqias, Plato 
denounces rhetoric as "The generic name I should give it is 
pandering; it has many subdivisions, one of which is 
cookery, an occupation which masquerades as an art but in my 
opinion is not more than a knack acquired by routine."43
Aristotle's views, developed in the Rhetoric and in the 
Poetics, provide the foundation for almost all succeeding 
theories of metaphor. His definition of metaphor remains as 
the classical paradigm: "Metaphor consists in giving the
thing a name that belongs to something else; the 
transference being either from genus to species, or from 
species to grounds, or from species to species, or on 
grounds of analogy."44 Basing metaphor in both rhetoric 
and philosophy was Aristotle's positive rebuttal to Plato's 
earlier negative evaluation of metaphor. Aristotle's 
treatment of metaphor can be summarized as follows: 1) as
something which happens to the noun, metaphor is attached to
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the word rather than to discourse in general; 2) As 
something that displaces meaning away from or toward another 
meaning, metaphor always borrows from another field of 
meanings; 3) Metaphor has some sense different from ordinary 
language; 4) Metaphor plays across several typologies.
While Aristotle did emphasize the creative aspect of 
metaphor, the basic result of his theory was to place 
metaphor under the rubric of style.
Cicero, in the De Oratore. also perceived metaphor as 
an ornament of language. Cicero's view of metaphor is 
important in homiletics because of his close connection to 
the later work of Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana. "A 
metaphor is a short form of simile, contracted into one 
word."45 Thus metaphor is seen as playing a cosmetic role 
"with respect to ordinary language . . .  in order to produce 
a pleasing effect."46
Quintilian's significance lies in his summation of 
rhetorical theories of metaphor that came before him, a kind 
of restatement of classicism. A trope consists of "the 
artistic alteration of a word or phrase from its proper 
meaning to another," and "the commonest and by far the most 
beautiful of tropes" is the metaphor. Metaphor is for 
Quintilian the "supreme ornament of style."47
George Campbell, in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 
introduces a rhetorical framework vastly different from the
classical system. In place of the five canons, Campbell 
reduces the goals of speaking to four: enlighten the 
understanding, please the imagination, move the passions, 
or influence the will.48 The significance of Campbell for 
this study can be traced to current homiletics textbooks 
which still utilize Campbell's framework. In addition, his 
treatment of metaphor as an occurrence in the mind, as an 
act of the imagination, is relevant to the proposed model 
developed in this study. The major tasks of metaphor, 
according to Campbell, are fixing attention and interest, 
moving the passions, and inducing belief. The role of 
metaphor in inducing belief has particular relevance for the 
preacher. Campbell argues that "lively ideas have a 
stronger influence than faint ideas to induce 
belief. . . .1149 Also, Campbell insists that metaphor is 
basically argument by analogy.50
Hugh Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres 
were first published in 1783. Blair, a popular Scottish 
preacher, develops a rather complete conception of metaphor 
as linguistic expression. His remarks on metaphor betray a 
negative concept of metaphor as ornaments; they are 
"artificial embellishments of rhetoric" or "laboured 
refinements of art" or "pompous."51 Thus Blair insists 
that metaphor is to be used to embellish and to decorate 
speech. His work carries this now obsolete concept of
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metaphor to its culmination. Blair defines metaphor as "a 
sort of picture."52 This definition is used in 
prescriptive preaching texts which encourage inspiring 
preachers to paint pictures with words.
Pierre Fontanier treated metaphor as a mere ornament to 
plain thought and only one of many figures of speech. The 
important task of the interpreter is paraphrase. Metaphor 
is a mere accident in naming and rhetoric is the art of 
pleasing not persuading. Metaphor is understood as the 
substitution of one noun for another. This approach to 
metaphor, dominant from Plato through part of the twentieth 
century, has been expressed and taught in homiletical text 
books through the present time. For Fontanier rhetoric is 
reduced to the study of figures of style, which he defines 
as "the more or less remarkable traits and forms, the 
phrases with a more or less happy turn, by which the 
expression of ideas, thoughts, and feelings remove the 
discourse more or less far away from what would have been 
its simple common expression."53
I. A. Richards, in The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 
represents a major shift in the direction of metaphor 
theory. His definition of metaphor, his nomenclature for 
the elements involved in metaphor, and his theory of meaning 
constitute his major contributions to the study of metaphor. 
For example, his definition of metaphor has been
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paradigmatic for most ensuing studies of metaphor: "When we 
use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things 
active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, 
whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction. 1,54 For 
Richards metaphor is basic to our thought process.
In The Philosophy of Rhetoric Richards makes several 
claims that in one form or another remain basic to the study 
of metaphor. Metaphor is not a trope dealing only with 
words, nor is it a matter of style alone. Instead, it is an 
omnipresent principle of thought. "Thought is metaphoric, 
and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language 
derive therefrom."55 Metaphor permeates all discourse. 
Because homileticians have missed or ignored these claims, 
they have taken metaphor as a stylistic ornament dealing 
with the matter of choosing visual words to enforce logical 
points in the sermon. Richards discounts this traditional 
or received view of metaphor and suggests that metaphor 
involves metaphysical and epistemological issues.
Homiletics has much to gain from the insights of 
Richards. The idea that thought is essentially metaphoric 
fits well with the concept that Judaic-Christian scriptures 
and religious languages are basically metaphoric. If, as 
Richards argues, metaphors are cognitively irreducible and 
indispensable, then homiletics can dispense with the futile 
attempt to merely repeat Christian traditions and attempt to
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expand them with new metaphoric formulations. Also, any 
adequate account of meaning and truth must give a central 
place to metaphor.
One of the attempts to explore the epistemological 
character of metaphor is the work of Susanne Langer. Her 
Philosophy in a New Key extends Kant's critique of reason, 
explores the power of metaphor, and explicates epistemology 
as all that is left to the philosophical heritage. Langer 
perceives metaphor as the principle by which new words are 
born. "One might say that metaphor is the law of life. It 
is the force that makes it essentially relational, 
intellectual, forever showing up new, abstractable forms in 
reality, forever laying down a deposit of old, abstracted 
concepts in an increasing treasure of general words."56 In 
a profession, such as preaching, which suffers from a loss 
of confidence in language as well as from the crippling 
weight of a whole pantheon of dead "god" metaphors, Langer's 
insistence on broadening the philosophy of meaning to 
include metaphor as new meaning offers potential.
Philip Wheelwright, in The Burning Foundation, 
discusses the relationship between metaphor and reality and 
the function of metaphor in religion. He proposed a double­
language theory--literal and metaphorical. As language that 
is "alive," "fluid," "vital," "open," and "resonant," 
metaphor has for Wheelwright an ontological character.57
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While Wheelwright's language theory may perpetuate the 
dichotomy of rhetoric and homiletics (since rhetoric is 
traditionally seen as poetic and homiletics as persuasive 
discourse), his description of metaphoric language acts to 
counteract the positivism and literalness in linguistic 
analysis as well as in homiletics.
A philosophical approach to the theory of metaphor is 
used by Max Black in his Models and Metaphors: Studies in 
Language and Philosophy. Black summarizes theories of 
metaphor, dividing them into substitution views, comparison 
views, and interaction views. The interaction view is the 
relevant theory in this study. Black relied on I. A. 
Richard's theory in which two different expressions act 
together to result in another meaning. Although Black fails 
to explain the significance of metaphor for philosophy, he 
does argue for the nonparaphrasable quality of interactive 
metaphors. "Up to a point, we may succeed in stating a 
number of the relevant relations between the two elements of 
a metaphor . . . But the set of literal statements so 
obtained will not have the same power . . . The loss in such 
cases is a loss in cognitive content . . . The literal 
translation . . . fails to give the insight that the 
metaphor did."58 Metaphor is a filter, according to Black, 
which links a system of associated meanings to a principal 
subject, its focus.
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Perhaps the most comprehensive theory of metaphor is 
that of Paul Ricoeur. In his Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur 
insists that metaphor contains the power to redescribe 
reality. The work progresses from a rhetorical to a 
semantical, to a hermeneutical study. He rejects common 
understandings of metaphor as word, as phrase, as sentence 
and argues for metaphor as discourse.59 Metaphor, notes 
Ricoeur, is a momentous creation of language. The 
metaphoric process involves more than mere expression. 
Indeed, it is "knowledge-in-process." The hearer/reader of 
metaphor is invited to discover more implications of 
metaphors. This discovery requires, according to Ricoeur, 
the ability to express or redescribe reality. Ricoeur 
argues that the metaphoric function of language impels human 
discourse not only toward new meanings, but toward an 
appropriate philosophical language to understand them. 
According to Ricoeur, the function of metaphor is to present 
"in an open fashion, by means of a conflict between identity 
and difference, the process that, in a covert manner 
generates semantic grids by fusion into identity."60
Another prominent theorist associated with the metaphor 
debate is Ernesto Grassi. In his Rhetoric as Philosophy 
Grassi sees metaphor as prior to scientific thought. In 
fact, he insists that metaphor is the basis of human 
thought. His concept of ingenium (ingenuity) suggests that
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metaphor has the capacity to create and transform reality.
In short, metaphor--the power of the word--is epistemic.
The primal, original power of words suggests that rhetoric 
is the evolutionary movement from chaos to cosmos, from 
darkness to light, from destructive tendencies to 
constructive ones. Metaphor is more than a figure of speech 
because it embodies the basic process by which humans think, 
know, and process the events of their world. Grassi argues 
that "philosophy itself becomes possible only on the basis 
of metaphors, on the basis of the ingenuity which supplies 
the foundation of every rational, derivative process."61
Kenneth Burke brings a sociological perspective to the 
study of metaphor. Burke defines metaphor in functional 
terms:
Metaphor is a device for seeing something in terms of 
something else. It brings out the thisness of a that, 
or the thatness of a this . . . metaphor tells us
something about one character as considered from the 
point of view of another character. And to consider A 
from the point of view of B is, of course, to use B as 
a perspective upon A.62
In Permanence and Change Burke asserts, "It is precisely
through metaphor that our perspectives, or analogical
extensions, are made . . .  a world without metaphor would be
a world without purpose."63 Burke develops from his
definition an institutionalized view of metaphor. An entire
system of thought is dominated by its metaphor or
perspective. In order to gain a perspective on our
30
perspectives we must be able to imaginatively transcend the
parameters of our perspective. This would enable one to
view the subject from as many diverse metaphoric
perspectives as his/her own power of invention would permit.
For his part, Burke claims priority for one metaphor--poetic
metaphor--as the ruling perspective: "Man is an actor."64
There are five ingredients of "man is an actor": Act, Scene,
Agent, Agency, and Purpose. Through the Pentad Burke is
telling us how to interpret the poetic metaphor. Thus we
have a new system of invention, and in this case, perhaps a
fresh prescription for the thought processes of the
discipline of homiletics.
At least two dissertations deserve consideration here.
Michael M. Osborn's 1963 dissertation attempts to trace the
historical development of the theory of metaphor from
Aristotle to the twentieth century. His theory rejects the
notion that metaphor's tradition is a matter of pure word-
change. Instead Osborn argues that "the shift of emphasis
from metaphor as an occurrence in language to metaphor as an
occurrence in thought is not an abrupt change. . . ."65
Metaphor, according to Osborn, may be defined as:
both communicative stimulus and response to stimulus.
As stimulus, metaphor is the identifying of an idea or 
object through a sign which generally denotes an 
entirely different idea or object. As a response, 
metaphor is an interaction of interpretants which 
spring from the stimulus sign's usual denotation and 
from its special denotation in this context. This
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interaction of interpretants provides the basis for the 
meaning of the particular stimulus-response cycle which 
is metaphor.66
Osborn concludes his work with suggestions for future 
research in metaphor that served as the catalyst for this 
dissertation.
Representative of studies in the cognitive nature of 
metaphor is Eva Feder Kittay's dissertation, "The Cognitive 
Force of Metaphor: A Theory of Metaphoric Meaning."
Building on the work of Richards, Black, Burke, Goodman, and 
others, Kittay suggests that the cognitive force of metaphor 
be sought in its perspectival character. Three propositions 
make up this perspectival nature of metaphor: 1) There are 
two identifiable components in every metaphor; 2) The 
components interact so that one is the "lens" by which we 
view the second; 3) There is a relation of tension between 
the two components. Kittay suggests that each component of 
the metaphor is an element in a semantic field from which 
terms in our language acquire their meaning. "The meaning 
of a metaphor involves the cross over from the semantic 
field of one of the components to the semantic field of the 
other.1,67
Rhetorical scholars have explored the theoretical 
implications of metaphor in numerous articles. For example, 
Franklin Fearing suggests that metaphor, at a different 
level, performs the same function as the "physiognomic
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perception" of primitive oral societies, in which the object 
is endowed with dynamic-affective qualities. To allege such 
close parallels between metaphor and perception in oral 
cultures, could have significant bearing on a rhetorical 
model of homiletics based on elements of orality.68
An assumption guiding much rhetorical research on 
metaphor is that the use of metaphor is a significant tool 
for rhetorical criticism. Kathleen Hall Jamieson, in "The 
Metaphoric Cluster in the Rhetoric of Pope Paul VI and 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr.," studies the recurring metaphors of 
Pope Paul and Governor Brown. Jamieson argues, "By 
isolating a rhetor's range of metaphors and comparing them 
with other habitual rhetorical behaviors, critics can 
minimize the likelihood that they are generalizing from 
aberrant rhetorical cues."69
Wayne Booth claims even greater critical power for the 
study of metaphor. Booth argues for an ethical criticism 
based on the quality of the characters and cultures built by 
metaphor.70 Some of the consequences of taking Booth 
seriously would include the study of metaphor as the solving 
of a puzzle, "taking literally Aristotle's statement that 
metaphors are like enigmas or riddles;"71 and the study of 
metaphor as "a quest for ways to improve my culture and 
myself; that is, a search for a cure."72
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Herman G. Stelzner, operating on the assumption that an 
age or an institution can be known by its metaphors, 
examines the figurative language "used in contemporary 
discussion of oral communication, emphasizing the organizing 
power that has been demonstrated by mechanical, evolutionary 
or biological, and military concepts."73 According to 
Stelzner, mechanistic metaphors, inspired by Newton, 
dominated nineteenth century speech pedagogy. The works of 
Darwin, however, provided the impetus for biological 
metaphors as paradigms in the twentieth century. Mechanical 
metaphors still govern homiletical methodology as a part of 
its rational, objective base.
In a related article, "Rhetoric and the Science of 
History: The Debate Between Evolutionism and Empiricism as a 
Conflict of Metaphors," Richard H. Brown argues that "both 
evolutionists and empiricists are engaged in poetic 
construction--albeit with different root metaphors." Brown 
extols the value of metaphor as being indispensable to 
science, as our fundamental way of noting similarity and 
difference. "All discourse is poetic," insists Brown, "in 
that it uses metaphors and other tropes. . . . 1174 Of
particular significance to my study are Brown's claims that 
we make worlds through the use of metaphors, and that we 
should engage in a rhetoric which fosters civic life.
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The role of metaphor in persuasion has been studied by, 
among others, John W. Bowers and Michael M. Osborn.75 
Utilizing empirical research, Bowers and Osborn pursued the 
question, "Are metaphorical conclusions more effective in 
changing attitudes than literal conclusions?"76 The study 
provided some initial empirical evidence that metaphorical 
conclusions have greater effects on audience attitudes.
Michael Osborn's study of "light-dark" archetypal 
metaphors has religious meanings important in preaching. 
Osborn lists the major variations of the light-dark family 
as light-dark, the sun, fire, and the cycle of the seasons. 
One of Osborn's more interesting suggestions is that 
"Archetypal images may be especially crucial not only when a 
society is in upheaval, but also in its formative stages 
before it has achieved a certain national identity."77
Philosophers have turned their attention to the topic 
of metaphor increasingly during the last twenty years.78 
Because of the explosion of studies of metaphor in 
philosophy, only sample views can be mentioned here.
Binkley has argued that the truth value of a metaphor is 
assessed the same as that for literal expressions. His 
point is that metaphor is not cognitively inferior to 
literal statements. He argues that metaphorical claims 
function as argument "which has more or less determinate
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criteria evaluation, which can be supported and weakened 
with evidence and so on."79
A growing number of philosophers are irreducible 
theorists. Mark Johnson, for example, asserts that "a 
consensus is beginning to emerge about the nature of the 
cognitivity issue. . . ."80 From the perspective of 
Johnson, metaphor is "an omnipresent principle of 
cognition;1,81 metaphor cannot be reduced to a literal 
paraphrase; and metaphor alters our conceptual structures as 
well as recreates our world.82
Strong support for the epistemic value of metaphor also 
comes from literature on the essentiality of metaphor in 
science.83 Metaphor can no longer be dismissed as a mere 
ornament, a simple comparison, or a matter of word usage.
If metaphor is indispensable in rhetoric, philosophy, and 
science, homiletics comes to this party hat in hand. From 
the realization that metaphor is essential even in science 
comes an assumption of the pervasiveness of metaphor in all 
language. As Lakoff and Johnson argue, "no account of 
meaning and truth can be adequate unless it recognizes and 
deals with the way in which conventional metaphors structure 
our conceptual system.84
In summary, then, metaphor is indispensable to our 
thought, to our ways of coming-to-know, to the making of our 
world, and potentially, to the evolving of global community.
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In science, in religion, in philosophy metaphor provides 
access to the unknown through describing the known. The 
literature related to metaphor suggests a consensus among 
rhetoricians and philosophers that metaphor has cognitive 
value, that it is not reducible to a literal paraphrase, and 
that it produces new insights not possible in literal 
language.
The Data, Their Treatment, 
and Their Interpretation 
The primary data for this study are the writings of 
representative twentieth century rhetoricians, philosophers, 
theologians, and homileticians. The literary and critical 
data are contained in the journal articles and monographs of 
the major theorists listed above. Secondary data will 
include the material which helps to set the historical 
background and interpretation of the interest in metaphor. 
The unpublished dissertations dealing with metaphor are 
another type of secondary data.
The Research Methodology 
This research study stresses historical and rhetorical 
criticism of major treatments in rhetoric, philosophy, and 
homiletics. Osborn's 1963 paradigm of the functions and 
significance of metaphor is not entirely adequate for 
critical application to the proposed rhetorical model for
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homiletics. Recent research in metaphor by rhetoricians, 
philosophers, and homileticians needs to supplement Osborn's 
theory; and a rhetorical model for homiletics centered in 
metaphor needs to be created. In addition, most other 
theories of metaphor fail to make any systematic application 
of the rhetorical significance of metaphor in preaching.
The primary research methodology will be qualitative. The 
historical method will be utilized, along with a descriptive 
survey of the data, and interpretation and application of 
its significance.
The Treatment of the Data 
Chapter one attempts a rationale for the study of 
metaphor as the key in a reconstruction of the Augustinian 
synthesis. The aim of the initial phase of the research is 
a historical perspective on metaphor.
Chapter two of this dissertation consists of a critique 
of homiletical methodology. Working from the notion of 
Michel Foucault's concept of discursive formation, I will 
attempt to show how the traditional methodology of 
preaching, and its liturgical context has precluded an 
epistemic role for metaphor.
In chapter three, using a historical review of 
attitudes toward rhetoric by homileticians, I attempt to 
show how rhetoric has been systematically divorced from
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homiletics. As revealed by a critique of historical 
attitudes toward rhetoric, I demonstrate that the divorce is 
one of ideology not praxis. I then argue from work done by 
Richard Weaver and Richard Kinneavy that rhetoric deserves a 
new reading in application to homiletics. On this basis, I 
propose a philosophy of homiletics and a rhetoric of 
homiletics which utilizes metaphor as the creation of 
knowledge. An additional purpose in Chapter Three is to 
demonstrate rhetorical criticism of preaching through an 
alternative method.
Chapter four will review theories of metaphor as a 
starting point for formulation of a tentative model for a 
rhetorical homiletics, i.e., a rhetoric of folly. The 
originating power of metaphorical language, the process of 
ingenuity, the irony of "folly," and the identification of 
significant components of a rhetoric of folly will provide 
the basic presuppositions of the rhetorical-theory-content 
in the proposed model. Crucial to the development of the 
model will be an introductory conception of a philosophy of 
homiletics. The pragmatic application of preaching cannot 
be other than a sophistic handbook without a philosophical, 
axiological, and epistemological base.
Chapter five describes and defines the significance of 
metaphor for preaching. An extension of the theories of
I.A. Richards and Paul Ricoeur is utilized to develop the
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base of a metaphorical epistemology defined as the creation 
of reality.
Chapter six discusses and evaluates the creative power 
of metaphor in terms of authority, community, and concepts. 
Chapter Six extends the discussion of metaphor's epistemic 
value.
The Conclusion consists of summaries and evaluations of 




1. The crisis of preaching has been expressed as 
secularism vs. supernaturalism, liberalism vs. conservatism, 
science vs. poetry, concept vs. symbol, rationality vs. 
irrationality, and secular vs. sacred. I have chosen to 
emphasize rhetorical aspects of the crisis of preaching.
The depth of the crisis can be discerned by noting that 
while theology has made four dominant responses to the 
crisis of rationality; the liberal model, the neo-orthodox 
model, the radical model, and the revisionist model, there 
has remained only one basic homiletical model.
2. T. H. Newman, The Idea of a University (New York: 
Longmans, 1947), 230-231.
3. Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960), 129-144.
4. Tertullian, De praescriptione (PL II, Col. 20a-b), 7. 
Gregory the Great expressed a similar view: "The same mouth 
singeth not the praises of Jove and the praises of Christ." 
R.L. Poole, Illustrations in the History of Medieval 
Thought, (London, 1884), 8. The dichotomy has been 
expressed in preaching as sacred vs. secular, eloquence vs. 
wisdom, religion vs. science and spirit vs. flesh among 
others. See H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, for 
four models of the Christian relation to culture.
5. Arnold, 130.
6. Floyd Anderson, "De doctrina Christiana 2.18.28: The 
Convergence of Athens and Jerusalem," Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly XV (1985):102. For related studies see James J. 
Murphy, "Saint Augustine and the Debate About a Christian 
Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech 46 (December, 1960): 
400-410; Murphy, "The Metarhetorics of Plato, Augustine, and 
McLuhan: A Pointing Essay," Philosophy and Rhetoric 4
(1971):201-214; and John H. Patton, "Wisdom and Eloquence: 
The Alliance of Exegesis and Rhetoric in Augustine," Central 
States Speech Journal 28 (Summer, 1977):96-105; and Andrew
A. King, "St. Augustine's Doctrine of Participation as a 
Metaphysic of Persuasion," Rhetoric Society Quarterly XV 
(1985 ):112-115.
7. Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, translated by 
D. W. Robertson, Jr. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
1958), 2.18.28. All quotations from De doctrina Christiana
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will be taken from this translation. Elevating a passage to 
the level of "text" indicates a vigorous engagement with 
Augustine's suggestions, and allows them to serve as thought 
provokers and new reflection and practice.
8 . De doctrina Christiana.
9. Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and 
Relativism: Science. Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania, 1983), 766-767.
10. W. Lance Haynes, "Of That Which We Cannot Write: Some 
Notes on the Phenomenology of Media," Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 74 (February, 1988):98-99. I am using the term 
"rationality" in the sense that the autonomous consciousness 
of the thinker could account for any reality by the strict 
application of the methods of science and logic. The crisis 
of preaching is considered as a subset of the larger crises 
of theology manifested as the crises of cognitive claims and 
the ethical and existential crises. The classical critiques 
of Enlightenment rationality were expressed in the works of 
the "masters of suspicion," Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche.
They called into serious question the naive rationalist 
claims of the Age of Enlightenment. A modern critique of 
rationality, by Hans-Georg Gadamer, argues that rationality 
leads to both philosophical folly and human impoverishment. 
For a succinct theological perspective on the crisis of 
secularism, cf. Schubert M. Ogden, The Reality of God (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1964), 6-20.
11. Haynes, 98.
12. Among numerous examples of the influence of archi­
tectural and building metaphors upon homiletics see, Harold 
T. Bryson and James C. Taylor, Building Sermons to Meet 
People1s Needs (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1980); James Earl 
Massey, Designing the Sermon (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
1980); and Dwight F. Stevenson, In the Biblical Preacher's 
Workshop (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967).
13. Leland Griffin, "The Edifice Metaphor in Rhetorical 
Theory," Speech Monographs 27 (November, 1960):279-291.
14. A number of homileticians utilize communication 
theory in their methodology, among them are M.R. Chartier, 
Preaching As Communication: An Interpersonal Perspective 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1981); G.R. Fitzgerald, A 
Practical Guide to Preaching (New York: Paulist Press,
1980); J. Randall Nicholls, Building the Word (San
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Francisco: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1980); C. Pennington, 
God Has a Communication Problem (New York: Hawthorne Books, 
Inc., 1976); and George E. Sweazey, Preaching the Good News 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976).
15. In the 1980's homiletics experienced a growing 
literature on preaching as story-telling. Samples of this 
work include: E. A. Steimle, M. J. Niedenthal, and C. L. 
Rick, Preaching the Story (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1980); Eugene L. Lowry, The Homiletic Plot (Atlanta: John 
Knox Press, 1980) and Doing Time in the Pulpit (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1985); and Henry H. Mitchell, The Recovery 
of Preaching (San Francisco: Harper and Row, Publishers, 
1977).
16. Fred B. Craddock, in As One Without Authority: Essays 
on Inductive Preaching (Enid, Oklahoma: Phillips University 
Press, 1971), is important for his rejection of the 
rational-deductive methodologies of the pulpit. See also 
Overhearing the Gospel (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1978), 
which starts from Kierkegaard and develops an "indirect" 
communication of the gospel; and Preaching (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1985).
17. David Buttrick, Homiletic: Moves and Structures 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987).
18. Haynes, 98.
19. Haynes, 98.
20. David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New 
Pluralism in Theology (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975),
8. The goal of creating a better society through rhetoric 
is not a new idea. Cicero, in De inventione, gave the 
challenge to rhetoric: "Men ought none the less devote 
themselves to the study of eloquence although some misuse it 
in private and in public affairs; and they should study it 
more ardently in order that evil men may not gain great 
power to the detriment of good citizens and the common 
disaster of the community." (Cicero, De inventione. 1.2.5.).
21. Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 51, 154.
22. Richard A. Cherwitz and James W. Hikins, Communi­
cation and Knowledge: An Investigation in Rhetorical 
Epistemology (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1986), 53.
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23. The whole postmodern movement in rhetorical theory, 
starting with Nietzsche, presents homiletics with a crisis 
of authority. Many would question the need to preach at 
all. Preaching has, from the beginning, received poor 
reviews, but the religious nature of life and the limit- 
situations in everyday life call for a continuing 
conversation which Christians call preaching. The crisis of 
authority presents preachers with a series of challenges; 
i.e., the claims of the hermeneutics of suspicion, the 
positivism which reduces religious language to nonsense, and 
the attempt to analyze the limit-questions of both religion 
and science.
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CHAPTER TWO
A DECONSTRUCTION OF CLASSICAL HOMILETICS:
A FOUCAULTIAN ANALYSIS
A symbiotic relationship exists between rhetoric and 
homiletics despite the historical divorce of the two 
disciplines, a divorce maintained mostly by homiletics. In 
Chapter One, I argued for an Augustinian synthesis of the 
rhetoric/homiletics mix. An additional problem now requires 
our attention. Not only has homiletics historically 
perpetuated a divorce from rhetoric, but even more telling, 
homiletics has ignored the potential contributions of 
contemporary rhetoric. Outside of bibliographic mention of 
some modern rhetoricians, homiletics textbooks are void of 
any rhetorical theory content beyond George Campbell and 
Richard Whately. For example, James W. Cox, in Preaching:
A Comprehensive Approach to the Design and Delivery of 
Sermons. a 1985 preaching textbook, suggests the following 
rhetoricians for study by students of preaching: Kenneth
Burke, George Campbell, Cicero, Lane Cooper, Edward P. J. 
Corbett, Quintilian, I.A. Richards and Richard Whately.1 
Cox does not, however, utilize any contemporary rhetorical 
theory in this book.
From a homiletician's perspective, we seem to have come 
to the end of rhetoric. Classical homiletics, lured by the
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philosophy of Descartes, has sold out to the gods of 
epistemological certainty and foundationalism. With 
philosophy and metaphysics providing one leg, homiletics 
added a romanticized theory of the inspiration of the Bible 
as the second leg, and proceeded with the task of providing 
the root principles of all knowledge, human and divine. The 
resulting metaphor is a three-legged stool with one leg 
missing. Combine the metaphor of the medieval preaching 
tree and the architectural metaphor of correct homiletical 
structure and one has arrogance of power suggesting that 
Christian knowledge is the only true knowledge. The 
Christian preacher postures as the possessor of privileged 
knowing, thus becoming not only a Sophist from a rhetorical 
perspective, but a Gnostic as well, from a theological 
perspective.2
Homiletics, however, is in a precarious position 
because of the attack on philosophy and the attack on 
religion by scholars of the lineage of end of philosophy 
thinking. From Nietzsche to Heidegger to Derrida there has 
been a radical deconstruction of philosophy. These voices 
have been joined by those of Wittgenstein, John Dewey, 
Richard Rorty, and Calvin 0. Schrag.3 The destiny of the 
epistemological paradigm--the search for certainty and the 
foundations of knowledge--has been outlined by Rorty in his 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. According to Rorty,
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the epistemological project was ill-fated from the start, 
designed to provide a "knowledge of knowledge."4 There 
comes a time, says Rorty, when it is a mark of wisdom to set 
aside this futile quest for incorrigible givens, elusive 
mental structures, and to situate ourselves in the ongoing 
"conversation of mankind."5 As put in one of Mannheim's 
lucid sentences: "That is why unambiguousness, too great
clarity is not an unqualified social value. . . ."6
According to Calvin Schrag, "Philosophy is dismantled as a 
collection of necessary conditions for knowledge and 
descends into the contingency of social practices and the 
conversational voice of mankind."7
What does philosophy have to do with homiletics? 
Homiletics, like other kinds of rhetorical practice, is 
based on a certain philosophical starting point. In the 
case of traditional homiletics, the philosophical starting 
point is Cartesian. Since the basis of the end of 
philosophical argument is a deconstruction of Descartes, 
homiletics based on Descartes is subject to the same 
criticisms as systematic philosophy. Schrag suggests "that 
when philosophy comes to its end, it becomes rhetoric."8
On the positive side, the end of philosophy results in 
a posture of hermeneutical retrieval: ". . . having to do
with the reclamation of a hermeneutical space that provides 
a new beginning."9 Schrag combines the hermeneutical space
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with praxis, "the imbeddedness of interpretation in the 
conversation and social practices of mankind,"10 to create 
a new rhetoric. Schrag then defines rhetoric as . . the 
interaction of self and other in dialogue and public 
encounter."11 I argue, therefore, that rhetoric within 
Schrag's hermeneutic space of communicative practice has the 
potential to give a new starting point for homiletics, a 
starting point not grounded in Cartesian certainty, 
sophistic rhetoric, or gnostic heresy.12 I do not, 
however, embrace the ontological claims of the so-called 
rhetoric of inquiry.13 My specific interest here is in the 
challenge to the Cartesian starting point, not a total 
abandoning of a possible objective reality.
In short, I appeal for a remarriage of homiletics to 
rhetoric, classical as well as contemporary. I say 
classical because rhetoric was the first love of homiletics. 
Aristotle and Cicero were essential to homiletics long 
before preaching went "whoring" after the illusive gods of 
philosophy. Concern for a return of homiletics to rhetoric 
is part of my attempted Augustinian synthesis. As Thomas 
Farrell reminds us, "Augustine loved rhetoric. . . ,"14
The superficial rhetoric of homiletics cannot be 
equated with the Aristotelian notion of "techne". Schrag 
maintains, "Far from being a simple routine guided by
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means-end coefficient, rhetoric as the art of persuasion was 
viewed as a collaborative and creative activity of 
deliberation and discourse against the backcloth of the 
common good of the polis."15 As Paul Ricoeur admonishes 
all who reflect upon the nature of rhetoric, "Rhetoric 
cannot become an empty and formal technique."16
That homiletics has suffered from its divorce from 
rhetoric, can perhaps best be demonstrated by a 
deconstruction of the classical model of preaching. Such a 
critique is justified by the obsolescence of the old 
rational homiletics. In the last century every aspect of 
homiletics--language, theology, and the liturgical context—  
has changed radically, yet the same model of topics, 
propositions, and points remains the central staple of the 
preacher. The rational Cartesian method of classical 
preaching no longer seems to fit the symbolism of Christian 
worship and scriptures. A new homiletic model is needed.
The question is how do we proceed with a deconstruction 
of homiletics? The choice of a critical tool has been 
influenced by the dominance in homiletical criticism of the 
study of "great preachers." The emphasis of scholars in the 
discipline of preaching has been on the history of great 
preachers. This approach has led to an inordinate number of 
personality studies focusing on biographical facts and 
psychology. Rod Hart in a critique of rhetorical
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scholarship (applicable to homiletics) insists, "Such a 
history becomes an intellectual version of People magazine 
and we, its readers, become voyeurs or worse yet, 
idolaters. "17
The overall nature of preaching has been overlooked or 
neglected by studies that concentrate on a few great 
preachers. Stereotypical conclusions have been drawn on 
entire generations of preachers. These generalizations, 
based upon small samples, ignore many possibilities.
Perhaps, as Michel Foucault argues, we have missed a whole 
universe of issues, situations, arguments, and discourses 
constituting the rhetorical experience of preaching.18
Preaching lives at least as much by the popular 
proclamation of ordinary people, "anonymous," away-from-the- 
spotlight preachers, leading ordinary religious lives, as by 
the "big-church" hero-preachers of the famous pulpits. From 
the viewpoint of Foucault, we cannot ignore or dismiss the 
importance of ordinary examples of preaching.
There is, perhaps, no option more important for an 
understanding of preaching than reflection upon the ordinary 
ways of preaching practiced by thousands of unknown 
"reverends" in sweat-box country churches of thirty-two or 
more flavors. The paradigm for homiletic critique so far 
has been the extraordinary preachers--the gifted, the well-
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educated, the big-time stars. This approach will not 
suffice for interpreting preaching.
Therefore, the rhetoric-content of Foucault's work 
seems suited to a deconstruction of traditional homiletics. 
Foucault is a discourse analyst, an interpreter of the power 
of pervasive, anonymous discourses, especially of the 
complex relations between power and truth in all discourses.
Consider, for example, Michel Foucault's analyses of 
different discourses in our history: the discourses of 
penology, medicine, law, sexuality, madness, and reason, 
indeed the discourse on discourse itself in the modern 
development of disciplines and specialization.19 What 
these analyses show is that every discourse bears within 
itself the anonymous and repressed actuality of highly 
particular arrangements of power and knowledge. Every 
discourse, by operating under certain assumptions, 
necessarily excludes other assumptions. Above all, our 
discourses exclude those others who might disrupt the 
established hierarchies or challenge the prevailing hegemony 
of power.
Foucault's elaboration of what he terms an "episteme" 
or "discursive formation" specifies units that are 
applicable to the criticism of a given culture or 
institution. Those units are: discursive practices, rules, 
roles, power, and knowledge. Since these units are
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characteristic of a social institution such as the church, 
and since preaching exists primarily within the context of 
the church, Foucault's theory opens the possibility for a 
critique of traditional homiletics within a different 
framework than is typical of preaching histories. Fou­
cault's concepts of discourse as an event and rhetoric as 
epistemic also offer an opening for a rhetorical model for 
preaching that gives a major role to metaphor.
The Theoretical Units of Foucault
The relevance of Foucault to problems in rhetoric has 
been demonstrated by a number of scholars. Foss and Gill 
use Foucault's notion of the discursive formation as a basic 
tool for construction of a middle-level theory of an 
epistemic rhetoric.20 Their model is adapted for use in my 
critique of the classical homiletical model.
Martha Cooper suggests that Foucault's archaeological 
theory of discourse conforms to the outlines of an 
interpretive rhetorical criticism.21 In a subsequent work 
Cooper expands upon Foucault's theories of the eventfulness 
of discourse and the incorporeal nature of discourse.22 
Gaonkar contends that Foucault's work is applicable to 
contemporary studies of argument.23 Foss, Foss, and Trapp 
devote a full chapter to Foucault in their Contemporary 
Perspectives on Rhetoric.24
My point here is that since homiletics is a type of 
rhetoric, Foucault's theory of discourse has the same 
relevance for homiletics as it does for rhetorical practice 
in general. The church, in which preaching usually takes 
place, is a social institution, is a part of culture, and in 
some cases it has been difficult to distinguish church from 
culture. (The culture of the South and the Protestant 
churches of the South come to mind.) The church as 
discussed throughout this chapter is the church/churches of 
the South, in particular the Southern Baptists and the 
United Methodists.25
Toward that end, I propose to focus upon the church and 
churchly discursive formations. My approach rests upon the 
conviction that the liturgical event, as a whole, with all 
its constitutive elements, is an event. It both does and 
says something. As such the worship event of a Christian 
church with its verbal elements of praying, singing, reading 
Scriptures, and preaching, along with its powerful nonverbal 
rituals, practices, and symbols, constitutes a discursive 
formation. When the backdrop of southern culture, so much a 
part of the church in the South, is added, there is a 
mixture of symbols; i.e., the cross of Christ is draped in 
magnolia blossoms and the dying Christ asks for grits and 
gin rather than water.
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The Episteme (Discursive Formation)
An episteme is "the total set of relations that unite, 
at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise 
to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly 
formalized systems."26 It is the code of a culture that 
governs "its language, its schemas of perception, its 
exchanges, its techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its 
practices,"27 and it imposes on all branches of knowledge 
"the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a 
certain structure of thought that the men of a particular 
period cannot escape."28. An episteme is the sum total of 
the discourse of a particular period. Applied to 
homiletics, a discursive formation may be defined as the 
characteristic system, i.e., the church and all its related 
educational institutions, that defines the conditions for 
the possibility of knowledge. The episteme is the world 
view of a given Christian church. "It is a kind of period 
style for the organization of knowledge that functions 
automatically in the church."29
In The Archaeology of Knowledge. Foucault substitutes 
the term "discursive formation" for "episteme." The two 
terms can be used interchangeably. Discursive formation, 
however, further emphasizes the central role of discourse in 
the creation of knowledge. For Foucault, "all that about 
which it is possible to speak within any given discursive
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formation is called savior or knowledge."30 He describes 
his project as the "pure description of discursive 
events. "31
The discovery of discursive formations, according to 
Foucault, is called archaeological analysis. The goal of 
such analysis is to examine human experiences and/or 
institutions and cultures as particular domains of 
knowledge, exercises of power, and acting out of rules and 
roles. The basic material of archaeological analysis is the 
statement. The archaeological examination of statements 
explores the nature of discursive transformation: "Rather 
than refer to the living force of change . . . archaeology
seeks to establish the transformations that constitute 
'change'."32 So Foucault seeks to identify and isolate 
discursive formations based upon statements, rules, roles, 
and strategic functions. "For Foucault, then, knowledge and 
these discursive practices are inseparable. Everything 
about which we can speak in a discursive formation is 
knowledge; knowledge is generated by discursive 
practice. "33
For example, conservative leaders of the Southern 
Baptist Convention have been able to control the 
denomination through the creation of "knowledge of the 
inerrancy" of the Bible. That such an outmoded relic of 
Fundamentalist theology could count as knowledge in the
nation’s largest Protestant body is evidence of a particular 
discursive formation or closed institution in which only 
certain statements can be accepted as knowledge. A 
framework for acceptable knowledge has been constituted 
among Southern Baptists: pietistic Puritanism, revivalistic 
emotionalism, and narrow sectarianism. These are by no 
means the only tentpoles of Baptist faith and ecclesiology, 
but they now dominate the Southern Baptist Convention. 
Preaching that falls outside the prescribed rules and 
definitions of the present discursive formation is rejected 
as knowledge and labeled as heretical. Morris H. Chapman, 
SBC President, says he will not give up inerrancy 
requirements. "My commitment is to pursue the perpetuation 
of allegiance to the perfect word from the perfect God. My 
heart's desire is to encompass all who do believe in 
perpetuating allegiance to the perfect word."34
The application of Foucault's concept of the discursive 
formation to the history of preaching reveals tendencies of 
previous discursive formations to exert continuing influence 
on preaching in the twentieth century. Since only one 
episteme can be present at any one time, carry-over from one 
period to the next can take place only at superficial, 
imitative levels. Considering the voices of a given 
episteme as the authentic voices of that era suggests that 
the imitators of these voices are mere echoes.35 When the
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authentic, originating voices of a given discursive 
formation have departed, the Christian church still contends 
with the echoes. The imitators of a preceding episteme copy 
the methods, the structures, and the style of their 
predecessors.
Every Churchly discursive formation produces numerous 
echoes for every authentic voice. The result is an 
artificial imitation deserving the epitaph of sophistry in 
the best tradition of Plato. A brief survey of the 
discursive formations characteristic of Christian preaching 
since the Reformation illustrates the problem with echoes of 
previous epistemes.
The episteme of the sixteenth century, according to 
Foucault, was based on the idea of resemblance or 
similitude. For the Reformation Church, however, the 
episteme was the Word. The word of preaching constituted 
the foundation and origin of the church. Reformation 
preachers placed the Word over the images and symbols of the 
medieval church. Luther went so far as to insist that 
"there is a sacrament of the word."36 Proclamation assumed 
the mantle of superiority as icons and rituals were 
disregarded. The oral nature of preaching and the 
exposition of the Scripture were more important then any 
other aspect of church life. Yngve Brilioth, evaluating
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Luther, underscores the significance of the change wrought
by the Reformation:
To present the word in this way is a terrifying 
responsibility since this word according to Luther is 
quietly reverenced by the whole creation. No person, 
before or since, has so exalted the word, not only the 
written word, but the living word on the lips of the 
preacher.37
While the Reformers produced an almost magical 
conception of the word, the Seventeenth century witnessed 
echoes of an older episteme, that of the Medieval Age. "The 
resemblance between the Dominican 'art of preaching' and 
much of the methodology of the seventeenth century is in 
many respects striking.38 The deceptive echoes of the 
reformed tradition crystallized the form of the Word into a 
new legalism. A scribal emphasis upon words replaced the 
dynamic emphasis on the power of the word. The end result 
was Protestant formalism. The word became less living unity 
and more of an inexhaustible storehouse of proof texts. The 
exegetical technique became an exaggerated, virtuoso's 
juggling of passages. The expository context and the 
scrupulously organized sermon became a straitjacket in which 
the preacher slowly strangled on the meaning of every Greek 
word in forty-eight verses of scripture.
In the episteme of the nineteenth century, language 
became an object to be known. This episteme was concerned 
with "the analysis of meaning and signification. 1,39 In
the church, however, preaching reached a zenith of power.
The sweet prince of the pulpit became the favorite metaphor 
to describe the masters of religious discourse.40 These 
preachers turned the sermon into a literary production. The 
power of the church, however, was but an illusion. It was 
the calm before the storm. The attempted duplication of the 
nineteenth century preachers traps the church in a 
methodology no longer adequate. In the interpretative 
framework of Richard Harvey Brown, community and 
communication by the church is no longer possible in the 
current age of Modernity.41
In the current age of Modernity, human beings, in 
gaining supremacy over language, have replaced it as the 
organizing principle of knowledge. For the church this 
results in disastrous consequences. God is replaced by 
humans as the origin of life. Truth is no longer inspired 
of God. Language has no particular power. Prophecy is 
ended. Humans are in control but also out of control. The 
Church has responded with the method of the nineteenth 
century discursive formation. The once proud and mighty 
church seems blithely unaware that when the rules and roles 
and knowledge change the source of power also changes. My 
point is that the classical homiletics speaks from an 
authoritative role, one the church and her preachers no 
longer enjoy.
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Foucault's theory serves as a critical tool for 
analyzing and understanding the system in which religious 
discourse is produced and functions. That system is the 
church and its related institutions. From a Foucaultian 
perspective of the church we can better understand the 
discursive production of preaching and the kinds of 
knowledge it has produced.
Discursive Practices
By discursive practices Foucault means discourse that 
follows particular rules and is understood to be true in a 
given culture. Written and spoken discourse as well as non- 
discursive acts make up discursive practices. He includes 
as discursive practices in his own writings such phenomena 
as architectural forms, use of space, institutional 
practices, and social relations. In Discipline and Punish, 
for example, Foucault discusses the use of the architectural 
figure of the panopticon to induce particular effects on 
inmates.42 Rhetoric as symbolicity seems to me the 
equivalent of Foucault's discursive practices. The 
multiplicity of symbols and forms which constitute the 
church certainly appears to qualify the church as a 
discursive formation.
Within the church, discursive practices include 
architectural forms, use of space, ritual and symbolic
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practices, music, the reception of visitors, the image of 
the preacher, and the persuasive appeals built into the 
fabric of the worship event. All of these practices follow 
recognizable rules and count as knowledge in the public 
known as church.
The design elements of the church that make up 
discursive practices include the architecture of the church, 
both externally and internally. One such element is the 
actual shape of the buildings. Even a novice church 
observer soon learns to distinguish a charismatic fellowship 
with its pre-fab steel structure, brick facade, and glowing 
neon sign from the First United Methodist Church, Anywhere, 
U.S.A. From huge white columns, to high steeples, to 
stained-glass windows, to bronze crosses, the architecture 
of the church speaks of sacred ground, solemnity, grandness, 
and power. Often perched on a hill in the center of town, 
the church appears as the ruling entity. The First United 
Methodist Church of Shreveport, for example, sits on a hill 
at the head of Texas Avenue, presiding over a downtown area 
of dilapidated, closed businesses. Perhaps here is a 
metaphor of the church's problem: a king without subjects.
Inside the church, the pulpit constitutes a major 
mechanism of discourse. In Herman Melville's Moby Dick, 
there is a description of the pulpit that is a metaphor tor 
the reverence of the church. The pulpit was shaped like the
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prow of a ship. Of this Melville says, "What could be more 
full of meaning?--for the pulpit is ever this earth's 
foremost part; all the rest comes in its rear; the pulpit 
leads the world . . . Yes, the world's a ship on its passage 
out, and not a voyage complete; and the pulpit is its 
prow.1,43 This is the image of the pulpit designed for the 
homiletic method of the nineteenth century. As much as I 
want to affirm this image, the age of Modernity scoffs at 
such arrogance. A more fitting image would be Norman 
Rockwell's painting of the preacher putting up a sign that 
reads, "Lift up thine eyes." while a crowd of people walk 
by, heads down, ignoring the message of the church.44
The arrangement of the pews is another design element 
used in the church. A church designed as a lecture hall 
constitutes different discursive practices from a church in- 
the-round. The former is for educational purposes where the 
preacher is the authorized, recognized professor. The goal 
is to pass along information. The worshipers bring their 
Bibles and notepads to take notes on first century New 
Testament "trivia." A flat-minded literalism pervades the 
verse by verse exposition of the text.45 The worship event 
becomes almost exclusively a process of conveying 
information. The very arrangement of the pews thus supports 
an image of worshipers trapped in the straitjacket of 
literal language.
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On the other hand, the church-in-the-round projects the 
image of the stage where the preacher is the actor--the paid 
professional. The goal is to entertain a passive audience. 
The worshipers' involvement is at the critical level as they 
judge how the choir sounded and symbolically hold up cards 
numbered 1-10 to express their evaluation of the sermon.
Music is another important part of the church's 
worship. A choir, at times with professional soloists,
performs at Sunday worship. Music begins and completes the
worship event. The musical style identifies the discursive 
nature of a given church. The high church anthem built 
around an arrangement of Bach creates a far different 
impression than a jazzed up version of "On Jordan's Stormy 
Banks I Stand."
Various discursive practices can be seen in the images 
created by the professional staff of a church. The 
ministers often wear robes and use symbolic paraments which 
match the altar and pulpit paraments. The choir wears 
matching robes. Again, different churches project different 
images. A Southern Baptist seminary course in pastoral 
work, for example, stresses the importance of a particular
physical image for preachers. Ministers are encouraged to
wear conservative suits and ties, well-shined shoes, short 
hair, and no facial hair. The mercurial shifts of faces and 
fashions, along with controversial styles, are to be avoided
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as they give evidence of conformity to a secular culture.
The preacher, members of the staff, and other worship 
participants conduct themselves in a particular manner that 
suggests a certain solemn, dignified, humble person.
Another dominant feature of some contemporary Christian 
worship is the synthetic and thus inauthentic nature of many 
elements in the worship setting. Some churches have been 
influenced by the artificial environment and entertainment 
motif of the television evangelists. After watching the 
televised worship services of Jimmy Swaggart, Oral Roberts, 
Robert Schuller, and Jerry Falwell, I devised a composite of 
the synthetic image being projected: Red-White-and Blue 
spangled sets mixing the old-time religion with patriotism; 
clean, freshly scrubbed young men and women singing 
religiously erotic music, an endless parade of religious 
celebrities, and the stylishly tailored star preachers with 
dental caps and artfully styled coiffures.46 Their 
production of Jesus is that of a plastic Jesus, with no 
sense of reality. He is an antiseptic Jesus huckstered like 
cars and deodorant soaps. Robert Schuller, for example, 
replaces the doctrine of sin with the mild concept of "low 
self-esteem." The message is upbeat. Possibility for 
happiness, good fortune, and riches is offered along with 
the 800 numbers for phoning in donations. The whole 
production is a carefully planned event which omits any
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natural, spontaneous acts of worship which might otherwise 
occur.
Finally, the role worshipers are assigned in church 
constitutes a discursive practice. The congregation sits 
passively through the service, responding as programmed by 
years of ritual to speed through the Apostles Creed as if in 
pursuit of a spot in the Guiness Book of World Records; 
nothing is required of them. While the minister encourages 
participation, the actual involvement is limited to 
repetition of known prayers and singing of familiar hymns. 
Even the "Amen" is scheduled. One violates the programmed 
roles of worship only at the risk of personal embarrassment. 
As Carlyle Marney explains, "At Highland Park Methodist in 
Dallas, a little girl in a choir once when I was preaching 
forgot herself and said, 'Amen'. It was so devastating I 
don't think she came back all week."47
Rules
Rules, according to Foucault, are principles that 
govern a discursive formation. Mostly unconscious and 
difficult to articulate, rules determine the possibilities 
for the content and form of discourse: "the production of 
discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized, and 
redistributed according to a certain number of proce-
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dures."48 Foucault suggests three categories of rules that 
govern various aspects of the discursive formation.
One category of rules controls what can and cannot be 
talked about in the discursive formation. One example would 
be the lack of a concept of the injustice of slavery in the 
first century church. The New Testament includes 
admonitions for slaves to obey their masters,49 and St.
Paul's Epistle to Philemon urges a slave owner to take back 
his slave.50 Opposition to slavery was not known as a 
concept in the first century church. In a different way, 
opposition to slavery would not have been an object of 
discourse in Southern pulpits of the nineteenth century 
because the congregation would not have permitted such a 
concept.
A second category of rules determines who is allowed to 
speak in a discursive formation. The rules of the United 
Methodist Church, for example, are quite specific about who 
is and who is not allowed to speak. "An elder is an 
ordained minister who has met the requirements of paragraph 
424 and therefore has full authority for the ministry of 
Word, Sacrament, and Order. . . . "51 Only speakers
accepted as qualified may engage in the practice of 
preaching in the church. Again, these rules may be 
carefully spelled out by a church hierarchy, or on the other 
extreme, may be left to the discretion of individual
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churches. Preachers in the United Methodist Church, for 
example, must meet numerous conditions in order to serve as 
an elder of the church in full connection.52 The Board of 
Ordained Ministry is responsible to enforce these 
conditions.
There are also rules, usually unwritten, concerning the 
gestures, behaviors, language, delivery that are deemed 
appropriate for the preacher. Religious discourse in the 
Pentecostal church, for example, must be accompanied by an 
enthusiastic, emotional, loud delivery, if it is to be 
viewed as holy and thus legitimate for that role. In other 
churches, the sermon must be accompanied by the wearing of 
robes if it is to be considered legitimate for the role of 
the clergy person.
A third group of rules concerns the form that concepts 
and theories must assume to be accepted as knowledge in the 
discourse. "Such rules govern the arrangement of 
statements, style, and terminology used in discourse."53 
In the churchly discursive formation, for example, the use 
of obscene words would not be recognized as appropriate. 
Rules, therefore, deal with what is accepted as appropriate 
in the discursive formation. Even though these rules may 
appear vague, the rules determine what is appropriate to the 
very nature of an occasion, of a relationship, of an event, 
of the truth. Members of the discursive formation recognize
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the appropriateness of discourse when it is present, and are 
so aware of its absence that they may stomp out of the room 
to protest the insult. There is such a thing as appro­
priateness in Christian discourse, a method of communicating 
accepted as congenial to the nature of the churchly 
discursive formation.
Those who wish to speak in the church, for example, 
must produce certain types of statements and use certain 
forms before they will be heard. The infamous "holy whine" 
of frontier revivalists has persisted to the present in some 
Protestant churches, and can be attributed to the unwritten 
rule that a preacher must sound like a preacher. Southern 
Baptists are expected to give allegiance on four points 
according to Chapman: "Adam and Eve were real people. The
historical narratives of the Bible are accurate. Miracles 
of the Bible were supernatural events. The authors stated 
by all the books were the authors of the books."54
The worship of the church involves specific rituals 
that require those participating to engage in certain 
behaviors and convey a particular image. At a basic level, 
this point can be demonstrated by the look of confusion on 
the face of an evangelical Protestant attempting to worship 
in a high-church Episcopalian chapel. The behaviors appear 
odd, the language foreign, and the rituals complex. As 
Richard Brown asserts, " . . .  each group's world appears an
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impenetrable mystery to members of other groups, even to 
people of good will who are seeking to help or to form 
alliances.1,55
The place from which church discourse must originate 
makes up other conditions imposed on speakers. The pulpit 
is designated as the appropriate place from which to speak. 
In the United Methodist Church, the lay reader's pulpit is 
for reading the Scripture and making announcements, not for 
proclaiming the sermon. For preachers to speak while 
walking up and down the aisle of the sanctuary, for example, 
would not be appropriate in mainstream Christian churches. 
The congregation would think such a performer mad and would 
not accord him/her the status given to the preacher in the 
pulpit.
Often churches engage in vigorous debate over which 
terms will be recognized as valid and which will be invalid. 
Certain terms often become catch words for defining an 
entire denomination; "inerrancy" for the Baptists,
"pluralism" for the United Methodists. Baptists have a 
code-word for inerrancy--"Bible-believing preaching"--that 
suggests other churches do not really believe or preach the 
Bible.
Rules also govern the process of the generation of 
knowledge in that they allow only certain individuals to be 
involved in the formulation of concepts, theories, and
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general church resolutions. Theological discourses, for 
example, generally are not discourses to which everyone has 
access and in which everyone can generate new knowledge.
Only a duly elected representative of a United Methodist 
Conference, for example, may propose changes in the general 
church's policy on abortion. And these proposed changes can 
only be considered legitimate when the General Conference is 
in session. Rules are, without question, a major factor in 
the structure of the churchly discursive formation.
Rules concerning religious discourse have a historic 
succession within the church. The preaching legacy has been 
passed from generation to generation. The rules are 
prescribed in great detail concerning the art of preaching. 
As a result, a rational homiletic design evolved: an
introduction was followed by the text, which was reduced to 
a propositional topic, developed in a series of points 
(three being the favorite number), and concluded with a 
summary. Most homiletic texts contain these well-defined 
and oft-repeated rules.56 These rules produced the 
homiletic model based on certainty, propositions, and 
authority. The homiletic model contradicts the symbolic 
nature of the churchly discursive formation, as this 
Foucaultian analysis attempts to demonstrate.57 In these 
texts we see the emergence of a pattern that has contributed 
to the continued relative unimportance of metaphor:
76
rhetoric is a manual of style and metaphor becomes a 
stylistic device. The congregation, without being trained 
in homiletics, clearly understands the rules. These rules 
are carefully monitored and unconsciously followed.
Roles
The role of the preacher as rhetor and minister has 
changed in each succeeding episteme. The preacher has been 
perceived as everything from a royal herald to a prince of 
the pulpit. As already noted, such authority roles no 
longer accrue to the preacher, the person once known as the 
"parson. 1,58
Particular roles have been created for the preacher. 
These roles are constrained by the discursive practices and 
their rules. In the church, the discursive practices create 
a consistent role for preachers - one that is authoritative, 
moralistic, and dogmatic. Richard Brown argues that "Any 
person who claims a right to alter societal processes on 
behalf of others [this applies to preachers] thereby 
presupposes some talent or knowledge superior to that of the 
person he presumes to help."59 This very assumption, 
however, seems to turn clients into objects upon which the 
expert exercises his technique. Such an approach is 
arbitrary, dogmatic, and smacks of an autocratic system of 
control.
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The role that is established for the preacher by
traditional homiletics can be a basic means of imposing and
maintaining relationships of domination. The nineteenth
century model of preaching clings to the theological
rationality of the Middle Ages which served cognitive and
political requirements of a transnational clerisy that
monopolized literacy and revelation.60
Traditional roles for the preacher have been
stereotyped to an inordinate degree. The preacher, however,
struggles with his/her role between two polarities: the
public and the private persona. Rod Hart has attempted to
make this point when commenting on politicians, but the
point is relevant to preachers as well. Hart argues that
politicians are best treated as public persons and not as
private individuals.
Rather than viewing the political leader as a small, 
independent actor playing rather nakedly on a large 
stage, we might conceive of an alternative metaphor. 
Indeed, since political actors are so heavily costumed 
and so expertly coached, natural, revealing, 
spontaneous speech is all but extinguished in them.
From a phenomenological perspective, politicians are, 
above all, public people. In that sense, they are not 
"persons" as the average voter is a person. Unlike the 
voter, they eat with elan and sleep strategically.
They feel pain bravely, and for all the voter knows, 
they do not make love. When angry they do not scream, 
they grimace. When happy they do not guffaw, they grin 
carefully.
As citizens, we invite politicians into our lives at 
only certain points during the day--often at 6:00 p.m. 
and 11:00 p.m.--and actively think about them only 
during certain months of the year--often, November.
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During the remainder of our waking hours, we 
concentrate upon the "real people," the private people, 
with whom we have daily commerce. What is being 
suggested, then, is that political figures are psychic 
projections that citizens create out of a very partial, 
perhaps undimensional, set of stimuli. Public people 
do not provide rounded-out psychological profiles of 
themselves. They occupy less space and time than do 
private persons and they permit us to see less of their 
emotional range than do our everyday associates. They 
gesture grandly and they pontificate vehemently, but 
because of their emotional and physical distance from 
us they never really attain fully human status, never 
ring completely true. . . .61
The role of the preacher is a public one. His or her 
congregation often has complex spiritualized expectations 
that make no room for the preacher as a real person. He or 
she represents God and must be pleasant, sanitized, holy, 
and humble.
In preaching, the minister projects this public 
persona. He or she is well organized and rational. He 
lives against the backdrop of a highly romanticized role, 
and in many cases, may be unaware that the minister's status 
in society may be as one without authority. Preacher and 
congregation may not note the incongruity between experience 
and the well-organized sermon. Life lacks the very things 
sermon method includes: order, coherence, clarity. "The
clearly wrought sermon seems to imply that truth is 
rational, consistent, and reducible to a limited number of 
points."62 The result is an aura of unreality that makes
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worship seem artificial and the preacher's role a holy 
masquerade.63
In one respect, Foucault's conception of roles diverges 
from the utilization of roles in the church. To Foucault, 
the individual rhetors in a discursive formation are 
unimportant.64 Instead, he sees rhetors simply as playing 
roles and filling vacant spaces in a discursive formation. 
Foucault's emphasis is on roles that receive power and 
position from discursive practices rather than individual 
qualities of individual rhetors. Foucault, then, is not 
interested in the individual gifts that enable a specific 
preacher to pastor a large congregation. In the church, 
however, the cult of the individual superstar assumes 
primacy. Churches are often built on the charisma of the 
preacher. The individual becomes more significant than the 
collective community of believers. Foucault's emphasis on 
the collective activity of a discursive formation needs a 
hearing in the modern church where individualism has 
superseded the corporateness of the church.
Knowledge and Power 
Finally, the knowledge/truth of the church that is 
produced by discursive practices, rules, and roles can be 
identified. The highest truth in the church resides in God, 
Scripture, tradition, and the church's interpreters. When
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truth is defined in such a way and the discursive practices 
create these elements of the definition, there is little 
room to question the knowledge of the discourse that is the 
church.
The discursive formation of the church possesses a 
power that controls the conduct of its members during 
worship. The printed order of worship discourages the 
congregation from thinking. All that is required is to 
follow the printed instructions: stand, sit, pray, sing, be
silent. The worship leaders follow predictable patterns 
Sunday after Sunday, and thus worshipers are controlled in 
unconscious ways. The power of the church is one of calling 
people back to the way life ought to be, even though that is 
not the way real life is. The power embodied in the system 
dictates acceptance of a rather simple view of life where 
Jesus has all the answers.
The church, then, is a powerful discursive system that 
has succeeded in creating a body of discourse that is 
accepted as truth by believers. It has also made people 
repress aspects of themselves and led them to not question 
what they normally would. It projects an image of a 
spiritual world far removed from the material world. The 
churchly discursive formation projects an arbitrary, 
dogmatic, and autocratic system of control reified in the 
traditional homiletic method.
81
This analysis of the church by means of the theory of 
Foucault presents a composite of the discursive formation 
responsible for the nineteenth century homiletic method.
The constant pressure to simplify, clarify and conceptualize 
has led to a radical denigration of the complexity of the 
search for truth. The restraints of the churchly episteme 
have saddled homiletic method with a number of 
methodological liabilities.
1. Failure to accept the basic rhetorical nature of 
preaching;
2. Failure to recognize the loss of authority since 
the church is no longer supported by infallible 
scriptural interpretation or the cultural ethos;
3. Failure to change a discursive style and language 
which divorces the preacher from the figurative and 
symbolic language of the Bible and from the 
everyday language of real persons;
4. Presupposing that the rational-scientific paradigm 
is ideally suited to preaching;
5. Exhibiting a reductionist approach to textual 
interpretations;
6. Failure to address the advent of a new discursive 
formation thus precipitating a crisis in 
methodology and language;
7. Failure to break loose from a three centuries old 
rationalist bind, with its attendant insistence 
upon Cartesian certainty, the original meaning 
illusion, and the literal truth paradigm.
I have attempted to question much of what preachers 
have often taken for granted in our study of homiletics. 
Also, I have examined the larger framework in which
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homiletical processes occur. There seems to be a direct 
relationship between the discursive formation of the church 
and the negative effects of it on the homiletical practices 
that occur within it.
According to Foucault's concept of discourse as event, 
preaching is seen as epistemic since it is a type of 
rhetoric--a malleable rhetoric influenced by the cultural, 
social milieu of which it is a part. Preaching creates 
rhetorically a version or versions of truth rather than 
disseminating pre-conceived absolute knowledge. This view 
of preaching as rhetorical practice opens the way for 
consideration for an epistemic role for metaphor; and 
development of a rhetorical/metaphorical model of preaching. 
Now I can say what I have only hinted at previously:
Rhetoric provides the foundation, the boundaries, and the 
methodology for the discipline of homiletics.
What is needed is the ability to imagine an alternative 
method as well as the invention of an alternative model for 
preaching. As preachers we are concerned with preaching 
Jesus here and now. Preaching, as an event, means relating 
the Gospel to a particular social mind in a particular place 
and time. I have attempted to demonstrate that the churchly 
discursive formation, with its attendant nineteenth century 
homiletic method, cannot communicate the gospel in late 
twentieth century America. Now our task is the discovery of
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a method and a language, contradistinctive of the rational 
paradigm, with which to preach. Therefore, in the next 
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CHAPTER THREE
THE RHETORIC/HOMILETICS RELATIONSHIP 
In the last chapter I utilized the rhetorical theory of 
Michel Foucault to deconstruct the classical homiletic 
model. At least part of my purpose was to demonstrate the 
need of homiletics for a rhetorical base. One of the 
assumptions of this study is that a symbiotic relationship 
exists between rhetoric and homiletics. This implies that 
there are qualities in virtue of which the two concepts are 
related. Yet in spite of what seems to be an obvious 
relationship, the rhetoric/homiletics mixture has, from the 
first, been at best an uneasy alliance, and at worst, an 
open antagonism. On the one hand, homileticians have 
considered rhetoric as an unnecessary, pagan art, while at 
the same time studying rhetoric and utilizing rhetoric in 
homiletical handbooks. Rhetoricians have, on the other 
hand, devoted extensive studies to preaching; studies which 
have contributed to a better understanding of the rhetorical 
nature of preaching. To explain the rhetoric-homiletics 
relationship I will examine the historical interaction of 
the two disciplines. To do so is practical as well as 
theoretical. For example, any homiletics proposing a 
dependence upon rhetorical theory will have to attempt an
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amelioration of any differences and attitudes presently 
separating rhetoric and homiletics.
As a prerequisite to formulating a rhetorical 
homiletics, at least two issues must be resolved. The first 
issue concerns the historical relationship between rhetoric 
and homiletics. This issue will be addressed by a review of 
the paradoxical treatment of rhetoric by Christian 
preachers. The second issue, conscious of the classical 
roots of the antipathy of homiletics toward rhetoric, 
concerns sources for a more positive view of rhetoric in 
homiletics. In arguing for what I consider to be the proper 
relationship between rhetoric and homiletics, I believe the 
potential for rhetorical/homiletical synthesis will have the 
necessary historical antecedents. Therefore, the first 
question posed in the introduction, "What is the nature of 
the relationship between rhetoric and homiletics?," is 
probably the most essential question requiring attention.
Fictions and Misuse of Rhetoric in Homiletics
Among those familiar with the history of homiletics 
there exists an extensive tradition of treating rhetoric as 
a "devil" term. As far back as St. Paul there exists among 
preachers a basic mistrust of rhetoric. "And my speech and 
my message was not in the plausible words of [human] wisdom, 
but in demonstration of the Spirit and power."1 In the
92
Christian literature of the first five centuries numerous 
theologians and preachers extended Paul's negative 
assessment of rhetoric. Cyprian, a teacher of rhetoric 
prior to his conversion to Christianity, renounced all pagan 
literature and rhetoric. Titian attacked rhetoric in 
particular: "You have invented rhetoric for injustice and 
calumny. . . .1,2
From this initial negative assessment of rhetoric, at 
least four fictions concerning rhetoric have gained 
credibility in the discipline of homiletics. These fictions 
parallel misapprehensions of rhetoric common in Western 
thought. Rhetoric, like preaching, has always played to 
poor reviews.
From Plato's insistence that rhetoric is not a true art 
to conceptions of rhetoric as "artificial eloquence, 
embellishment, ornament, and elaboration in language and 
literary style," rhetoric has suffered from reductiveness, 
fragmentation, and misapplication. Preachers, finding in 
rhetoric a convenient scapegoat for packaging their anti- 
pagan culture attitudes, have attacked rhetoric perhaps even 
more vehemently than other critics.
First, rhetoric, according to many homileticians, is a 
pagan art which defiles the gospel of Jesus Christ. 
Tertullian has a famous passage representative of this view: 
"What concord is there between the Academy and the church?
What between heretics and Christians?"3 Those who like 
Tertullian continue to treat rhetoric as a "devil" term are 
not likely to grant rhetoric a significant place in modern 
homiletics. In colonial America, the Puritan preacher 
Cotton Mather advised young ministers to avoid "squandering 
away your time on the RHETORIC. . . . 1,4 The paradox is 
that the charge against rhetoric is made by persons trained 
in rhetoric. In Tertullian's day, many Christian preachers 
were teachers of rhetoric prior to their conversion. In 
Mather's Puritan America, the study of Petrus Ramus was 
required of all ministers.
Second, rhetoric, it is argued, deals with style and 
ornamental language whereas preaching deals with the simple 
truth of Jesus Christ. Cyprian speaks for this view as 
early as the third century: ". . . i n  speaking of the Lord 
God, a pure simplicity of expression (vocis pura sinceritas 
non eloquentiae) which is convincing depends upon the 
substance of the argument rather than upon the forcefulness 
of eloquence."5
In the ensuing history of preaching many critics have 
sounded the trumpet for the "simple gospel." Savonarola, 
arguing against the popular rhetoric of Friar Mariano, says, 
"These verbal elegances and ornaments will have to give way 
to sound doctrine simply preached."6 The dramatic thrust 
was given to the simple Gospel by what William Muehl calls
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the "vulgarized Reformation.1,7 Luther's and Calvin's 
insistence on simplicity became perverted into a radical 
denigration of the complexity of the truth, an elimination 
of mystery from life, a loss of creative energies, and 
later, a "literal-truth" paradigm of expository preaching by 
conservative Christians.
Reinhold Niebuhr asserts that "the judgment of God is 
always partly revealed in the effect of the structure of 
reality upon the vitalities of history which defy that 
structure."8 Applied to preaching, this means that the 
imposition of the fiction of simplicity imposed upon 
homiletics a reductionistic, arbitrary structure from which 
it has yet to escape. In the twentieth century, the most 
anti-rhetorical of all preachers, Karl Barth, deprecates the 
value of rhetoric and insists upon the virtues of 
simplicity.
Nor are we required to display the truth of God in an 
artistic form by the use of vain images or by 
presenting Jesus Christ in outpourings of sentimental 
eloquence. When Paul told the Galatians that he had 
portrayed before their eyes Jesus Christ crucified, he 
was not referring to speeches in which he had used 
every device of artistry to capture the imagination of 
his hearers. For him, to portray Christ was to show 
him forth in plain truth without embellishments.9
The attempt to reduce Christianity and Christian
proclamation to a "simple Gospel" has exercised a
debilitating influence on homiletics. Rooted in the
mistrust of Rhetoric by early Church Fathers and cultivated
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by the "Vulgarized Reformation," the "simple Gospel" fiction 
has been a force in the "anti-intellectualism" of American 
revivalism as well as the arbitrary theology of Funda­
mentalism and the neo-Pentecostal movement.
Third, parallel with the association of rhetoric with 
ornamentation and preaching with "simple truth" is the 
assertion that rhetoric is appearance and not reality. For 
example, John Calvin insists that in preaching there should 
be "nothing for appearance . . . everything . . . for
substantial reality."10 Fred Craddock, discussing the 
current state of preaching, complains that "We are still 
haunted by the ancient fear that . . . attention to artistic 
form, compromises truth and morality.1111 Further,
Craddock argues that the fiction of appearance only in 
rhetoric prescribes that attention to rhetorical matters 
"shall be in inverse ratio to the importance of the subject 
matter;" "that content and form are separate 
considerations," i.e., content is essential and form is 
accessory; and "that style is at best unnecessary embroidery 
upon the truth and at worst subversion of it."12
Fourth, homiletics, it is implied, is a spiritual art 
with different intentions, motives, and methods from 
rhetoric. In other words, homiletics is not rhetoric. Most 
homiletics textbooks define preaching as different from 
other kinds of public speaking. Several scholars in the
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discipline of homiletics have taken the position of Yngve 
Brilioth that rhetoric is a secondary cultural motif. "In 
our frame of reference," Brilioth asserts, "rhetoric has a 
poor connotation."13
The homiletical textbook which has set the standard for 
subsequent works is that of John A. Broadus, On the 
Preparation and Delivery of Sermons. Broadus, despite his 
respect for the use of rhetorical theory, provides warnings 
against rhetoric that remain an essential part of the 
homiletical tradition: "Attention must be called to the fact 
that in the adoption of rhetorical methods all was not 
gain." Broadus delineates three dangers of rhetoric for the 
preacher: 1) overemphasis on rules and forms (ironically 
this is a criticism of most homiletics textbooks),
2) imitation, and 3) artificiality.14 James Earl Massey 
contends, " . . .  the sermon is quite unlike other speech 
forms in terms of its motive, setting, spirit, and 
substance.1,15
Other homiletic texts consider rhetoric in less than 
positive ways. For example, H. C. Brown, Jr. has a 
truncated definition of rhetoric that is implied in many 
homiletics: "The accent has fallen loud and clear on the 
view that rhetoric or form is the chief element in 
preaching. Preaching never has been, is not now, and never 
will be a one-dimensional emphasis on rhetoric or form."16
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At best rhetoric is perceived as only one of the many 
influences on the development of the sermon.
The discussion of the relationship between rhetoric and 
homiletics reveals confusion concerning the proper role of 
rhetoric, the definition of rhetoric, and whether or not 
rhetoric can be equated with homiletics. From the vantage 
point of the above perspectives, it is my contention that 
the four fictions concerning the nature of rhetoric must be 
systematically challenged.
Since we are the inheritors of the preaching legacy of 
each preceding age, it seems imperative that the attempt to 
establish a more positive role for rhetoric (and by 
implication, for metaphor) should be grounded in the 
classical tradition which first produced the complex 
relationship between rhetoric and homiletics. James J. 
Murphy has written at length of the Christian dilemma over 
rhetoric in the fourth century. "The basic issue was 
whether the church should adopt in toto the contemporary 
culture which Rome had taken over from Greece. The fate of 
Rhetoric was involved . . . 1,17 Was the Hebraic to be 
subjugated to the Hellenic? Murphy surveys the literature 
of the early church and documents its ambiguous attitude 
toward rhetoric. He also contends that Augustine wrote the 
De Doctrina Christiana, not only as a rejection of the 
Second Sophistic, but also to "urge the union of both matter
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and form in Christian preaching.18 Augustine, according to 
Murphy, was attacking the rhetorical heresy "that the man 
possessed of truth will ipso facto be able to communicate 
the truth to others."19 An intriguing comparison is made 
by Murphy between Plato and the ecclesiastical writers of 
the fourth century. While acknowledging that Christian 
writers did not look to Gorqias for a theory of 
communication, Murphy does argue that they did adopt a 
parallel attitude toward rhetoric, an attitude he dubs the 
"Platonic rhetorical heresy."20
Murphy agrees with the scholarly consensus that Plato 
was no friend of rhetoric. In fact, Plato's attitude toward 
rhetoric can be considered the historical breeding grounds 
for the four fictions described earlier. I believe, 
however, that Plato produced a much higher concept of 
rhetoric than that allowed by Murphy. This theory of 
rhetoric appears in the Phaedrus, and has been defended by 
Richard Weaver and James W. Hikins.21
Overcoming the Platonic Rhetorical Heresy
Agreeing with Weaver, I assume that the Phaedrus 
". . . is consistently, and from beginning to end, about one 
thing, which is the nature of rhetoric."22 Weaver argues 
that the Socratic dialogue is an example of transcendence, 
and that calls for the use of metaphor and the analogical
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mode. In addition, he cautions readers against a literal
reading of the Phaedrus; a warning that he deduces from the
myth of Boreas and Oreithyia mentioned by Phaedrus.
Phaedrus: "I haven't noticed it. But 
seriously, Socrates, do you believe this 
legend?"
Socrates: " . . .  though I find such 
explanations very attractive, Phaedrus, 
they are too ingenious and laboured, it 
seems to me, and I don't altogether envy 
the man who devotes himself to this sort 
of work. . . ."23
Socrates dismisses the question of Phaedrus as 
irrelevant. According to Weaver, "It is a limitation to 
suppose that the truth of the story lies in its 
historicity."24 For students of homiletics, the suggestion 
that the search for the "literal truth" is irrelevant, will 
be of significance later in this proposal. For now, it is 
enough to note Socrates is satisfied with the parable, "and 
we infer from numerous other passages that he believed some 
things are best told by parable and some perhaps 
discoverable only by parable. Real investigation goes 
forward by analogy. 1125 Thus early on, there is an 
admission by Plato of the utility of rhetoric.
The dialogue proceeds with three speeches: the non­
lover, the evil lover, and the noble lover. The first 
speech, in praise of the non-lover, is symbolic of neuter 
discourse. In homiletics, this would be the rational-
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deductive model that dominates most theories of preaching. 
The language is literal and prosaic and maintains point-by- 
point contact with objective reality. Also, this is the 
language of prudence which does not excite public opinion: 
"It is a circumspect kind of [language], which is preferred 
by all men who wish to do well in the world and avoid 
tempestuous courses."26 Therefore, I think it safe to 
assume that Plato condemns neuter discourse.
I have compared the detachment of such literal language 
to the dominant homiletical model. In practical terms, such 
language from the pulpit reveals an ambivalence toward the 
biblical criticism that has uncovered the literary nature of 
the Bible--myths, fables, metaphors, stories, and 
narratives. Rather than formulating a homiletical model 
analogous to the literature and its form, preachers tend to 
perpetuate the old rational-deductive model in spite of the 
revolutionary theory modifications that have taken place in 
theological and biblical studies. What results is a "self- 
interested" rationalization by the preacher who claims his 
congregation could not handle the truth about biblical 
criticism. Plato's condemnation of such literal-language 
rhetoric is thus the first piece of evidence in a 
discounting of the so-called "Platonic rhetorical heresy."
The second major speech of the Phaedrus is delivered by 
Socrates in praise of the evil lover. The theme of the
speech centers on the point that the lover is an exploiter. 
By analogy, Plato condemns base rhetoric in the speech by 
Socrates. The evil lover represents a speaker exercising a 
mystic-dogmatic authority over the beloved. Persons who 
yield themselves to mystic-dogmatic authority enter into a 
dependency mode that emasculates them. Such authority is 
obeyed without question, and in a sense, those in authority 
play God with the lives of others. Examples of this kind of 
emotional manipulation occur in preaching, e.g., witness the 
demagoguery of Jim Bakker, Jimmy Swaggart, and other 
television preachers (although this type of rhetoric is not 
unique to media preachers or the twentieth century). Once 
again it is important to focus on Plato's rejection of 
rhetoric that never permits an honest examination of 
alternatives. As Weaver points out, the base rhetorician is 
of profound danger today " . . .  with his vastly augmented 
power of propagation," with provisions of "means of deluding 
which no ancient rhetor . . . could have imagined.27
The third speech, in praise of love, represents the 
noble speaker. Its theme is types of divine madness. A 
crucial argument in the speech occurs in the opening lines: 
"If it were true without qualification that madness is an 
evil, that would be all very well, but in fact, madness, 
provided it comes as the gift of heaven, is the channel by 
which we receive the greatest blessings."28 (I will return
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to these remarks in discussing preaching and the concept of 
"folly".) As Weaver suggests, "Mere sanity, which is of 
human origin, is inferior to that madness which is inspired 
by the gods and which is a condition for the highest kind of 
achievement."29 Prophecy and poetry fall within the realm 
of the inspiration of divine madness. The noble speaker, 
then, is possessed of creative love. C. S. Lewis, in The 
Four Loves, defines such agape as a gift-love, love which 
gives without asking for anything in return. Thus, the 
third speech celebrates the poet and the rhetorician, each 
of which "is trying to advance the borders of the 
imaginative world."30 There are elements of rhetoric, 
approved it seems by Plato, that are positive and essential 
to my proposed model; among these elements are passion, 
creativity, imagination, and transformation through 
figurative language.
The problem of rhetoric, as far as Plato was concerned 
in the Gorgias, was its inability to lead to truth. Plato 
maintains in the Phaedrus that truth needs rhetoric. In a 
personification of Rhetoric, Plato allows Rhetoric to speak: 
"I do not insist on ignorance of truth as an essential 
qualification for the would-be speaker; for what my advice 
is worth I suggest that he should acquire that knowledge 
before embarking on me. I do emphatically assert, however, 
that without my assistance the man who knows the truth will
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make no progress in the art of persuasion."31 And again:
"Come forward, noble creatures, and persuade Phaedrus, who
begets such lovely children, that unless he becomes an
adequate philosopher, he will never be an adequate speaker
either on any subject."32 Now, rhetoric, according to
Plato, consists of truth plus its imaginative presentation,
and this presentation makes use of metaphor. As Weaver
contends, "It is by bringing out these resemblances that the
good rhetorician leads those who listen in the direction of
what is good. In effect, he performs a cure of souls, by
giving impulse, chiefly through figuration, toward an ideal
good."33 The culmination of Plato's conception of rhetoric
comes in the conclusion of the Phaedrus:
Our whole previous discussion has proved that speeches, 
whether their aim is to instruct or to persuade, cannot 
be scientifically constructed, in so far as their 
nature allows of scientific treatment at all, unless 
the following conditions are fulfilled. In the first 
place a man must know the truth about any subject that 
he deals with, either in speech or writing; he must be 
able to define it generically, and having defined it to
divide it into its various specific kinds until he
reaches the limit of divisibility. Next, he must
analyze on the same principles the nature of soul, and
discover what type of speech is suitable for each type 
of soul. Finally, he must arrange and organize his 
speech accordingly, addressing a simple speech to a 
simple soul, but to those which are more complex 
something of greater complexity which embraces the 
whole range of tones.34
The picture, then, of the true rhetorician is that of a 
noble lover of good, who works though philosophical and 
analogical association. Sophistry is condemned while noble,
104
philosophical rhetoric is praised. Weaver applies a 
positive conclusion to Plato's portrayal when he says, "So 
rhetoric at its truest seeks to perfect men by showing them 
better versions of themselves. . . ."35 I contend 
homiletics will benefit from such a perspective of rhetoric.
Plato makes other contributions that, I believe, can be 
interpreted as having positive rhetorical value for 
homiletics. These contributions may be summarized as 
follows:
First, he shows that the speaker should know the truth 
of what he is going to say. In other words, the rhetorician 
must initially be a philosopher. Applied to homiletics, the 
preacher must first be a hermeneutician. "All the great 
arts need to be supplemented by philosophical chatter and 
daring speculation about the nature of things."36 Second, 
the rhetorician is like a physician--a "doctor of souls."37 
Third, the function of rhetoric is "to influence the soul." 
The central task, then, of the rhetorician is to match his 
speech with a particular kind of soul. For the preacher, 
there is here a hint of twentieth century studies in moral 
development. Of more significance, however, is Plato's 
insistence upon the rhetorician doing a life-time of 
homework; in the sense of studying human beings. Carlyle 
Marney, noted Baptist preacher, explains homework as:
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that decades-long process of inquiry, hat in hand 
. . . addressed to competent psychology, psychiatry, 
sociology, history, drama, art, daily affairs, 
interpreted by a growing Biblical memory, contemporary 
experience, theological acumen.38
Fourth, for Plato an oral rhetoric is to be preferred to the 
art of writing. Those who depend on writing will lose their 
memory, forfeit wisdom for a source of quantitative informa­
tion, and defeat the dynamic impact that only orality can 
bring to discourse. Writing, says Plato, is like a 
painting. Still-life is all you get as spontaneity and 
open-endness are forfeited. The value of oral communication 
has been recognized both by public speaking instructors and 
homiletics professors. For example, Clyde Fant's Preaching 
for Today, argues for an "oral manuscript." Fant pleads for 
what he defines as "incarnational preaching" which is 
neither culturally accommodative nor an uninterpreted 
biblicism.39 He seems to argue, in the end, for a free­
form sermon that at its best may overcome the impersonal 
written sermon manuscript, but at its worst may lack focus. 
In any event, Plato's passionate defense of the spoken word 
has relevance for preaching, especially in light of the 
potency of oral language described in Walter Ong's The 
Presence of the Word. Finally, the noble rhetorician, 
argues Plato, will seek to know the will of God. This gives 
an ethical base to rhetoric that has always been part of the 
preaching tradition. The ethos of the preacher, his/her
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character and credibility, is an important subject for 
homiletics.
Another perspective that suggests a positive role for 
rhetoric is to project Plato's Socrates as a rhetorician. 
Socrates' own kind of rhetoric involved a highly 
sophisticated semiotic machinery in which rhetoric plays a 
first-order role. His attack of rhetoric is itself a 
rhetorical strategy. In short, Socrates is a rhetorician. 
The analysis of Socrates' conversational patterns, however, 
has come under such headings as Method, Irony, Maieutic, 
Dialectic, or Dialogue. What seems to be overlooked is the 
obvious rhetorical nature of Socrates' methods.
One reason for the neglect of the rhetorical side of 
Socrates is tied with the prevailing fiction of rhetoric as 
mere embellishment. In other words, having accepted what 
appears as Socrates' rejection of all rhetoric, it has been 
assumed that Socrates himself could not possibly employ 
rhetorical techniques. I believe that this carte blanche 
acceptance of the Socratic status quo overlooks the 
rhetorical devices of Socrates. The protests of Socrates 
serve as a weapon of concealing his art; and that art is the 
art of rhetoric.
For example, Socrates frequently complains that he is 
not a good speaker. In Plato's Apology Socrates claims to 
be unable to produce "speeches finely tricked out with words
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and phrases, carefully arranged" (17B9-C1). By stressing 
his harmlessness, Socrates defuses the possible defenses of 
his listeners.
A second rhetorical strategy of Socrates is to appear 
as a person involved in a casual conversation rather than as 
a speech-maker. The strategy allows Socrates to reach a 
rhetorical goal despite what appears as a meandering conver­
sation. Socrates succeeds, it seems to me, in establishing 
a credible ethos by insinuating that the listener has 
nothing to fear, that Socrates has no manipulative, evil 
goals, that he is benevolent, can be trusted, that he 
desires only to help the listener achieve noble goals, and 
that his is the voice of truth. Socrates sets up his 
listeners and moves them slowly toward his own rhetorical 
goals.
The very existence of these goals marks Socrates as a 
rhetorician. "Socrates . . . was, in fact, aware of having 
a certain mission to accomplish and felt himself engaged in 
accomplishing it; and if he understood this mission as an 
attempt to make other people aware of how badly they needed 
to submit their behavior to radical change, it is likely 
that he realized both how difficult it is to convince other 
people that they behave in a radically improper way."40
What we discover here is a new rhetoric. Socrates 
rejects the long-winded speeches of the Sophists for a
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different approach: the indirect, the unassuming tone, the 
shorter speech, simple remarks, questions, and analogies. 
Socrates hammers away at the same message: "no danger, no 
suspicions, no need for being on guard."
The rhetoric of Socrates can be understood in terms of 
rhetorical means toward noble ends. Socrates attempts to 
establish a rhetorical or communicative atmosphere. He 
tries to establish a sense of relevance of intimacy, of 
confidence, of communication in depth. To accomplish these 
goals requires taking care to avoid what may be felt as 
disturbing, to concentrate only upon certain sides of the 
subject-matter, and to select what one has to say in order 
to give a coherent picture of the state of affairs.
In "The Rhetoric of Socrates," Livio Rossetti lists 
additional rhetorical devices employed by Socrates: 1) 
getting a bystander to open a conversation rather than 
opening it himself, or concealing himself under the mask of 
a third person who is said to be much less compliant when 
submitting a concept to careful analysis; 2 ) concentrating 
upon a question of detail; 3) giving the impression of 
abandoning a particular subject and of wishing to turn to 
quite another kind of question; 4) saying something without 
assuming the responsibility for having said it; 5) making 
extensive use of examples and analogies; 6 ) offering two 
obvious analogies before passing to a much more
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controversial one in order to elicit from the interlocutor 
the same answer to the third; and 7) contriving a pseudo- 
analogical inferential formula.41 Rossetti gives no 
example, but the rhetorical devices listed could be amply 
illustrated from passages of the Phaedrus.
The foregoing analysis can be summarized as follows: 
Socrates' rhetoric does exist, may be described in positive 
terms, plays an important role in the dialectic interaction, 
may be taken as the beginning of a new kind of rhetoric, and 
is strongly marked by a rhetoric of anti-rhetoric.
Rhetoric and Christian Origins
A second source for formulating a more positive role 
for rhetoric in homiletics is the Greek language. The New 
Testament documents were written in KOINE Greek. Two 
assumptions of biblical scholars have been that 1 ) the 
concept of the Christian faith is unique, and 2) the origin 
of Christian faith is neither in the Old Testament nor in 
Greek thought. With the first of these assumptions, I 
agree. However, the second assumption has been called into 
question from a variety of perspectives. For example, James 
L. Kinneavy has proposed an origin of the Christian concept 
of faith in classical rhetoric. His hypothesis is "that a 
substantial part of the concept of faith found in the New 
Testament can be found in the rhetorical concept of
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persuasion, which was a major meaning of the noun pistis 
(faith or persuasion) and the verb pisteuein (to believe) in 
the Greek language at the period the New Testament was 
written. 1,42 Kinneavy supports his hypothesis with three 
arguments:
1. The semantic concept. Persuasion and faith are 
similar semantically, and this establishes the 
potential of a mutual historical influence.
2. The social, linguistic, and educational background 
of the first century, A.D., when the New Testament 
books were written. Especially significant were 
the Greek language and the awareness of Greek 
rhetoric in Palestine.
3. An analysis of the 491 occurrences of pistis and 
its related cognates in their New Testament 
contexts.
Kinneavy could have strengthened his case with a study 
of pistis from the Theological Dictionary of the New 
Testament. For example, Rudolph Bultmann, in his analysis 
of pistis, in Volume VI of Kittel, points out "In particular 
a word (Enos , pripa, or Xoyoq) can be called pistos. also 
the qlossa (tongue), so that in philosophy the Xoyog (Plato, 
Tim. 49b), the tnoGeaig (Plato, Phaedrus, 207b), or the 
ano66i|ig, (Plato, Phaedrus 245c) is maxog or niaxr], and 
niaxtg can be combined with anoSGiKiKog( Aristotle's 
Rhetoric, II, 1, p. 1377b, 23 ).43 Bultmann goes on to say, 
"From a purely formal standpoint there is nothing very 
distinctive in the usage of the New Testament and early 
Christian writings as compared with Greek usage."44
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A more detailed study of pistis reveals parallels 
between rhetorical persuasion and Christian faith, n  10x05 
means trusting, reliable, or certain. By contrast, amaTog 
means unfaithful, distrustful, and unreliable (see Plato 
Phaedrus 245c--"untrustworthy speech"). riiaxig means 
confidence or trust. In so far as it contains an element of 
uncertainty, trust can be contrasted with knowledge, 
especially in Plato (See Resp. VI 511 d-e, where vor]aig 
(insight), Siavoia (understanding), niaxig (belief), and 
GiKaaicn (probability) are listed in their graded relation 
to aXr|0Gia (truth). Another meaning of luaxig can be 
conviction or certainty as in "trust in what is real." In 
Resp. VI, 505e, Plato speaks of nioxig povipog (firm 
belief). Also ruaxig became a catchword for those religions 
which engaged in propaganda. "This did not apply to 
Christianity alone. All missionary preaching demanded faith 
in the deity proclaimed by it."45 Preachers engaged in 
rhetoric designed to persuade people to trust in Christ. 
Faith thus can mean to be persuaded. The author of the New 
Testament Epistle to the Hebrews associates other rhetorical 
terms with maxig. "Now faith is the evidence of things not 
seen, the substance of things hoped for." (Hebrews 11:1, 
emphasis mine.)
Through his analysis of pistis, Kinneavy shows that the 
Christian faith is already a part of its Greek culture and
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Greek rhetoric. Of course, there are other significant 
rhetorical terms with New Testament parallels (not discussed 
by Kinneavy): Xoyog, E k k X t | o i c x ,  and K a i p o g  (Gorgias and the 
opportune time). For example, the A.oyo5 is the means of the 
niaxLg. The two concepts clearly belong together as 
interacting signs in the emergence of Christian thought.
Augustine's Relation to Rhetoric and Homiletics
Augustine stands in a dialectical relation to the 
rhetorical tradition of which he was part. In his 
background lie rhetorical studies and experience as a 
teacher of sophistic rhetoric. After his conversion to 
Christianity, Augustine sought to reconcile rhetoric and 
homiletics. The fourth book in the essay De Doctrina 
Christiana, considered in the history of preaching as the 
first homiletical text, is the classic work on the relation 
between rhetoric and preaching. While the first book 
articulates the relation between thing and sign, and the 
second and third books contain a summary of the principles 
of biblical interpretation, the fourth develops rules for 
the use of eloquence in preaching.
For Augustine there are reasons to incorporate rhetoric 
into preaching. The seemingly contradictory remarks about 
rhetoric which appear in De Doctrina can be attributed to 
Augustine's uneasiness about Christian spokespersons who
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viewed rhetoric as a pagan art. Still Augustine states 
clearly his belief in the usefulness of rhetoric. For 
example, in Book 2.40.60, (one of the two texts inspiring 
the present study) Augustine advises Christians to "despoil 
pagan thought of the gold of wisdom and the silver of 
eloquence, as by God's command the Hebrews despoiled the 
Egyptians."46 Augustine takes his own advice by despoiling 
the rhetoric of Cicero, particularly Orator, from which he 
borrows extensively. While Cicero is never mentioned by 
name, Augustine refers to him as "the master of Roman 
eloquence," (4.3.4); "those who thought to teach the art of 
rhetoric" (4.5.7): "a certain author," (4.10.24); "a certain 
eloquent man," (4.11.26); and "the author of Roman 
eloquence." (4.17.34). Some scholars have concluded from 
their reading of De Doctrina that Augustine opposed the 
study of rhetoric by the Christian preacher, but the 
consensus, with a few notable exceptions, is that Augustine 
produced a synthesis of rhetoric and preaching.47
Several scholars have defended the position that, for 
Augustine, rhetoric was a positive force in Christian 
preaching. For example, Floyd Anderson observes that 
Augustine "joins eloquence to wisdom, proclaims the value of 
secular and profane learning, and seeks to embrace both 
sacred truths and secular knowledge within the unified grasp 
of wisdom."48 Keith V. Erickson affirms this judgment by
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classifying De Doctrina as "a homiletic rhetoric" and "a 
neoclassical rhetoric designed to serve the Christian 
Paideria."49 Thus, Augustine argues that rhetoric is not 
secular paganism but a legitimate means by which the Gospel 
could be preached. In short, Augustine re-established 
Ciceronian rhetorical concepts, and should be viewed as the 
last of the classical rhetoricians. The argument is that 
while Augustine's Ciceronian rhetoric is well known by 
rhetorical scholars, homileticians have long since restored 
the separation between rhetoric and homiletics. The 
significance of De Doctrina for the present study lies, not 
in a summary of its well-known rhetorical rules, but in its 
ability to serve as a positive model for a new marriage of 
rhetoric and homiletics. As John H. Patton concludes, "In 
the final analysis, it is surely Augustine's lasting 
contribution that his treatment of exegesis and rhetoric 
supplies a valuable means of uniting content with form."50
Conclusions and Assessments 
I have examined the complex relationship between 
rhetoric and homiletics, giving special attention to 
representative preachers who have condemned rhetoric as a 
pagan art. There is evidence that this condemnation, dubbed 
the "Platonic Rhetorical heresy," has suffered from 
imprecise definitions of rhetoric. What seems condemned in
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homiletics is not so much rhetoric but sophistic rhetoric. 
Though homiletical textbooks are saturated with rhetorical 
principles and techniques, we have seen a long history of 
warnings against the use of rhetoric. The result has been a 
negative assessment of rhetoric, leading to a divorce 
between rhetoric and homiletics that still exists.
In an attempt to reclaim a positive role for rhetoric 
in homiletics, a return to two primary classical sources was 
undertaken. Since I believe the refusal of homiletics to 
come to grips with its basic rhetorical nature is deeply 
rooted in history, a new reading of Plato's Phaedrus was 
suggested. The result of this evaluation of the Phaedrus 
was the conclusion that while Plato did condemn sophistic 
rhetoric, he created a noble or philosophical rhetoric.
This philosophical rhetoric was shown to be a positive and 
ethical theory of speaking which can be applied to 
homiletics. The second classical source, Augustine's De 
Doctrina Christiana, took the argument one step further by 
suggesting, not only a positive value for rhetoric, but the 
union of rhetoric and homiletics.
The major conclusion of this historical prelude to a 
rhetorical homiletics is that preaching is rhetoric. This 
modest claim opens the door to a homiletics based on 
rhetorical principles. The way is now clear to utilize
116
rhetoric and metaphor as the bridge in a positive interface 
of rhetoric and preaching.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A RHETORIC OF HOMILETICS OR 
THE RHETORIC OF "FOLLY"
Based on the preceding application of Foucault's 
discursive formation in Chapter Two, and a positive 
attribution of the rhetoric/homiletic mix, I am now prepared 
to suggest a new rhetorical model for homiletics. The first 
step in the proposed process is the substitution of the 
philosophical starting point of the classical homiletics 
with a different starting point. Therefore, I have 
jettisoned Descartes and the rational certainty starting 
point for what I call "Christian humanism." My "Christian 
humanism" combines the humanistic studies of Ernesto Grassi 
with the Christian philosophy of proclamation exemplified in 
the writings of St. Paul. In both of these thinkers the 
notion of "folly" can be interpreted as the way of seeing 
the world that allows us to move beyond the rational 
paradigm.
In addition, A. Cheree Carlson suggests a "comic frame" 
as an option to the tragic interpretation of movements. She 
argues that the comic frame enables persons to transcend 
themselves by noting their own foibles. "The end of a 
movement from this perspective is to free society by 
creating a consciousness of the system as a system,
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revealing its inherent weaknesses, and preparing an aware 
populace to deal with them."1 Elements of the comic frame 
will be incorporated into my understanding of folly. I 
shall argue that 1 ) a comic movement requires a "spiritual 
element in its rhetoric, one emphasizing identification with 
humanity through some unifying force; and 2 ) a comic 
movement must assume that the individuals in the social 
order are inherently moral beings.2
There is ample precedent in the history of the Church 
for a rhetoric of folly. In the ritual irony of the 
medieval church, celebrations such as the Feast of Fools, 
Easter Humor, or the Feast of the Ass during which a carved 
donkey was carried in procession, indicate that church 
leaders recognized the need for the comic, i.e., the ability 
to laugh at themselves.3 M. M. Bakhtin notes that 
"Carnival celebrated temporary liberation from the 
prevailing truth and from the established order; it marked 
the suspension of all hierarchial rank, privileges, norms, 
and prohibitions. Carnival was the true feast of time, the 
feast of becoming, change, and renewal."4 What the Church 
considered "folly"--a pretension, a comedy to release 
tension once a year will now be interpreted in my evaluation 
of St. Paul and Grassi as the norm all the time. The 
function of folly in the medieval church, especially the 
ability to make the church laugh at its own foibles and
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uncertainties, and the inversion of class structure, is now 
the function of a rhetoric of folly.
Grassi's thesis is that rhetoric is at the basis 
of philosophy. "Rhetoric is identified, notes Donald 
Verene, "with the power" of language and human speech to 
generate a basis for human thought."5 This view of 
rhetoric contradicts Cartesian philosophy. Grassi counters 
the rational paradigm with a recovery of senses of language 
and thought. As Verene claims, "Grassi sees the humanist 
tradition and the ancient notions of metaphor, imagination, 
memory, and ingenuity as culminating in the thought of 
Giambattista Vico."6
Much of Grassi's thesis can be grasped by a cursory 
examination of Vico's central ideas. According to Vico 
certainty has nothing to do with politics, military science, 
medicine, jurisprudence, history, and religion. The formal 
logic approach of Descartes runs counter to nature in two 
ways: First, it deemphasizes the faculty of memory, and 
second, it ignores imagination. The result is a reduction 
of our genius for invention. In addition, Descartes rejects 
rhetoric as being beneath the level of philosophy, placing 
undue stress on pathos, and not possessing epistemic value. 
Vico disagrees with all of these criticisms and counters by 
insisting that rhetoric is rooted in a probability-based
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reality. Through rhetoric knowledge is created and we can 
communicate our ideas and impressions to others.7
Grassi's thesis asks us to choose Vico over Descartes 
as our philosophical starting point. From such a 
perspective we may be able to recover the power of the word 
as connected to and based in the creative imagination. 
"Creative imagination means the prophetic power of the word 
to ground thought in the real order."8 The fundamental 
power of the word is the metaphor. The ability of metaphor 
to make a beginning point for thought is thus deemed more 
fundamental than the logical power of the word.
The significance of Grassi's move to choose the 
humanities over science, the imagination over the rational 
paradigm, can be supported by numerous contemporary 
conceptions of rhetoric.9 For example, Henry Johnstone 
considers rhetoric the art of evocation. "A successful 
argument," according to Johnstone, "is intended to evoke, 
and does evoke, a response of a certain kind in the man to 
whom it is addressed."10 Michael Hyde and Craig Smith 
suggest that the primary function of rhetoric is ". . . t o
'make-known' meaning both in oneself and to others. Meaning 
is derived by a human being in and through the interpretive 
understanding of reality.1111 Robert Scott asks us to see 
rhetoric "more broadly as a human potentiality to understand 
the human condition.1,12 Walter R. Fisher offers his
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"narrative paradigm as an alternative to the rational world 
paradigm. ”13
The common thread in these conceptions of rhetoric is a 
shift from a Cartesian-based epistemology to a broader 
rhetorical space of probabilities and beliefs. I am not 
suggesting, however, that Christian belief should be 
disregarded. On the contrary, I ask that beliefs be 
rhetorically constructed and compete for their place in the 
"ongoing conversation" among all other beliefs, practices, 
and knowledge systems as part of the adventure of being-in-- 
the-world.
The Christian aspect of my "Christian humanism" can be 
represented in the word of St. Paul: "Has not God made 
foolish the wisdom of the world? For since, in the wisdom 
of God, the world did not know God through wisdom, it 
pleased God through the folly of what we preach to save 
those who believe."14 To connect the power of God with the 
weakness of a cross equates weakness as power and folly as 
wisdom. God, according to St. Paul, has made the wisdom of 
the world a folly. He means that Christianity involves a 
contradiction, what J. Kellenberger calls the "absolute 
paradox." The cross is a supreme paradox, an objective 
uncertainty of the greatest magnitude that is an absurdity 
to reason.15 As a result, the world is perishing with its 
wisdom.
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Folly, not the rational world paradigm, is the 
appropriate stance for the human world according to Grassi 
and St. Paul. As Grassi says, "To live in folly is the 
profound reason for existence.1,16 Thus the weight shifts 
from an epistemological notion of rationality to a broadened 
concept of praxis that encompasses not only the redirection 
of the course of modern times but a potential for our very 
survival.
Part of the stated purpose of my study concerns the 
rhetorician's and the preacher's goal of human survival. 
While such a construct sounds somewhat naive, I am more 
convinced than ever of the need for the effort. I do, 
however, feel obligated to insert a caveat. Any mention of 
humanism in a Christian context should not be equated with 
the social gospel of nineteenth century American Christian 
liberalism. Evil was considered, not a matter for individ­
uals, but a non-transcendental matter of institutions. Good 
(God) was constructed through social consensus. The social 
gospel became a liberal version of the simple gospel of the 
fundamentalists. According to Carlyle Marney, noted Baptist 
preacher, "The error of our nineteenth century liberalism 
was its use of human powers, human obligations, human 
concepts, and human work to produce an 'arrived-at' kingdom 
of God."17
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Notice, for example, the naive view of human nature:
"If the people were free, they would stop exploitation," 
says Walter Rauschenbusch.18 In the sermon, "The Social 
Problem, Our Problem," Rauschenbusch claims that his 
generation is solving the problem of poverty. 1,19 Does not 
this view of human nature require the illusion that humans 
could build a new society through education and moral 
persuasion? Are not nineteenth century liberals 
participants in a middle-class, American-dream optimism?
Perhaps the most damaging blow to nineteenth century 
liberalism was the loss of the doctrine of God.20 Nowhere 
were the footsteps of God heard. The nineteenth century 
liberals were unable to come to grips with God as creator; 
even the possibility of a transcendental being faded before 
the new physics, the new universe, the new glorification of 
man. The loss of the divine awaited a correction and a 
chastened humanism. By humanism I mean the willful turning 
away from preoccupation with knowledge we are not equipped 
to expand and the devoted acceptance of our place where we 
are, as we are, with the strength that is already in our 
hands, to be committed to the social, personal, and 
redemptive tasks that confront us.21
I suggest that the road to a chastened humanism that 
maintains connections to Christian theology is a "rhetoric 
of folly." I wish to juxtapose the views of Grassi and St.
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Paul concerning folly as a base for a rhetorical homiletics. 
The fact of their widely disparate ontological positions 
serves only to enhance the widespread acceptance of the 
common goal of survival among atheists and Christians.
The Concept of Folly According to St. Paul
A review of the original meaning of folly will 
establish its significance in the writings of St. Paul. The 
Greek word pcopia and cognates denote a physical or 
intellectual deficiency of persons in their conduct and 
actions. The word refers to dullness, stupidity, and sloth, 
but its main reference is to the intellectual life. Grassi 
asserts, "The word is usually used psychologically and 
mentally in a deprecatory manner. It refers to a general 
inferiority in thinking and behaving. By pwpia, man falls 
under a ruling power which confuses his mind and induces him 
to 'crazy' or 'insane' actions."22 According to Georg 
Bertram, "The word implies censure on man himself; his acts, 
his thoughts, counsels, and words are not as they should 
be."23 Examples of folly in classical Greek imply a kind 
of madness as well as an external control by a power which 
confuses individuals.
In the Greek Old Testament and the corresponding Hebrew 
originals, pcopia is used almost exclusively for the fool. 
However, in Deuteronomy 32:6 and Jeremiah 5:21, pwpia means
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not possessing a true knowledge of God. The folly of man is
seen as apostasy from God.
Philo uses the term as a criticism of all worldly 
wisdom. Man is ensnared in folly. He cannot escape by 
means of his own reason. There is here an echo of the 
pessimism of Greek philosophy.24 Philo addresses as a fool
the person who has no understanding of the world.25
In the writings of St. Paul, pcopia acquires a 
theological meaning. The theological background revolves 
around the death of Christ. Paul uses the term 
"crucifixion" most often in connection with pcopia. "To 
crucify" is a pregnant metaphor for the birth, life, death, 
and resurrection of Jesus Christ. "The preaching of Christ 
crucified cannot be done with the instruments of human 
wisdom because the X0705 rot axatpou (I Cor. 1:18) is 
regarded neither by the world nor by Christian believers as 
ao(j)ia t o d Koapoo"26
In his own work Paul came under the judgment of folly. 
According to Luke, the philosophers at Athens mocked him 
(Acts 17:18); Gallio regarded the dispute between Paul and 
the Jews as foolishness (Acts 18:25); Festus declared Paul 
to be out of his mind (Acts 26:24). The dispute could be 
interpreted as an example of the conflict between 
philosophical rationalism and religious irrationalism. 
Numerous texts, however, demonstrate that the Greek search
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for wisdom often resulted in theological conclusions. In 
the thought world of the first and second centuries A.D., in 
which an academic-peripatetic mixture formed the basis of 
general education, the interest in the afterlife is worth 
noting. Perhaps the polarities between Greek philosophical 
rationalism and supposed Christian irrationalism are not as 
severe as scholarly cliches indicate.
Paul gives pcopia a metaphorical and met amorphic 
function. The metaphorical character results from the 
transferring of the usual negative meaning of folly to a 
positive meaning. In I Corinthians 4:10, for example, Paul 
is proud to be "a fool for Christ's sake." The metamorphic 
transformation takes place with Paul's assigning to folly 
the meaning of true, original knowledge. "What is rejected 
as pcopia in the opinion of the Greek scholars is raised by 
Paul to the sign of true knowledge.1127 "The transvaluation 
of values in the Gospel is the basis of the use of the word 
group by Paul."28 An example of this transformation and 
transvaluation occurs in I Corinthians 1:11--"For the word 
of the cross is folly to those who are perishing, but to us 
who are being saved it is the power of God. . . . "
Preaching is depicted as foolishness, a certain kind of 
folly. As noted previously, homiletical methods have 
attempted to be the opposite of such folly. The perennial 
attempt to eliminate the folly of the cross from Christian
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faith appears in the very method used for the proclamation 
of the cross. In what sense, however, does preaching the 
word of the cross constitute folly? According to St. Paul, 
the word of the cross is diametrically opposed to human 
wisdom--the latter being condemned by that word of the 
cross. The issue for Paul is that the Jews demand a sign 
from above and the Greeks expect wisdom. What Paul offers 
each is the same: the word of the cross. Thus, the Jewish 
expectations of signs is met by the kerygma of the cross. 
The Jews get their sign, but where they demanded power, God 
has answered in weakness, and therefore, the word of the 
cross is a csKav&aXov. God with the cross is both folly and 
scandal.
The word of the cross to the Greeks is analogous to the 
word Paul offered the Jews. Since the Greeks search for 
wisdom, the Christian offers them wisdom--Christ and him 
crucified (I Cor. 1:23,24), but this wisdom is a reversal of 
what the Greeks expected. This is not wisdom; it is folly. 
God is thus a fool in human eyes (I Cor. 1:25). The Greeks 
get wisdom, but their expectation of wisdom is met in a way 
that paradoxically falls short of that expectation. Where 
worldly wisdom was expected, the foolish word of the cross 
is offered. The Greek search for wisdom has no categories 
for salvation effected by means of a despised cross.
132
Folly, according to Paul, is a complete reversal of 
human standards, expectations, and conventional wisdom.
There is, to use Paul Tournier's term, a "great 
reversal."29 The world's values are turned upside down 
since power now resides in weakness, and wisdom comes from 
folly. God's power is not demonstrated with forceful signs 
from above; it shows its strength in the word of a weak 
cross. God's wisdom is not displayed with scientific 
certainty or absolute dogmas; it shows its knowledge in the 
word of a foolish cross. Reversal of human values, of human 
ways of being-in-the-world, therefore constitutes the folly 
of Christianity.
In summary, the word about the cross as the power and 
wisdom of God is fundamentally critical for human knowledge 
and expectations; in this word an alternative rhetoric is 
offered as hope for survival. The rhetoric about God cannot 
be absolute. Any theological language faces a crisis by its 
own subject for discussion--God. Thus the preacher is shown 
to be what all claimers of knowledge turn out to be-- 
rhetoricians. What Herb Simons says of science is just as 
valid for homiletics: "Like rhetoric, [science] [or
homiletics] is rooted in unprovable belief and value 
premises; 'undetermined' rules; shackled by the constraints 
of language; inspired by personal passions and ambitions; 
made credible by stylistic devices; and strongly influenced
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by political, cultural, and marketplace factors."30 In a 
later article, Simons asserts, "Scientific theories are 
rhetorical constructions and their key terms are 
ineliminably metaphorical . . . scientists [and preachers] 
appear to be stuck with metaphor."31
The preacher possesses no absolute dogmas or certain 
proofs but tenuous metaphors suggestive of a whole new way 
of living. For him, truth is not a static point revealed 
through scriptural reading but an emerging interpretation. 
The preacher stands ready for constant revision of her 
images, aware that she may have to start from scratch time 
and again and that no amount of dogmatism permits her to get 
beyond probabilities and beliefs, i.e., rhetoric. When one 
preaches God, the message is always rhetorical in nature and 
content. Of such is the folly of the kingdom of God.
After all, what recourse is there for the preacher who 
knows himself/herself to be made of ambiguities and 
probabilities, who sees himself/herself as a collective 
consensus of reality, and yet who dares to speak for the 
love and the despair of the Christian folly? I think the 
choices are three. She may confine her voice to the 
monotone of the nineteenth century rational methods, and so 
alienate herself from the world. Or she may choose what 
George Steiner called "the suicidal rhetoric of silence," in 
the tradition of Dietrich Bonhoeffer.32 As a Nazi prisoner
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during World War II, he preached to his fellow prisoners, 
but on the morning of his execution, said his prayers and 
went silently to his death.33 Or she may choose the folly 
of St. Paul and the title, "fool for Christ's sake." In 
what respect, however, can St. Paul's concept of folly have 
commonalities with Ernesto Grassi's concept of folly? To 
attempt an answer, I will survey Grassi's theory of folly.
The Concept of Folly According to 
Ernesto Grassi
In Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric, Karen A. Foss 
describes Grassi's understanding of folly as "the basic 
process of inqenium, which allows the human world to emerge 
. . . Only in the framework of folly--and not in rational 
thought--do the meanings of history reveal themselves."34 
There is, however, more to Grassi's concern for the "problem 
of folly" than this summary view. This section illustrates 
how a fuller understanding of the role of folly helps 
explain Grassi's concerns about the dominance of the 
scientific-rational paradigm in Western culture. The 
explication of Grassi's views will focus on a brief review 
of Grassi's concepts of rhetoric, ingenium, and metaphor, 




Simply put, Grassi argues that rhetorical speech is the 
primary and original form of speech. Rhetoric, in Grassi's 
view, is tied to the act wherein the premises of thought are 
created. "It is this original, prophetic sense of the word, 
the word that connects the world to a transcendent order of 
reality that is at the basis of rhetoric . . . "35 Rhetoric 
is not a mere act of persuasion, a language of the emotions, 
or a way of communicating truth established by logical 
thought. Rhetoric connects with imaginative speech and 
ingenuity to disclose the reality signified in terms of 
constantly new situations.
Rhetoric is essential to philosophy. For one thing, 
rhetoric is the first step in the process of philosophical 
thought. Or to put it another way, "Rhetoric is the first 
and primordial form of thought from which philosophy 
flows."36 Rhetoric involves dialogue, metaphor, 
imagination, and ingenium.
In "Why Rhetoric Is Philosophy," Grassi insists that 
philosophizing can only be rhetorical. Using the metaphor 
of the "game" Grassi builds on the ideas that language is a 
game, that language does not occur for the determination of 
beings, and that authentic language is pure word-play. The 
games we play with language have three essential 
characteristics: 1 ) subjectivity, 2 ) possibility of winning
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or losing, and 3) matches reveal the possibilities of the 
players as well as their personality and passions.37
Why do we play the game? "The stake we are playing for 
is our world."30 We play as actors and spectators in an 
uninterrupted game which reveals the metaphorical nature of 
reality. Grassi's metaphor of the game is relevant to the 
concern for survival. "Having identified rational language 
as the preeminent language--as happens in the Western world- 
-and having played our era by means of it, we have lost and 
we are still losing the 'match' of the Western world. Our 
hope for winning (i.e., surviving) is in the 'vulgar' 
language of rhetoric . . . because it is by means of it that 
we 'uncover' the various worlds . . . "39 At stake is our 
own kosmos.
Grassi's concept of rhetoric has its detractors. One 
more or less representative attack of Grassi's rhetoric 
helps illustrate the tenuous nature of rhetoric's invitation 
to the academic party. The case in point is Thomas B. 
Farrell's "Rhetorical Resemblance: Paradoxes of a Practical 
Art."40 Farrell argues that Grassi attempts to do away 
with rational speech. "Where rational speech has failed 
. . . we must now have recourse to a privileged speech of
the muses, a mythic speech of pure emotion, a speech that 
points us toward primordial truth itself."41 Rhetoric is 
reduced to a privileged language of inspired passion.
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While Farrell admits there is some merit in Grassi's 
rendering, he insists that Grassi's expressivist, mythical 
speech cannot be the foundation of society. As Farrell 
counters:
But what cannot be countenanced is the subordination 
of all these issues to a privileged aesthetic of 
expression--a vision that runs counter to the very 
thinkers it invokes as authorities, a vision that 
entices us to abandon reflection itself. The impulse, 
such as it is, should be resisted.42
I believe Farrell overstates Grassi's attack on the 
impotence of rational language. It would be inappropriate 
to associate the visionary language of the muses with 
irrationality or mysticism. Grassi's interpretations 
indicate that the origins of rational speech lie in semantic 
speech, that rational knowledge results from insight into 
the non-rational character of archaic principles, not that 
rational speech should be excluded from culture. What is 
offered is a correction to overdependence on the rational 
paradigm and the unceremonious ouster of rhetoric from the 
house of respectable disciplines. Rhetoric, as queen of the 
sciences, simply wants to reclaim her place at the table in 
the kingdom. Rhetoric has not, as Farrell suggests, gone 
begging, like ancient King Saul of Israel, to the cave of 
Endor's witch, desperately searching for a mystical speech 
as key to finding again the tree of knowledge.
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In short, Farrell's argument rests upon a restatement
of Cartesian dualism, as if one must choose rhetoric over
reason or vice versa. Grassi reminds us that St. Augustine,
in De Trinitate for example, draws attention to the
limitations of reason:
It is impossible for human beings either to search for 
what he knows because that he knows already and no 
further search is necessary; nor can he search for what 
he does not know because he does not know what to 
search for (80e 2).
Grassi is not opposing the realms of cognition and pathos
but is attempting to show their unity. He speaks for a
sense of historical order: first comes rhetorical speech,
then rational speech. In either event, both modes of
speaking are experienced as the content of a faith (pistis).
Ingenium
Along with the rest of the Humanistic tradition, 
ingenium has been rejected in scientific and philosophical 
disciplines. Usually ingenium is interpreted solely as an 
artistic and literary faculty or as a "psychological 
concept."43 For Grassi, however, ingenium plays a central 
role as the inventive power in the creative shaping of the 
world. "Ingenium, in other words, refers to a basic 
capacity to grasp what is common or similar in things--to 
see relationships or make connections."44 Common synonyms 
for ingenium are ingenuity, mental cleverness, wit, or
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insight. Yet it is much more than a mere mental feat; it is 
a way of knowing that Grassi describes as a "grasping.1145
Foss summarizes ingenium as the key term embodying the 
"process by which humans move from the natural realm to the 
human one . . . Ingenium allows humans to deal with the 
changing situations of nature and thus make the transference 
from the world of senses to the world of intellect and 
interpretation."46 In short, ingenium's task is to 
decipher the world in order to discover reality. In the 
discovery of reality, ingenium becomes, for Grassi, the 
origin of community.
I believe there is a strong link between ingenium and 
Peter Berger's concept of ecstasy ( EKcruaaig ).47 The 
experience of ecstasy involves the risk of stepping outside 
the taken-for-granted rules. There is an element of risk in 
the attempt to grasp, to find, to know, to get outside the 
status quo. Perhaps Berger is on target: "Acting out the 
social drama we keep pretending that these precarious 
conventions are eternal verities."48 Ingenium and ecstasy 
can act in concert to help the preacher gain a perspective 
on his/her perspective.
Grassi, working from his profession of atheism, 
describes Being as the original force in nature, or that 
which makes the demands to which humans must respond. Only 
through language and the process of ingenium can humans
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confront Being. I, in contrast, operate from a confession 
of faith: "In beginning was the Word and the Word was God 
. . . "49 Being, for me, is the God of the Jewish-Christian
scriptures. Since Jesus was/is the Word, the Christian 
responds to Him. Jesus, as metaphor of God, is open to 
numerous imaginative interpretations. No one or all of 
these interpretations constitute the only way of being in 
relationship with Being. Through ingenium the preacher 
constantly creates new images of Being. For example, Jesus 
as liberator or friend may be more understandable than 
traditional images like Redeemer or Savior.
Metaphor
Metaphor, in Grassi's view, provides for the operation 
of ingenium and allows for the transfer of meaning and for 
connection between the world of nature and the human realm. 
"Thus metaphor, as a process of transfer, has the ability to 
transform things--to create new relationships."50 In other 
words, metaphor is the most important figure of speech.
Throughout Rhetoric As Philosophy. Grassi insists upon 
the significance of metaphor. A review of Grassi's basic 
ideas concerning metaphor seems necessary before moving on. 
The metaphor is the original form of the interpretative act 
itself. The metaphor lies at the root of our human world. 
"The metaphorical, pictorial nature of every original
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insight links insight with pathos, content with the form of 
the speech."51 Metaphor makes philosophy possible because 
the archaic assertions on which rational proofs depend have 
a metaphorical character. Metaphor is more than a figure of 
speech because it embodies the basic process by which humans 
come to know.
Grassi's concept of metaphor supports the theory that 
language is the medium of hermeneutic experience. But more 
than this, since metaphor produces light, i.e., knowledge, 
then we are released from the illusion that rational truth 
is the only truth. The preacher then can be concerned not 
so much with describing facts as with creating images. As 
Jacob Bronowski says, " . . .  all our ways of picturing the 
invisible are metaphors, likenesses that we snatch from the 
larger world of eye and ear and touch."52
Folly
However, Western culture has been dominated by reliance 
on science. Choosing rhetoric over the scientific paradigm 
would be considered folly. Grassi reverses this under­
standing:
The reasonable world into which the analytic philosophy 
puts us today turns out to be a purely "formal" one, 
and only as such is it "sound," "unbroken," "formal" 
and "firmly" within the frame of quite special limits.
In this case . . . must we not argue that purely formal 
activity without "an ultimate reason," i.e., "formal
142
thinking" of the analytic philosophy, is itself nothing 
but a "folly"?53
Folly, for Grassi, requires an act of ingenium, or
seeing beyond things as they are to the meaning of Being.
Under this definition of folly contemporary society is seen
as laboring under the illusion that rational knowledge is
true knowledge. In such a system, man is dehumanized and
perhaps ends up committing technological suicide. For
example, even if science were to solve all problems, answer
all questions, and verify every hypothesis, there is still
no guarantee that humanity could survive. Rudolph Carnap
warns that "the mastery of life requires an effort of all
our various powers; we should be wary of the shortsighted
belief that the demands of life can all be met with the
power of conceptual thinking alone."54
Grassi develops his concept more fully in Folly and
Insanity in Renaissance Literature. Written with Maristella
Lorch, this book deals extensively with the theme of folly.
Of special significance is the critique of Erasmus's Praise
of Folly, where Grassi's understanding of folly can be
grasped more completely.
For Erasmus, as for St. Paul, the term "folly" acquires
new meaning. Grassi explains this change:
Moria for Erasmus has a fundamental meaning which holds 
not only for the range of the human world, as it would 
if we understood pcopia only as a human condition . . . 
He affirms that moria is the deeper root of the
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unveiling of all beings and, by its undeductibility and 
nonrationality, an abysmal folly which has nothing to 
do with a subjective insanity. Through its power the 
world appears.55
Moria, as separate entity, is divine. In fact, Moria
claims divinity for herself:
Now, lest my claim to divinity should seem unsub­
stantiated, listen carefully and I will show you how 
many benefits I bestow on gods and men alike and how 
widely my divine power extends . . . The essence of
divinity is to give aid to mortals.56
The power of Moria opens up the immense stage of the world
with the unfolding of its paradoxical play of comedy/
tragedy. The principal actors are humans; folly is the
divine director; and the outcome of the play depends upon
the actors' willingness to embrace the claim of folly.
Two kinds of folly present themselves to the actors:
one is the folly of insanity, the other folly is viewed as a
god. Insanity results when man loses his sense of the value
of life. The theme of the play concerns man's attempt to
cope with his environment. As long as he remains under the
spell of divine folly, he survives. In fact, Grassi claims
divinity for the power of the word, a metaphorical and
metamorphic power. "Only in the word can I find myself
again in that I recover my world from nature."57 The word
possesses a prophetic power to ground thought in the real
world. The fundamental power of the word is the metaphor,
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especially its ability to create a beginning point for 
thought.
The power of the word grants new insights and the hope 
of eternity to the actors. However, the tragic element now 
comes into play. As Grassi notes, "We are actors in an 
uninterrupted game which bears witness to the metaphorical 
nature of reality. Not only the different eras but also the 
different languages are born, exist, and perish."58 
However, the illusion is maintained by the spell of folly.
In other terms, a deep spiritual identification with the 
common community of humanity casts its spell of survival 
over the actors. Only in this way can humans avoid 
insanity.
Folly from Grassi's perspective is a necessary 
illusion. Folly enables man to survive, to change, to cope, 
and to realize his existence, because it produces a mirror 
which enables people to be observers of themselves as 
actors. Folly produces a consciousness of human frailty 
which allows people to transcend themselves.
By this I do not mean that humans are led to despair or 
to a feeling of being "nobody" in the larger scheme of life. 
In contrast, folly allows an opposite interpretation, i.e., 
an act of ingenium, an act in which one sees the ironic 
dimension of life. No longer do we have to labor under the 
illusion that rational knowledge is all there is because
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folly reveals the significance of humans in the world.
Folly enables us to see beyond the restricted boundaries of 
rationality to the opposite truth.
In order to explain what Grassi means, Erasmus's three 
negative judgments about the claim of folly are summarized: 
1) Life is a ludicrous comedy because the actors do not 
realize that they have submitted to the spell of Moria. 2) 
Since life is an empty masquerade, history becomes the 
highest tragedy. 3) Unmasking the actors would prove to be 
insanity. Man's only hope is to remain under the spell of 
folly. Any attempt to arrive at the truth will lead to 
insanity. This awareness of the tragic interpre- tation of 
life and human history is the basic theme of Erasmus.
Grassi adopts Erasmus's view and sees folly as man's only 
hope for coping with the threat of the scientific-rational 
paradigm. The argument against the scientific-rational 
paradigm is not an attempt to dismiss the legitimate 
advances made by science. The threat lies in an over­
dependence on the rational paradigm, a convenient forgetting 
that science is itself metaphorical. The threat is 
manifested in an attitude of superiority and arrogance on 
the part of those who believe in the primacy of rationality 
and technology to solve all problems.
The correlation between St. Paul and Grassi lies in 
their paradoxical definitions of pcopia and their common
concerns for the salvation of society. Both concepts of 
folly are important for contemporary rhetorical theory 
because they demonstrate that rhetoric has the power to 
effect transformation through its metaphorical and meta- 
morphic powers, and the alliance of rhetoric with homiletics 
will benefit preaching. Both St. Paul and Grassi offer a 
consistent guide for action, action that gives humans 
choices about the claims being made on it. People have 
ultimate significance within the world and can rhetorically 
structure that world. Both St. Paul and Grassi offer an 
alternative to the rational paradigm for contemporary 
society. Those who choose "folly" can discover values that 
can unify their lives, values that are fundamental to human 
existence. Both St. Paul and Grassi are evangelists in the 
sense that their language is indicative, declarative, 
inventive, imaginative, and pathetic in character.
The Bankrupt Cartesian-Rational World Paradigm 
The threat of an attitude of superiority on the part of 
those who believe in the scientific-rational paradigm is a 
common concern for all rhetors, Christian and secular.
Grassi suggests some of the consequences for a society which 
over-values the rational paradigm: First, he argues that the 
premise of rationality allows humans to abuse the environ­
ment by upsetting the delicate balance of the ecological
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system. He also notes that the premise of rationality 
produces a lust for power and control without concern for 
the implications for the common good of our world. Third, 
the premise of rationality, suggests Grassi, puts roadblocks 
in front of building a global community. The dominance of 
the rational paradigm also results in the excessive 
consumption ethic of our culture. Finally, for Grassi, the 
attitude of the primacy of technology raises the prospect of 
the destruction of the planet.59
In a quite different context, the ancient church 
fathers of Christianity demonstrated similar concerns.
Their labels, gathered around the central concept of 
"cardinal sins," listed greed, pride, envy, acedia, and lust 
as our greatest problems. While nineteenth century American 
liberalism played a major role in a reductionistic theology 
of sin, changes in meta-vocabularies from religious terms to 
market-place terms aided the decline of the church. 
Conscience was replaced by interests and the cure of souls 
became a technique of psychological science. "Likewise, the 
seven deadly sins became lively capitalist virtues: avarice
became acumen; sloth,leisure; and pride, ambition . . .  A 
religious vocabulary of passions had been replaced by a 
commercial vocabulary of interests."60
I am more interested in making like an Old Testament 
prophet than a nineteenth century liberal. In the folly of
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prophetic reproach there may be a viable hope for our 
future. The task, against an entrenched refusal even to 
speak of sin, will be extremely hazardous. Recognition of 
the difficulty led to Karl Menninger to write Whatever 
Became of Sin? Menninger does not fear being prophetic. He 
preaches with more fervor than most liberals and with more 
intelligence than most fundamentalists. He exhorts 
preachers to get on with the task of helping our world be 
more humane by insisting that we have far more intelligence 
and power than we need already at hand.61
The Rhetoric of Folly 
Thus far I have emphasized the primacy of rhetoric for 
preaching and suggested that the method of folly is our 
opportunity for redirecting and recreating our world. And 
in accepting these premises, I want to outline the 
characteristics of a rhetoric of folly. My vehicle for this 
is the previous discussion of Grassi and Paul. But it also 
draws from other sources--for example, Carlyle Marney's 
fundaments of a competent ministry,62 and Richard Harvey 
Brown's concept of emancipatory rhetoric.63 All of these 
theorists have concerns for the moral evolution and well­
being of humans. By uniting the various concepts of these 
scholars we can achieve a rhetoric in which ethical
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responsibility for the global community is accepted and 
embraced.
What then do I mean by a rhetoric of folly? Such a 
rhetoric entails that strange dialectic of power through 
weakness, strength through vulnerability; it embodies 
discontinuity from the criteria of our culture. The 
rhetoric of folly goes against the status quo of the culture 
without surrendering the meaning of the central Christian 
event of Jesus Christ. "I will," claims Paul, "all the more 
gladly boast of my weakness that the power of Christ may 
rest upon me."64 Having defined a rhetoric of folly, I 
will now discuss its major characteristics.
Identification
The first characteristic of a rhetoric of folly is 
identification. Two biblical examples— one from the Old 
Testament and one from the New Testament--can serve as 
models for the concept of identification. The prophet 
Ezekiel, in captivity with his fellow Jews, "sat where they 
sat for seven days and wept."65 Jesus' entire ministry is 
a metaphor of identification: a baptism with sinners, meals 
and weddings with tax collectors and prostitutes, and death 
on a cross are but a few of the possible examples.
Our identification with those we address puts us 
beneath the shadow of a cross. We take up the cross— a
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metaphor for the dehumanization of human life--and we work 
to make and keep humanity human. Such an incarnational 
identification is derived from the Christ--the true, best of 
the breed, human. As Marney puts it, "Here emerges the 
Christian advantage--ours is a genuinely nameable and 
recognizable identity . . . Our "I" as Christian is derived 
from . . . Jesus the Christ."66
Personal identity presupposes moral agency, and moral 
agency is the capacity to create culture. "Indeed, to be a 
person as opposed to an object means to be able to 
symbolically construct reality."67 Identification, 
however, means that society is the proper field for the 
realization of individuality. The self can be best served 
in community as the Christian ideal of community has 
demonstrated. We are asked to create through ingenium and 
metaphor public community, not an ideology that legitimates 
privatization and lack of community.
Only in community, a nourishing communion and communi­
cation, can social isolation, psychological narcissism, lack 
of commitment to others, and a mindless conformism be 
avoided. True identification is within a community that 
redeems society from atomization: By identifying ourselves 
fully with the human race, we may be able to create a 
morally deeper conception of ourselves and a safer world. 
Such identification will always involve risk.68
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Direct Semantic Speech 
A second characteristic of a rhetoric of folly is what 
Grassi calls rhetorical, vulgar language or direct, semantic 
speech. Grassi distinguishes between three kinds of speech: 
external rhetorical speech, rational speech, and true 
rhetorical speech. External rhetoric is purely emotive, 
false speech. Metaphor has, in this form of rhetoric, only 
a decorative purpose, and is considered capable of affecting 
only the passions. Rational speech arises exclusively from 
the formulation of first principles. Rational language is 
dialectical, mediating, demonstrative, apodictic, and 
without pathetic character. True rhetorical speech, 
however, springs from the archai, the nondeducible and 
indicative.69 Rather than the rational language of dogma 
and concepts, the preacher, as rhetor, is asked to embrace 
the language of conversation. The Greek New Testament was 
first written in the common street language of the first 
century--koine Greek. The lively, conversational metaphors 
have been taken literally and have crystallized into narrow 
ways of viewing the Christian experience. For example, the 
metaphor, "born again," has in its literal interpretation 
produced a cult of "born-again Christians." Since born 
again is a metaphor for Christian, the born-again Christian 
is a redundancy.
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Direct, semantic speech has its roots in the prophets 
and poets and muses. Primary orality and dialogical 
communication combine in such spokespersons in a formidable 
partnership. Here the preacher's task is not to lecture, 
but to rhetorically create possible new ways of being-in- 
the-world. The main source of creating new worlds of 
meaning and being is metaphor. "Through metaphor, we come 
to see the similarity that exists between being and Being. . 
. . "70 For the Christian this means apprehending God. For
the secularist this means discovering the ultimate 
worthwhileness of human existence.
Trembling and fear would be the correct attitude of 
direct, semantic speech. The preacher does not possess 
absolute, certain truths, but stands, hat in hand, ready for 
constant revision and discussion. The Christian rhetor is 
aware that even twenty centuries of gospel preaching do not 
permit one to know anything definitive. The tree of 
knowledge remains hidden. As we never find our way again to 
the Garden of Eden, so speech about God cannot be absolute.
Empathic Communication
The third characteristic of a rhetoric of folly is 
emphatic communication. By emphatic I mean the ability to 
understand and integrate our basic nature as humans. Grassi 
insists that our lives are divorced from our social,
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corporate selves: "Contemporary men feel the need for values 
that can unify their lives. But the source of this need 
lies in man's original nature as a human being and not in 
his momentary situation."71 Richard Harvey Brown 
interprets the need for emphatic discourse as a result of 
the bifurcation of the private sphere of the individual and 
the public sphere of society. He laments the lack of
bridges between groups and the lack of communication. Brown
also argues that we have systematically "failed to discover 
the kinds of role relations necessary for communicating with 
adults or children who realize different orders of 
meaning.1,72
In order for our communication to be emphatic, we must 
set outside the sociological tent poles of sex, family, 
race, region, religion, class, and economics. If the Gospel
is to offer compassion, it will put every one of these
values under judgment and "bless or damn each, on the basis 
of what its faithful service does to persons."73 In terms 
of these considerations, the questions, What is our 
culture?, and What is the relationship of our preaching to 
our culture?, become crucial. Are our concepts of 
Christianity grounded in a religious imperialism? Have we 
regarded middle-class moralism as the criteria for being 
accepted as a Christian? Have we immersed ourselves so
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deeply in our culture as to be unable to discover a proper 
mixture of Christ and culture?74
Emphatic communication is dialogical in nature (Grassi, 
Brown, and Marney). For the Christian rhetor, however, no 
dialogical being-in-the-world is possible without knowing 
the words of consolation. The name comes from Martin 
Luther's Fourteen on Consolation.75 Without a proper 
empathy, the consolations cannot console. The words of 
consolation may be summarized:
1. No rhetor may give a word of consolation he/she has 
not yet heard. We represent our truths as fellow 
strugglers and listeners.
2. There is no consolation unless the words spoken are 
received (dialogical nature). Perhaps this is the 
meaning of Jesus' "shake the dust" metaphor in St. 
Luke 10. The disciple took back the offered 
blessing not received--the implication being that 
the blesser may need the word before the journey is 
done. Also, the metaphor encourages the 
preacher/rhetor that while responsible for how 
he/she tells the truth, he/she is not responsible 
for the results.
3. There is no consolation for any rhetor who cannot 
bless his/her own origins. The word is always 
personal, spoken by one who has come to terms with 
one's history and tradition.
4. The speaker of the word is always caught in the 
dis-ease and problem-situation and contradiction of 
the hearer. This insight lies behind the 
magnificent poem of the servant in Isaiah 53: 
"Surely he has borne our griefs and carried our 
sorrows. Yet we esteemed him stricken, smitten by 
God, and afflicted. But he was wounded for our 
transgressions . . . and with his stripes we are 
healed." C. C. Jung says, "The doctor is effective 
only when he himself is affected." Only the wounded
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can heal.76 (This is the insight behind the 
healing rhetoric of Alcoholics Anonymous. )
5. The word of consolation cannot rest on certainty
for faith never knows--it just bets its life. This 
means that the preacher of folly risks everything 
when she speaks. What she has at her disposal is 
the experience of a common humanity, a cross of 
Christ, and a rhetoric of folly: pathetic,
indirect, metaphorical, and always and everywhere 
intimate, loving, trusting, and personal.
Dialectical Irony 
The fourth characteristic of a rhetoric of folly is 
dialectical irony. Richard Brown argues that we may turn to 
the rhetorical trope and the logical method of dialectical 
irony as a potential discourse for humanizing political 
practice. He defines irony as " . . .  a metaphor of 
opposites, a point of view that distances and derealizes 
what is taken as real in order to permit the realization of 
new meanings and forms"77 I believe such irony has 
potential for the preacher as an act of subversion against 
religious regimes "that presume they have an absolute right 
to define reality. "78
Dialectical irony requires the ability to imagine 
things as other than they are. Brown observes, "To summon 
forth the contrary of that which is through the power of 
dialectical irony is the basis of moral freedom and 
imagination",79 and "Dialectical irony lifts us above the 
view we are given of what the world is or must be."80
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Brown contrasts the ritual ironist to the free ironist. 
According to Brown, "Whereas ritual irony shakes us out of 
conventional rules and assumptions only to allow us to wryly 
rejoin them, a mastered dialectical irony shows that any 
role or assumption is reversible."81 Whereas Brown insists 
that the preacher is a ritual ironist who uses irony to 
serve his notion of morality, I argue that the preacher may 
use "irony in order to liberate us from moralism of any 
stripe."82 The preacher as free ironist offers his/her 
congregation the opportunity to experience and resolve 
ambiguity and contradictions.
How, then, might dialectical irony help the preacher 
and his/her congregation realign humane values and 
contemporary Christian practice? Ironic awareness can 
safeguard religious authority against arrogant presumption 
of certainty, infallibility, and dogmatism. The preacher 
does not, as an ironist, set himself up as the authority who 
dispenses the simple gospel to a willing group of followers. 
The audience must participate in his ironic speech acts or 
performances in order for him to succeed. Rather than 
passive adherence to a simple gospel, the congregation 
becomes an active audience struggling with the ambiguity and 
complexity of life.
Brown's dialectical irony appears to parallel Farrell's 
comic discourse. Farrell, for example, argues that "Comic
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discourse is immersed in the crowd, with persons not much 
better, and perhaps a bit worse, than ourselves."83 In 
addition, comedic discourse is concerned with contingency 
and possibility. As such, the rhetoric of comedy is limited 
and perishable discourse. There remains, however, the comic 
hope of a happy ending, the hope of renewal and survival as 
well as the recurrent hope that everything will turn out all 
right after all.
Ironic awareness also reveals all modes of Christian 
theology/proclamation to be processes of symbolic 
construction, all to be historical, and none to be superior 
to others. Brown suggests that "irony teaches that nothing 
is known absolutely, and that everything is reversed when 
overextended. An awareness of this would encourage humility 
in those wishing to shape human affairs."84 Farrell also 
reminds us that rhetoric is tenuous: "This is because 
rhetoric is the only art responsible for the imitation and 
expression of human thought. And nothing is more tenuous 
than that."85 Such attitudes would reduce the dogmatic 
certainty of socially-constructed religious movements like 
the negative, hopeless vision of the modern apocalypticists, 
the romantic version of reality in fundamentalists such as 
Jerry Falwell, and the emotional, subjective reality of the 
Charismatics. Perhaps more importantly, the attitude of 
humility would ally Christian preaching with humanism, not
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only in their common goal of survival, but also in their 
acknowledgement of human freedom and frailty as well as 
their recognition of moral responsibility and tolerance.
Conclusion
As I attempt to develop a theory of communication with 
the goal of survival, the preacher should realize that he is
involved in a "folly" likely to be rejected by those who see
this as just one more warmed over by-product of the social 
gospel and nineteenth century liberalism. Those who preach 
are also likely to be ostracized by the conservative
bastions of resurgent frontier pietism with its
individualistic salvation. And in accepting this we must 
recognize that the rhetoric of folly can be useful only if 
we become in a radical sense participants in the ongoing 
communication process. We must establish a communication 
process that is conversational. We must be ready to take 
risks (what else does cross-bearing mean for the 
Christian?). We have to present our truths as witnesses and 
fellow-strugglers. To meet these requirements would be to 
make our sermons acts of political and moral courage. It 
would liberate us from unreflective pietism and put us to 
the work of freeing persons to be fully human.86
I have examined the concept of folly and proposed a 
"rhetoric of folly" for those who engage in a particular
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kind of rhetorical practice--preaching. I suggested that 
the concerns for the survival of humanity are rhetorically- 
based concerns. I have proposed to define rhetoric as an 
event of folly through which people are confronted with 
ethical choices. I contend that a "rhetoric of folly" 
solves or avoids the problems not resolved by previous 
homiletical methodology. In general, a rhetoric of folly:
1. Accommodates not only the preacher but the congregation 
as well;
2. Recognizes that rhetoric includes the entire discourse 
of the church, verbal as well as nonverbal;
3. Makes clear that there are alternative methods of truth 
telling thus negating the dependence upon the Cartesian 
paradigm;
4. Makes clear that the preacher is ethically responsible 
for his/her discourse;
5. Identifies the preacher, not as the subject, but as a 
fellow struggler and witness with the congregation in 
the journey toward a Christian way of being in the 
world;
6. Presumes that the use of metaphor offers the most 
promising model for producing truth-claims or knowledge 
in the Christian community;
7. Recognizes that the preacher will have to take risks.
8 . Puts a high premium on empathic communication, based on 
love and trust;
9. Insists that the congregation reach its own conclusions 
and make its own choices; and/or
10. Releases the preacher from the role of church
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CHAPTER FIVE
TOWARD A METAPHORICAL HOMILETICS 
In Chapter Four, a nonauthoritarian status for the 
preacher was developed. Without the epistemology of 
certainty, the preacher turns to a rhetoric of folly. The 
most significant rhetorical component of the rhetoric of 
folly is the metaphor. The purpose of this chapter is to 
show the relevance and applicability of metaphor to a 
homiletical model based on the "rhetoric of folly."
Metaphor is the indispensable language of the rhetoric of 
folly. Preaching by its very nature is metaphorical. I do 
not argue, however, that all instances of preaching are 
necessarily metaphoric. I shall provide a summary of the 
status of metaphor in philosophy, theology, and homiletics 
in order to ground my proposed metaphorical homiletics in 
previous scholarship. I will evaluate problems relating to 
metaphor that require some adjudication in terms of 
homiletical relevance. Finally, I will extend the 
philosophical and rhetorical studies of metaphor by applying 
the thought of I. A. Richards, Max Black, and Paul Ricoeur 
to specific homiletical purposes.
Metaphor in Contemporary Philosophy 
The last four decades have witnessed an increasing 
philosophical interest in metaphor. Philosophers have
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explored the nature of metaphor, the definition of metaphor, 
the pragmatics of metaphor, and the cognitive status of 
metaphor. The present state of the study of metaphor may be 
summarized as follows:
1. Metaphor is a part of all disciplines in the sense 
that thought is metaphoric.
2. Metaphor is best understood within the parameters 
of some kind of tension or interaction theory.
3. Context is essential to any understanding of 
metaphor.
4. Metaphors are neither necessarily literally false 
nor semantically deviant.
5. A variety of "metaphors" have been proposed as 
being descriptive of what happens in the metaphoric 
process and its resultant tension: "clash of 
literal meanings,"1 "transgression,"2 
"metaphorical twist,"3 "category-mistake,"4 
"redescription of reality,"5 "experiential 
gestalts, 1,6 "semantically deviant and non-deviant 
sentences,"7 and "world-structuring disclosure."8
6. Metaphor is not reducible to a literal meaning or 
paraphrase.9 (Davidson disagrees)
7. Metaphor has the potential to redescribe our world, 
restructure our concepts and categories, and 
reshape our experience of reality.10
In short, metaphor is pervasive, indispensable, irreducible,
creative, and resistant to definition.
The philosophical and rhetorical study of metaphor has 
produced at least two problems that impact any metaphorical 
homiletics. Both of these problems are associated with the 
language and "metaphors" historically employed to discuss 
metaphor. The first problem relates to the way metaphors
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have been perceived as being violations of normal, literal 
language. Metaphors from theology, for example, like 
"transgression," "violation," and "mistake" have been used 
to define what happens in a metaphorical utterance.
"Transgression" belongs to the biblical word-group that 
includes "sin," "iniquity," and "trespasses." The literal 
definition of "transgression" is to walk beside or pass by. 
It refers to not following the original, true direction as 
well as to a violation of the standard or the norm. To 
transgress is to violate the law.11 Applied to language, 
metaphor becomes criminalized as a law-breaker. Arbi­
trarily, then, a supposed literal meaning becomes the norm 
or standard for all language use.
Contemporary studies of metaphor have basically dropped 
this prejudice against metaphor. When metaphor was shown to 
not always involve a transgression of linguistic laws, the 
distinction of law-breaker no longer held. As Timothy 
Binkley insists, "Once we recognize that there is no pure 
core of literal meaning, we lose the inclination to set up 
the literal as an ideal against which figurative language is 
to be measured."12 To accept metaphor in this fashion is a 
positive step toward a metaphorical homiletics. With 
Grassi, the preacher can set up the metaphoric as the 
creator of the literal. In this sense, metaphor claims an 
ontological status superior to literal language.
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A related metaphor often used to explain what happens 
in a metaphorical utterance is "deviance," a sociological 
metaphor. Deviant behaviors were once considered the prime 
rhetorical responsibility of preachers. Almost any person 
with a family tree containing eight or more generations of 
Protestant preachers can conjure up a caricature of the 
minister blasting away at immoral, sinful behavior. In 
American society, however, there has been a transformation 
of definitions of deviance from "badness" to "sickness,"
i.e., the "medicalization of deviance."13 This change of 
perspectives has met continued resistance from certain 
fundamentalist churches. I can recall, for example, hearing 
numerous preachers insist that alcoholism was a sin not a 
sickness (my childhood church was in the midst of the Bible 
Belt of Baptist North Louisiana).
Applied to metaphor, deviance refers to an explicit 
moral judgment that metaphor is a "sin" against literal 
language. In the etymology of sin, such an assumption about 
metaphor would mean that metaphor "misses the mark."14 As 
demonstrated in chapter three, the typical charges against 
metaphor by homileticians have been its danger and its 
seductive power; i.e., "deviance."
To explain metaphor as the deviant behavior of language 
is a typical positivist approach. This approach assumes 
that there is an "undeviant" use of language--an ideal, pure
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language, and that it exists in an objective and expressible 
form. Deviance, according to the logic of the positivist or 
literalist, is the usage of words not within conformity to 
literal language norms. In other terms, deviant is "bad," 
literal is good.
To approach metaphor as a type of deviance is to take 
the traditional philosophical approach to metaphor: "A 
metaphor is an elliptical simile useful for stylistic, 
rhetorical, and didactic purposes, but which can be 
translated into a literal paraphrase without any loss of 
cognitive content."15 Metaphor has for centuries suffered 
from one reductionistic attack after another. A request for 
historical witnesses to testify against metaphor would be a 
"Broadway cattle call" for a bit part. Two most often cited 
opponents of metaphor, however, are Thomas Hobbes and John 
Locke.
Hobbes thought that metaphors impeded thought and 
served only to deceive people. Hobbes attacks speech that 
undermines proper reasoning. Included in his displeasure 
are four abuses of speech: "First, when men register their 
thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of 
their words; by which they register for their conception, 
that which they never conceived, and so deceive themselves. 
Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in 
other senses than that they are ordained for; and thereby
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deceive others . . . And therefore such [inconstant] names 
can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can 
metaphors, and tropes of speech: but these are less
dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the 
others do not."16
Mark Johnson, discussing the peculiarities of Hobbes's 
linguistic theory, enumerates the characteristics of what he 
calls the "literal-truth paradigm":
1. The human conceptual system is essentially 
literal--literal language ("words proper") is the 
only adequate vehicle for (a) expressing one's 
meaning precisely, and (b) making truth claims, 
which together make possible correct reasoning by 
the philosopher.
2. Metaphor is a deviant use of words in other than 
their proper senses, which accounts for its 
tendency to confuse and to deceive.
3. The meaning and truth claims of a metaphor (if 
there are any) are just those of its literal 
paraphrase.17
The literal-truth paradigm goes hand-in-hand with the 
homiletical association of metaphor with rhetoric. This 
connection assumes that metaphor, like rhetoric, has a 
negative connotation in preaching. Metaphor, according to 
this view, has little value for preaching other than making 
"pretty" sermons, and even this is countered by metaphor's 
deviance.
Reference to metaphor as "transgression" and "deviance" 
raises an interesting religious question. If metaphor
really is a misuse of language, are those who insist on 
using metaphor guilty of sin? Just such a moral charge is 
implied by biblical literalists. Christians, for example, 
who reject the metaphor "inerrancy" as descriptive of the 
Bible are labelled by James Draper, former president of the 
Southern Baptist Convention, as those who have "started over 
the edge. They have abandoned divine revelation . . .  It is 
also extremely likely that those to whom they minister or 
those whom they teach will go a lot farther down than they 
do."18 Again Draper warns: "Once we depart from divine 
revelation, we have at least opened the door to whatever 
deviation a person chooses to engage in, 1,19 and 
"Ultimately, historic, biblical Christianity will be in 
shambles. "20
The question of metaphor in preaching thus becomes a 
question of credibility in the rhetorical sense of ethos. . 
Wayne Booth, for example, suggests that "the deliberate use 
of a recognizable metaphor . . . inevitably invites 
judgments of the speaker's character."21 In the more 
generalized discussion of whether or not metaphor should be 
used at all Booth's assertion becomes particularly apropos.
A homiletical tradition that reduces metaphor to a deviant 
use of language has now been transferred to a mistrust of 
persons who use metaphors, especially by literalists.
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A second problem related to the language employed to 
discuss metaphor can be interpreted as relevant to 
preaching. I refer particularly to the slow but steady 
transformation in the language used to talk about metaphors 
as "figures of speech," which are described as a "pretty," 
"fickle," "merely emotional," and generally weaker form of 
language. Such language, I believe, can be traced to what 
Jacques Derrida calls the logocentric, phonocentric, and 
phallocentric prejudices of our Greek forebears.22 If 
Derrida has become the Trojan horse within the walls of the 
structuralists, he is a very un-Greek horse. In any event,
I will argue that the language used to talk about rhetoric 
in general, and metaphor in particular, expresses a 
masculine prejudice which I shall call the "feminization of 
metaphor." The current transformation of metaphor's status 
and language I shall label the "defeminization of metaphor." 
This transformation is certainly not complete and has not 
been universally accepted.
These changes have not occurred by themselves nor have 
they been the result of a "natural" evolution of society.
The roots of these changes lie deep in our social, cultural, 
and religious understandings of the role and place of women. 
I believe that, aside from its technical and intellectual 
aspect, this change parallels the significant gains, made in 
our time, for the equality of women. In short, metaphor has
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gained in status as women have gained in status. The
suggested parallel is by no means considered causative or
derivative, simply a way of seeing or connecting two
different ideas.
The traditional positivist approach to the study of
metaphor assumes that metaphor is feminine in nature. Let
me explain what I mean. This assumption rests on a second
assumption, namely, that metaphor is definable in a
straight-forward manner as language-use not within
permissible conformity to rational thoughts. Metaphor, in
other words, if admitted any status at all, must be kept in
its place. As Paul deMan, in his analysis of Locke's
denunciation of eloquence, points out,
It is clear that rhetoric is something one can 
decorously indulge in as long as one knows where it 
belongs. Like a woman, which it resembles ('like the 
fair sex'), it is a fine thing as long as it is kept in 
its own proper place. Out of place, among the serious 
affairs of men, it is a disruptive scandal-like the 
appearance of a real woman in a gentleman's club where 
it would only be tolerated as a picture, preferably 
naked, framed, and hung on the wall."23
As the entire history of Western civilization is a
story of the oppression and subjugation of women, so is the
treatment of metaphor as a mere figure of speech to be kept
in its proper place. Those religious positivists, usually
Protestants and fundamentalists, who still deny equality to
women with their crude literal interpretations of Saint
Paul, also have a very low regard for metaphor. Perhaps the
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positivistic literalism of these groups has more than a
casual relationship to their refusal to grant ordination to
women. According to the assumption of the feminization of
metaphor, I suggest the following list for comparison,




















Following the model projected here, homiletics would 
benefit from 1) a defeminization of its traditional treat­
ment of metaphor and 2) an acceptance of the powerful 
positive feminine qualities suggested here.
As concerns for inclusive language claim an increased 
and deserved attention in the various Christian denomina­
tions, the defeminization of metaphor becomes a small part 
of a far larger crusade. While my rhetorical concern is 
with changing perspectives of metaphor and the consequences
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of these for homiletics, this is also a study of ethics, 
especially as related to the treatment of women and other 
oppressed, powerless persons.
I have briefly examined philosophical treatment of 
metaphor and delineated two problems within the parameters 
of such study. I summarized leading assumptions about 
metaphor. I suggested there has been a general failure of 
the traditional homiletical model to participate in the 
transformation of thought concerning metaphor. I have 
proposed that metaphor not be considered a deviant use of 
some ideal literal language, and that literalist Christian 
interpreters have an inherent prejudice against rhetoric and 
metaphor. Based on consideration of contemporary studies in 
metaphor, I suggest that a metaphorical homiletic:
1. Recognizes that metaphor is not a deviant use of 
language, but a different use of language.
2. Presumes that metaphor requires inventional 
activity because to describe metaphor as a mere 
device of style is to fall back into our 
phallocentric prejudice.
3. Recognizes the role of metaphor in all human 
thought and disciplines.
4. Makes clear that metaphor involves ethical power in 
the sense of ethos as well as logos and pathos.
5. Assumes that metaphor is indispensable to the
preacher and irreducible to a literal paraphrase.
6. Insists that we preach by metaphors that create
Christian community as a way of being-in-the-world.
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Each of these assumptions of metaphor's potential value 
for preaching could be elaborated in great detail. In 
order, however, to attend to the modest goal of pragmatism, 
i.e., the practical rhetorical/metaphorical model of 
preaching, it will be necessary to concentrate on particular 
aspects of metaphorical theory of representative scholars' 
thoughts on metaphor. This section shall concentrate upon 
two representative analysts of metaphor: I. A. Richards, and 
Paul Ricoeur. At the same time these theorists must be 
understood in the context of the wider discussion of 
language by philosophers and rhetoricians. Richards and 
Ricoeur represent a view of metaphor different from the 
received homiletical and philosophical theory of 
substitution.
I. A. Richards
I. A. Richards sets forth his central understanding of 
metaphor in his book The Philosophy of Rhetoric. As the 
title indicates, Richards is principally concerned with 
rhetoric. He defines rhetoric as a "study of misunder­
standing and its remedies."24 Richards contended that 
through examination of language and its use we can 
comprehend the nature of communication and improve 
communicative enterprises. He hoped to decrease 
misunderstanding by an analysis of meaning and how it 
changes as discourse occurs.
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Richards' definition of metaphor has impacted all
succeeding treatments of metaphor: "In the simplest
formulation, when we use a metaphor, we have two thoughts of
different things active together and supported by a single
word or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their
interaction. "25
One of the ways Richards suggests for communicators to
work at preventing misunderstandings is the use of metaphor.
He sees metaphor as the heart of our language systems. The
metaphor "is a borrowing between and intercourse of
thoughts, a transaction between contexts. Thought is
metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of
language derive therefrom."26 Daniel Fogarty summarizes
the importance Richards delegated to metaphor:
Richards' most emphatic contention about metaphor, thus 
explained, is that language is naturally metaphoric. 
Since metaphor is just abstraction for the purpose of 
clearer and more vivid communication, since it seems to 
be the nature of our thinking to be perpetually busy 
with sorting and classifying references and comparing 
contexts and their parts, and since our language 
symbolizes this thinking, it seems to Richards that our 
language must be highly, habitually, and even naturally 
metaphoric.27
The concepts of metaphor worked out by I. A. Richards 
continue to influence new explorations of metaphor:
1. Metaphor is an omnipresent principle of thought.
2. Metaphor permeates all discourse.
3. Metaphors work through the tension created by the 
tenor and the vehicle.
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4. Metaphor is cognitively irreducible.
5. Any account of meaning and truth must give a 
central place to metaphor.28
In at least two ways, Richards' study of metaphor can 
be extended to the discipline of homiletics. First, his 
insistence that metaphor as the essence of thought 
permeates all discourse parallels similar conclusions by 
theologians. The language of the Bible is seen to be as 
essentially metaphoric in nature. According to Sallie 
McFague, "Metaphor is the way we think, and it is the way 
the parables--a central form of expression in the New 
Testament--work. These are related assertions, for the 
power of the parables stems, in part, from that basic 
movement by indirection from the known to the unknown--the 
heart of metaphor."29 Theologians have extended the 
linguistic conclusion of Richards to an assertion that 
religious reality is metaphoric. Some theologians agree 
with McFague that Jesus is the metaphor of God.30 There­
fore, metaphors not only move to the center of New Testament 
discussion, but become crucial to the preaching of the New 
Testament.
While homileticians have, with few exceptions, ignored 
contemporary scholarship on metaphor, theologians have 
incorporated metaphor into much of their work. Theologians
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seem to have reached an emergent consensus on the study of 
metaphor:
1. Metaphors in the New Testament disclose a number of 
possible Christian modes of being-in-the-world.
2. Literary genres are seen as productive of meanings. 
Metaphor, therefore, is no longer interpreted on 
the rhetorical model of decoration.
3. Original intention and meaning of a biblical writer 
(finds meaning of the text behind the text) is 
being replaced with a hermeneutics locating meaning 
in front of the text.
4. Interpreters seek to analyze the production of the 
sense of the text and the production of the 
referent of the text. That referent is a possible 
mode of being-in-the-world.
5. The major candidate for the central root metaphors 
of Christianity is the group of stories known as 
the parables of Jesus.31
A second way Richards' study of language and metaphor 
impacts homiletics concerns what Richards labels the "Proper 
Meaning Superstition."32 The history of homiletics is a 
history of the attempt to avoid the excesses of allegorical 
and spiritualistic interpretation of the scriptures e.g., 
(Origen). In the attempt at discovering a realistic, 
historical interpretation, preachers and theologians have 
searched diligently for the original meaning and the literal 
meaning of the biblical text.
As long as biblical texts are considered to have an 
original meaning, a literal meaning, and a literal 
application, the essential metaphorical nature of the Bible
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remains an unexamined presupposition. At this point, I. A. 
Richards can shed some light on this particular homiletical 
problem. "A chief cause of misunderstanding . . .  is the 
Proper Meaning Superstition. That is, the common belief-- 
encouraged officially by what lingers on in the school 
manuals as Rhetoric--that a word has a meaning of its own 
(ideally, only one) independent of and controlling its use 
and the purpose for which it should be uttered."33
The proper meaning view belongs to the school of 
literal language interpreters, whether philosophers or 
preachers. The literalist insistence upon univocal meaning 
I have labelled the Literal Truth Superstition and the 
Original Meaning Fallacy. These two terms are somewhat 
parallel to the proper meaning superstition of Richards:
"It is only a superstition when it forgets (as it commonly 
does) that the stability of the meaning of a word comes from 
the constancy of the contexts that give it its meanings.34
The problem with the literalist is that only one way of 
interpreting words, phrases, and texts is allowed; all 
others are heresies. Stephen Brown claims, "Literalism is a 
view of representation that has forgotten its own dependence 
on a sociohistorical, and hence relative, community of 
discourse."35 It eventually collapses into authoritarian­
ism. In the light of the worldwide conservative resurgence, 
an insistence on the plurality of meanings within religious
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texts is an ethical and religious responsibility. No
peremptory decrees from the Pope, and no threats from Jerry
Falwell should be allowed to destroy such an insistence.
Developments in the theory of metaphor have shown that
the literalist hope for a language of univocal meaning and
precision was doomed to fail. We are now, more than ever,
aware that metaphor is indispensable to science, religion,
theology, everyday life, and preaching.36 As Tracy notes:
The central theological concern with metaphor is to 
analyze the root metaphors which disclose a 
distinctively religious form of life in the major 
religions. In descriptions of God in Judaism and 
Christianity, for example, one finds a whole cluster of 
metaphors ranging from father, lord, shepherd, and king 
to more elusive and subtle choices like light, truth, 
love, and wisdom. If metaphors are purely and simply 
defined as decorative substitutions for real, literal, 
ideational meanings, then the relative lack of concern 
among many theologians with most biblical metaphors for 
God is completely justified. If, however, metaphors 
are more properly understood to function by means of 
some theory of tension or interaction (on the three 
levels of the word, the phrase, and the text), then the 
move to replace these decorative images with concepts 
seems a precipitate one.37
This view of metaphor, first illuminated by Richards, 
reverses the traditional literalist view that a word or text 
has only one meaning. Metaphor is by nature symbolic, 
ambiguous, and polysemous.38 If multiple and excess 
meanings for words and texts within multiple contexts is the 
correct way of viewing language, if the interpreter is 
influenced by the culture of which he/she is a part, if the 
interpreter is conscious of his/her responsibility within a
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highly ambiguous history and society, then literalism is but
a superstition. As David Tracy affirms:
We may continue to try to persuade ourselves of our 
autonomy, our innocence, and our idealism. Our 
theories can become exercises in passive contemplation 
of mere possibilities, or deceptively hard exercises 
excluding anything not fitting an already determined 
model. Our theories and our conversations can become, 
however, what they in fact always were: limited, 
fragile, necessary exercises in reaching relatively 
adequate knowledge of language and history alike.39
Any attempt at an autonomy so pure that it is unaffected by
the plurality of religious meanings in which we stand is the
final form of the general privatization which plagues our
culture.40
Maintaining the literal truth superstition leaves few 
alternatives. We may embrace the increasing privatization 
of the autonomous self, loosed on the world, according to 
William Muehl, by the forces of the vulgar Reformation.41 
We may run for security to the heteronomous privatization in 
which once proud traditions harden into ideologies. (Witness 
the ideological turn within the Southern Baptist 
Convention). Or we may risk interpreting our sacred texts 
in order to discover new, multiple meanings.
In our pluralistic present, we may risk concentration 
on the polysemous nature of biblical texts, symbols, images, 
and metaphors. Tracy, from a theological perspective, and 
Brown, from a sociological perspective, offer just such a 
risk as "one hope for a move forward into publicness."42
In a recent essay, Allen Scult considered the use of an 
interpretive approach to elucidate sacred texts which is in 
accord with the polysemous nature of religious language. In 
Scult's account, the critic is an interpreter--a surrogate 
for the audience--whose recounting of the process of textual 
encounter helps others to gain access to textual meaning. 
Noting that certain texts have the power to speak beyond 
themselves via a medium which he labels "textuality," Scult 
describes the process of critical interpretation: "Texu- 
ality draws rhetorician-interpreters to the text as the 
source for what might be known or said. The interpreter's 
audience shares in the textuality and helps direct the 
inventional process toward the text. The shared textuality 
is what gives the text the force of testimony, to use 
Ricoeur's phrase . . . The events and experiences described 
in the text might remain within the bounds of a spatial- 
temporal moment, but their meaning reaches beyond that 
moment. "43
In a more obvious rebuttal of original meaning, Scult 
observes that "if the interpreter tries to understand the 
text in terms of the original rhetorical situation which 
gave rise to it, to which it was a fitting response, then 
the more adequate the interpretation becomes, the more 
circumscribed the epistemological range of the text also 
becomes. If the direction of the interpretation is backward
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in time, toward the original rhetorical situation in which 
the text was uttered, its original meaning might become 
clear; but its capacity to transcend the original rhetorical 
situation and speak to a contemporary audience is muted."44
Scult also argues persuasively against the significance 
of original authorial intent when he observes that "in order 
for a text to be interpreted in a way that provides a 
fitting response to a new rhetorical situation, its 
meaningfulness in the original rhetorical situation must 
somehow be overcome . . .1145
To summarize, I am making an appeal for a pluralistic
attitude on the part of the preacher as rhetorician. It is
an attitude I trust. I am not, however, suggesting a limp
pluralism that becomes simply a passive response to more and 
more possibilities. Such a liberal pluralism is never 
practiced. That kind is the perfect ideology for the modern 
bourgeois mind. "Such a pluralism masks a genial confusion 
in which one tries to enjoy the pleasures of difference 
without ever committing oneself to any particular 
vision. . . ."46 My position is thus a paradox. The 
preacher embraces pluralism, but at the same time, commits 
herself to a particular interpretation.
Such a preacher will allow the speaker-immediate 
audience relationship to move off center stage. The new 
stage star will be the text, and, in particular, the text
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interpreted not backward but forward. To understand the 
biblical text is to open oneself to a search for original 
intent as well as an interpretation different from how the 
original authors and their first audiences may have 
understood them. Thus the preacher struggles upstream 
against cultural distance and historical alienation (like 
the creature in Richard Bach's Illusions of a Reluctant 
Messiah). Instead of a precise, good-for-all-time, 
pedestrian meaning, the preacher strives toward 
identification, toward Burke's "consubstantiality, 1,47 
toward Gadamer's "fusion of horizons,"48 toward Tracy's 
"analogical imagination."49
Numerous substantive definitions have been proposed for 
religion: Friedrich Schleiermacher's "the feeling of 
absolute dependence," Rudolph Otto's "mysterium fascinans et 
tremendum." Paul Tillich's "ultimate concern," Bernard 
Lonergan's "being-in-love-in-an-unrestricted-fashion," and 
David Tracy's "limit-experience." In my analysis of the 
significance of metaphor for preaching, I have adopted 
Tracy's definition of a distinguishing characteristic of 
religion. Tracy argues that there is a presence of an 
implicit religious dimension in our ordinary experience and 
the presence of religious-as-limit use of language in 
Christianity. He then argues for a limit-language in the 
form of metaphors, images, symbols, and myths as adequate
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for interpreting the experiences of life. At a certain 
limit-point or boundary, the language of rationality 
falters. Then the human spirit searches for metaphors 
expressive of the positive and negative limit experiences of 
life. Examples include death, guilt, and anxiety as well as 
creativity, joy, and fundamental trust.50
Limit-situations allow, even demand, reflection upon 
the boundaries of our existence. These are self- 
transcending moments, and they are more than "emotional M 
and M's" or "warm fuzzies" or pious statements. We touch 
upon a dimension of experience which cannot be stated 
adequately in ordinary language. We experience, in short, a 
reality simply given. Life is seen as gift-love. Authentic 
love, both erotic and agapic, puts us in touch with a 
reality whose power we cannot deny.51 Such experiences 
disclose the possible existence of a limit, a religious 
dimension or horizon to our lives. I am arguing that life 
has a religious dimension due to limit-situations. The 
preacher can describe the reality of these limit-situations 
through metaphor. In summary, three assertions about the 
significance of homiletics of metaphor are made:
1. All authentic limit-language seems to be initially 
and irretrievably a symbolic and a metaphorical 
one.
2. Insofar as the hidden dimension of an ultimate 
limit is not merely hidden but not even expressible 
in the language of everyday (as no-thing), that
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language retains the linguistic structure of 
metaphor and symbol.
3. The language of the scriptures is intrinsically 
symbolic and metaphorical limit-language.52
Paul Ricoeur
Metaphor rises from a kind of discourse Paul Ricoeur 
labels as "ontological" where the task is to reveal a "mode 
of being." Ontological discourse, in opposition to a 
univocal language, "is at best a kind of broken discourse, 
full of ambiguity . . . 1153 This is significant for our 
purpose because metaphor has a privileged position in 
ontological discourse.
Two important characteristics of ontological language 
are polysemy and ambiguity. Ricoeur defines polysemy as 
". . . a  feature of words, several senses for one name."
Ambiguity, however, "means that for one string of words we 
have more than one way of interpreting it."54
Ricoeur develops his theory of metaphor on three 
levels: the word, the sentence, and the discourse. He
produces a series of polarities with each pair in tension: 
word/sentence, semiotics/semantics, substitution/tension, 
and deviant denomination/impertinent predication. While 
insisting that metaphor's ties to the noun must be cut, and 
that the sentence takes priority over the word, Ricoeur does 
not dispense with the word. "The place of metaphor is
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neither the name, nor the sentence, nor even discourse, but 
the copula of the verb to be. The metaphorical 'is' at once 
signifies both 'is not' and 'is like'."55 Also, he argues 
that " . . .  the function of the word within discourse is to 
embody the semantic identity."56
Contrary to the view of literalists, Ricoeur praises 
the positive value of polysemy and metaphor. Ambiguity, for 
example, is the source of the creativity of all language.57 
Metaphor has a direct relationship to polysemy's creative 
capacity. Ricoeur asserts, "I shall treat metaphor as a 
creative use of polysemy and in that way as a specific 
strategy of language. "58
The creativity of metaphor contradicts the classical 
view of metaphor. In Study One of the Rule of Metaphor 
Ricoeur sets his own view of metaphor against the classical 
view of Aristotle. According to Aristotle, metaphor is a 
matter of denomination, words, and in particular nouns. 
Recall Aristotle's definition of metaphor as ". . . giving
the thing a name that belongs to something else."59
According to Ricoeur, when metaphor is connected to the 
noun, its destiny is sealed for centuries to come. In fact, 
as we have seen, the word remained the essential metaphoric 
unit until I. A. Richards' argument that metaphor is "the 
omnipresent principle of language."60 As Ricoeur notes,
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"It is important for the theory of metaphor that its link to 
the noun can be cut . . . "61
Ricoeur characterizes Aristotle's definition of 
metaphor as follows:
1. Metaphor is something that happens to the noun.
2. Metaphor is defined in terms of movement "from
. . . to", "For Aristotle the word metaphor
applies to every transposition of terms."62
3. Metaphor is the transposition of a name that
Aristotle calls "alien" (aXXorpiog) as opposed to 
"ordinary"( Kppiov ). Metaphor is thus defined as 
deviation. As Ricoeur warns, "In these 
characteristics of opposition or deviation and 
kinship are the seeds of important developments 
regarding rhetoric and metaphor."63 Ricoeur 
offers a summary of Aristotle's idea of aXAoxfLLOS.: 
deviation, borrowing, and substitution. As Ricoeur 
correctly points out, "It is the idea of 
substitution that appears to bear the greatest 
consequences: for if the metaphorical term is
really a substituted term, it carries no new 
information, since the absent term (if one exists) 
can be brought back in; and if there is no new 
information conveyed, then metaphor has only an 
ornamental, decorative value."64
Ricoeur proposes a theory of metaphor that counters the 
classical understanding. His theory begins with the word, 
progresses to the sentence, and culminates in metaphor as 
discourse. Ricoeur traces the route of his proposed theory: 
"At the same time each forms part of a unique path which 
begins with classical rhetoric, passes through semiotics and 
semantics, and finally reaches hermeneutics."65
Ricoeur declares as his "most important theme . . .
that metaphor is the rhetorical process by which discourse
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unleashes the power that certain fictions have to redescribe 
reality."66 In examining the nature of metaphor Ricoeur 
proposes three interpretive hypotheses to counter the 
classical tradition of metaphor:
1. It always takes two ideas to make a metaphor. If 
metaphor always . . . involves taking one thing for 
another by a sort of calculated error, then 
metaphor is essentially a discursive phenomenon.
To affect just one word, the metaphor has to 
disturb a whole network by means of an aberrant 
attribution. 67
2. A second line of reflection seems to be suggested 
by the idea of categorical transgression . . .
should we not say that metaphor destroys an order 
to invent a new one; and that the category-mistake 
is nothing but the complement of a logic of 
discovery? . . . One must say that metaphor bears 
information because it 'redescribes reality'.68
3. A third more venturesome hypothesis arises on the 
fringe of the second . . . metaphor does not 
produce a new order except by creating rifts in an 
old order. Nevertheless, could we not imagine that 
the order itself is born in the same way that it 
changes? Is there not, in Gadamer's terms, a 
'metaphoric' at work at the origin of logical 
thought, at the root of all classification? . . . 
The idea of an initial metaphorical impulse 
destroys these oppositions between proper and 
figurative, ordinary and strange, order and 
transgression. It suggests the idea that order 
itself proceeds from the metaphorical constitution 
of semantic fields, which themselves give rise to 
genus and species.69
My thesis, adapted from Ricoeur, is that what we mean 
by metaphor is that here we recognize the disclosure of a 
reality which we cannot but name truth. We find here 
something valuable, something meaningful, some disclosure of
a reality in a moment that can be called one of recognition
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which surprises, provokes, challenges, shocks, and 
potentially transforms us; an experience that upsets 
conventional opinions and expands the sense of the possible. 
The presence of metaphors in every culture is undeniable. 
Their effects in our lives endure and await new 
translations, new interpretations, new imagined worlds.
The power of metaphor to produce such changes may be 
explained as the tension or interaction aspect of metaphor. 
Since Ricoeur adopts the concept of interaction, an 
explanation of his method is necessary.
Interaction Theory
Ricoeur's theory of metaphor is centered in the tension 
or interaction theory of English-language scholars such as 
I. A. Richards, Max Black, Monroe Beardsley, and Philip 
Wheelwright. Ricoeur critiques Richard's and Black's 
interaction theories of metaphor. Having already discussed 
Richards, I will present a brief summary of Black's 
contributions to metaphor theory in general and of Ricoeur's 
theory of metaphor in particular.
Black's work advances the theory of metaphor in at 
least three ways. First, metaphor is a matter of the whole 
statement, but attention focuses on a particular word.
Black replaces "tenor" and "vehicle" with "focus" and 
"frame." The "focus" is the metaphorical word, while the
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"frame" is the rest of the sentence. "The advantage of this 
terminology," according to Ricoeur, "is that it directly 
expresses the phenomenon of focusing on a word, yet without 
returning to the illusion that words have meanings in 
themselves, . . . Black's more precise vocabulary allows us 
to get closer to the interaction that takes place between 
the undivided meaning of the statement and the focused 
meaning of the word."70
Black's second advance is the distinction between the 
interaction theory and the substitution and comparison 
theories. In the interaction theory the frame (as the new 
context) creates a new meaning, an extended metaphorical 
meaning. The interaction is between systems of associated 
commonplaces which characterize each subject. The nature of 
this interaction is that the two parts of the metaphor 
combine to organize our view of the subjects of the 
metaphor. Ricoeur observes that the distinction between the 
interaction theory and the substitution theory is the same 
as the dichotomy between semiology and semantics.71
One of the problems with Black's theory, is the 
vagueness and open-endedness of the "associated systems of 
commonplaces." Preachers have used such a method, in 
different guise, to handle metaphorical language in 
Scripture. For example, the metaphor, "You are the light of 
the world," was unpacked by John Claypool as follows: "Put
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into simple terms, this means that light performs two 
important functions: it warms and it illumines. . . . "72
What criteria are used to select only these two 
characteristics of light? Michael Osborn, in "Archetypal 
Metaphor in Rhetoric," suggests three characteristics of 
"light": "Light . . . relates to the fundamental struggle 
for survival and development. Light is a condition for 
sight . . . Light also means the warmth and engendering 
power of the sun. . . .1173 The method appears to be 
somewhat reductionistic, and, in the case of the preacher, 
seems to be an attempt to paraphrase the metaphor by 
eliminating the tension.
Ricoeur applies the concept of tension in three ways: 
First, the internal tension of the metaphorical term and the 
rest of the statement takes place "between tenor and 
vehicle, between focus and frame, between principal subject 
and secondary subject"; second, external tension occurs 
"between a literal interpretation that perishes at the hands 
of semantic impertinence and a metaphorical interpretation 
whose sense emerges through non-sense"; and third, 
relational tension exists "between identity and difference 
in the interplay of resemblance."74
In taking into account both the metaphor-maker and the 
metaphor-interpreter, Ricoeur's tension theory is superior 
to those which fail to account for the structural and the
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phenomenological aspects of metaphor. Ricoeur wrestles 
with both the production of the metaphor and the product of 
metaphor. In this sense his theory is interactional because 
an interpreting subject and an interpreting object are 
present. Otherwise a hermeneutics of metaphor would be 
impossible.
Imagination
A second major aspect of Ricoeur's theory is his more 
fully developed account of the role of imagination in 
metaphor. Ricoeur, by combining a semantic theory of 
metaphor with a psychological theory of imagination and 
feeling, explains how metaphor works. He defines a semantic
theory as "an inquiry into the capacity of metaphor to
provide untranslatable information and, accordingly, into 
metaphor's claim to yield some true insight about 
reality."75 To this theory Ricoeur adds a concept of 
imagination and feeling, arguing that metaphors with truth 
value are partly constituted by images and feelings.
Ricoeur explains his purpose: "I want . . .  to show that the 
kind of theory of metaphor initiated by I. A.
Richards . . . Max Black . . . Beardsley, Berggren, and 
others cannot achieve its own goal without including
imagining and feeling . . . 1176
There are three steps in the process of connecting the 
iconic moment to the work of resemblance. Ricoeur draws on 
Kant's theory of imagination, "specifically on Kant's 
concept of productive imagination as schematizing a 
synthetic operation.1,77 In the first step, imagination is 
the "seeing" which effects the shift in logical distance.
The role of imagination is insight into likeness. "This 
insight into likeness is both a thinking and a seeing." 
Ricoeur calls this act of thinking/seeing, "the instan­
taneous grasping of the combinatory possibilities. . . . "78
He calls this productive character of insight "predicative 
assimilation."79 Mark Johnson explains the synthesis as 
"the imaginative leap in which we see how two previously 
unassociated systems of implications fit together to reveal 
an underlying unity. "80
The second step is the "pictorial" dimension. It is 
this aspect which is at stake in the figurative character of 
metaphor. Ricoeur argues that the pictorial dimension of 
metaphor was intended by I. A. Richards' technical terms, 
tenor and vehicle. He draws a distinction between Richards' 
terms and Black's frame and focus: "Frame and focus 
designate only the contextual settings, say, the sentence as 
a whole--and the term which is the bearer of the shift of 
meaning, whereas tenor and vehicle designate the conceptual 
import and its pictorial envelope."81 In short, the first
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function of imagination is an imaginative leap and the 
second is a picture of the semantic innovation. Ricoeur 
borrows Paul Henle’s concept of the iconic signification of 
metaphor: "If there is an iconic element in metaphor, it is
equally clear that the icon is not presented, but merely 
described.1182 As Johnson points out, ". . . the claim that 
the iconic element provides a rule for reflecting on some 
object or situation constitutes a preliminary account of how 
imaginative metaphoric insight is possible.1183
To imagine, according to Ricoeur, "is the concrete 
milieu in which and through which we see similarities. To 
imagine, then, is not to have a mental picture of something, 
but to display relations in a depicting mode."84 Ricoeur 
ties his concept of imagining to the Wittgensteinian concept 
of "seeing as," even though Wittgenstein himself did not 
extend his analysis beyond the field of perception. Ricoeur 
extends the "seeing-as" notion by reference to Marcus B. 
Hester and his The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor. Hester 
attempts to relate the concept of "seeing-as" to the 
functioning of poetic images. He distinguishes between 
"wild" poetic images, which divert the reader, and "bound 
images," by which he means concrete representations aroused 
by the verbal element and controlled by it.85 Poetic 
language, according to Hester, not only merges sense and 
sound, but sense and senses, meaning by that the flow of
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bound images displayed by the sense. These images, Ricoeur 
argues, " . . .  bring to concrete completion the metaphorical 
process . . . The metaphorical sense is generated in the 
thickness of the imagining scene displayed by the verbal 
structure of the poem. Such is, to my mind, the functioning 
of the intuitive grasp of a predicative connection."86 
Moreover, Ricoeur locates the second stage of his theory of 
imagination on the borderline between pure semantics and 
psychology. The metaphorical meaning thus compels an 
exploration of the borderline between the verbal and the 
non-verbal. "The process of schematization and that of the 
bound images aroused and controlled by schematization obtain 
precisely on that borderline between a semantics of 
metaphorical utterances and a psychology of imagination.1187
The third step in imagination is the moment of 
suspension, or "the moment of negativity brought by the 
image in the metaphorical process."88 This crucial step 
makes possible a remaking of reality. "A metaphor may be 
seen as a model for changing our way of looking at things, 
of perceiving the world."89 The contrast between the 
everyday, ordinary world and the possibility of a new world 
created by metaphor is a crucial development in the present 
study. There is a suspension of the ordinary, and there is 
an invasion of the extraordinary. The ordinary, however, is 
not destroyed, but is held in tension with the new.
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Ricoeur sums up the three-fold movement of imagination:
My contention now is that one of the functions of 
imagination is to give a concrete dimension to the 
suspension or epoche proper to split reference. 
Imagination does not merely schematize the predicative 
assimilation between terms by its synthetic insight 
into similarities nor does it merely picture the sense 
thanks to the display of images aroused and controlled 
by the cognitive process. Rather, it contributes 
concretely to the epoche of ordinary reference and to 
the projection of new possibilities of redescribing the 
world.90
Based on Ricoeur's theory of imagination, we can 
project the metaphors of the New Testament as disclosers of 
possibilities for human existence which seem and are beyond 
the limit of what our ordinary language and experience might 
imagine. I do not mean that religious metaphors present a 
new, supernatural world wherein we may escape the world in 
which we live. I do mean that metaphor redescribes ordinary 
reality in order to disclose a new, an extraordinary 
possibility for our lives. The New Testament contains a 
parable of Jesus that suggests an additional "text" for this 
entire study. "Therefore, every scribe who has been trained 
for the kingdom of heaven is like a householder who brings 
out of his treasure what is new and what is old."91 I will 
attempt such a new metaphorical reading of a biblical genre 
known as apocalypse.
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A Rhetoric of Apocalyptic Consciousness
I want to show the relationship between Ricoeur's 
theory of imagination and metaphor and what I call a 
rhetoric of "apocalyptic consciousness." The connection can 
be made because metaphor is such an essential ingredient in 
all apocalyptic rhetoric. Also, Ricoeur's definition of 
metaphor as a redescription of reality coincides with a type 
of apocalypticism that I consider essential to any proper 
Christian preaching. Apocalyptic texts are frequent in the 
Bible, and I will argue for a different reality that is 
created by the metaphor of apocalyptic. What I attempt is a 
positive hope rather than the usual negative despair 
characteristic of much apocalypticism.
"Apocalypse" is a central New Testament genre. Whether 
apocalyptic demands demythologizing with Bultmann and Dodd, 
or compels recognition as "the mother of all Christian 
theology" with Kasemann, or the prophetic protest and sense 
for the struggle for historical justice sensed in 
apocalyptic by the liberation theologians, apocalypse 
remains a central New Testament genre.92 I will not 
attempt in this discussion to answer historical-critical 
questions on the characteristic of New Testament 
apocalyptic. Rather, I will abstract an "apocalyptic 
consciousness" which I consider necessary for metaphorical 
preaching. Note that any association of apocalyptic with
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Ricoeur's definition is itself a metaphorical move, i.e., 
the asserting of similarity in dissimilarity.
In any event, a minimum "apocalyptic consciousness" 
rooted in metaphor will include apocalyptic's challenge to 
the status quo, explosive intensification, negativity, and 
hope for a new "not-yet" future. The tension of metaphor is 
matched with the intensity of apocalyptic to form the 
preacher's "apocalyptic consciousness." Such a 
consciousness is a challenge to any purely "individualized" 
understanding of the Christian event. The suggested view of 
salvation is far more than "saving your soul" or "getting to 
heaven." The "privatization" of salvation is a leftover 
from primitive, frontier revivalism that, while still 
providing impetus for evangelism, allows the preacher to 
escape, avoid, or ignore the genuinely public nature of 
Christianity as well as the oppressed, poor, suffering 
marginalized majority in the world.
To refuse an "apocalyptic consciousness" and to claim 
success as "God's chosen people" by baptizing thousands of 
converts into a culturally accommodated religion of the 
status quo is to evade responsibility as surely as those who 
court an end-of-the-world literal apocalypse are attempting 
to escape responsibility. Either move--to save the world 
one individual at a time or to devise cataclysmic schemes to
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destroy the world--is to deny the public, corporate, 
communal nature of Christianity.
An apocalyptic consciousness serves as one corrective 
to any slackening of intensity for publicness, for the "not- 
yet" future, for the power of the negative, and for the 
power of the metaphorical "is/is not." Moreover, the 
presence of an "apocalyptic consciousness" negates the 
pretense of the arrogant certainty of all claims to total 
adequacy. In short, apocalyptic consciousness challenges 
all wisdom and all principles of order as a correlative to a 
"rhetoric of folly."
Apocalyptic rhetoric flourishes in times of crisis. 
"Terms like 'anomie' and 'aporia' recur in descriptions of 
the apocalyptic situation. Everything is lost. Not only 
answers but questions, meaning, and categories of meaning 
are all forfeit."93 In times of crisis, the old ways of 
understanding and practice no longer work. David Tracy 
argues that " . . .  the larger crisis is likely to be . . .
in a tradition, a culture, or a language that can no longer 
simply move forward by means of its usual ways of 
experiencing, understanding, acting, or interpreting."94 
Stephen Brown carries Tracy's argument even further: "Yet 
when sufficient anomalies arise, or when competing 
perspectives or root metaphors challenge the dominant one,
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both old and new paradigms appear as metaphors until the old 
world image is reaffirmed or the new one replaces it."95
We live in such a crisis age. Our culture qualifies as 
one in which old and new paradigms struggle to define 
reality. We face something that is systemically awry in our 
culture, i.e., systemic distortion. To try to escape this 
reality either by romantic hyperbole or positivist fiat is 
to find oneself bound to old metaphors, and "trapped in two 
intellectually spent but culturally powerful languages, 
romantic expressivism and positivist scientism."96 I 
realize that many scholars are not prepared to invite any 
kind of Christian preacher to the conversation about our 
survival. Some do not want to think any longer about 
theology, for the religions seem to be spent forces. Some 
may want, like Richard Rorty, simply "to change the 
subject." Others have too many unhappy childhood memories 
of a moralistic religion. Still others are unable to 
overlook the appalling history of Christianity, with its 
litany of murder, inquisitions, political expediency, holy 
wars, obscurantisms, persecutions, and exclusivisms. While 
these ethical charges have to be taken seriously, the 
explicitly Christian offer of an authentic existence within 
community deserves a hearing.
We simply need to appropriate the warning of David 
Tracy:
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Whoever comes to speak in favor of religion and its 
possibilities of enlightenment and emancipation does 
not come with clean hands nor with a clear conscience. 
If interpreters of religion come with any pretense to 
purity, they should not be listened to. If religious 
thinkers will not combat the obscurantism, 
exclusivisms, and moral fanaticisms within their own 
religious tradition, how can the rest of us take them 
seriously as providing new strategies for 
resistance?97
The proposal of fundamentalist Christianity that the 
hope for survival lies in the past and in the old seems to 
me false and illusory. The Garden of Eden cannot be re­
entered for we are not innocent. Rather, as Abraham Joshua 
Heschel insisted: "Not all are guilty, but all are 
responsible."98 Responsible in this case means "response- 
able. "
Crisis times call for rhetorical homiletics more 
radical than the secure and tamed rhetoric of the 
fundamentalists. In light of the failure of the reduction 
of religion to the revelational positivism called 
fundamentalism, which proclaims intellectually untenable 
tenets, I ask for a different strategy. In particular I 
argue for a Christian proclamation that has the potential to 
create a new world, i.e., a rhetoric of apocalyptic 
consciousness.
While rejecting fundamentalism with its traditional 
apocalyptic mindset, there is a sense in which any relevant 
preaching will have an apocalyptic consciousness. Such a
consciousness, as described within the parameters of a 
rhetoric of folly, does not share all the characteristics of 
biblical or secular apocalypticism. Much of the excess 
baggage of the apocalypticism of intertestamental Judaism is 
thrown out. For example, the element of determinism is not 
included in the apocalyptic consciousness. Mixon and 
Hopkins define biblical apocalyptic as "a narrative text 
reporting a vision of the end of things - all things - and 
the vision of a new world to come. The texts, appearing in 
times of crisis for the writers' people and containing 
allegorical symbols meaningful to the people but not to 
their oppressors, offer hope to the intended readers. Their 
message is that doom is certain for the existing system.
God will effect the change; the oppressed need only await 
God's replacement of the present world."99
The proposed apocalyptic consciousness considers the 
preaching of Jesus as an appropriate model. Jesus was not a 
thoroughgoing apocalypticist, but he did display some 
features of apocalyptic thought: Notably, his idea of a new 
age about to break into the old reality. As Barry Brummett 
reminds us, "Apocalyptic predicts an impending change (the 
arrival of the Jewish Messiah or the return of Christ, 
nuclear war, ecological catastrophe, or civil 
disintegration) . . . "10° In addition, apocalyptic 
presages the reversal of the values of the status quo. (For
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a clear example of the rhetoric of reversal, see the 
Beatitudes in Matthew 5). Finally, apocalyptic demonstrates 
that the the old age is passing away. In David Buttrick's 
words, "The new eon of the Spirit will inevitably displace 
institutional securities of the present age."101
In summary, apocalyptic consciousness proclaims that a 
new social reality is being created. There are no cosmic 
favorites, no atonement of violence, no Satan, no end-of- 
the-world doom and gloom. These traditional elements of 
apocalypticism are discarded. In place of apocalyptic gloom 
there is a radical hope. There is a rhetoric of reversal, 
resistance, and radicalism. The sacred cows are all swept 
away: national identity, religious affiliation, sexual 
pride, and racial make-up.
To proclaim a new social order means to abandon 
ecclesiastical accommodation in favor of a more radical 
ekklesia, a new-order, being-saved community in the world. 
Such a community is by no means an easy one to form. As 
Richard R. Niebuhr observes, we are all "radial" people; we 
internalize the slogans, images, attitudes, advertisements 
around us, and build a social world in which to live."102
Apocalyptic consciousness and Gospel metaphors are both 
in tension with this present age: "Repent for the Kingdom of 
God is at hand." The message of Christ is not the promotion 
of death, destruction, violence, and hatred, but an explicit
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faith, a complete trust, and an unrestricted love. The 
future is still hope. The future is still open. There is 
much we can do.
Apocalyptic consciousness thrives on the old age/new 
age paradox. The open, uncertain future, known only by the 
Abba, sets persons free to engage in whatever conversation 
is taking place, and to propose a new social order or 
reality in place of the old one. The old order will not 
expire or be destroyed in apocalyptic splendor, but the 
audacity of the proclamation puts the "powers that be" on 
notice. We preach a gospel of new reality.
Apocalyptic consciousness, without blinking in the face 
of corporate evil, accepts a bold, fearless responsibility 
for the world. Such a proclamation counters the gnostic 
escapism of much biblical/secular apocalypticism, as well as 
the feeling of powerlessness that such apocalypticism 
promotes. Walker Percy's Lancelot and The Second Coming. 
for example, depict an out of control society in which 
nothing can be done.103 In contrast, the preacher of folly 
and apocalyptic consciousness is not caught in the illusion 
of power and success, nor deluded by the myths of the super 
hero so prevalent in American society104, nor deluded by 
our frontier metaphors and myths, secular as well as 
religious.105
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Finally, apocalyptic consciousness projects a theme of 
reversal. In the words of Jesus: "Some are last who will be 
first, and some are first who will be last."106 The 
radical inversion of values and understanding and status is 
perhaps the most prominent feature of the New Testament. 
Jesus made as much clear in the paradigmatic text of his 
ministry: "For the Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he 
has anointed me to preach good news to the poor. He has 
sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovering 
of sight to the blind, to set at liberty those who are 
oppressed . . . "107 Paul echoes the same reversal: "For
consider your call, brethren; not many of you were wise 
according to worldly standards, not many were powerful, not 
many were of noble birth; but God chose what is foolish in 
the world to shame the wise, God chose what is weak in the 
world to shame the strong, God chose what is low and 
despised in the world, even things that are not, to bring to 
nothing things that are."108
Foucault's concept of power and knowledge seems to 
indicate that the discourse of others, such as the poor and 
the oppressed, has been systematically excluded. And yet we 
live in an age when the voices of the others multiply: the 
hysterics and mystics speaking through Lacan; the mad and 
the criminals allowed to speak by Foucault; the primal 
peoples defended and interpreted by Eliade;109 the dead
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whose story the victors still presume to tell; the repressed 
suffering of peoples cheated of their own experience by 
modern mass media; the poor, the oppressed, and the 
marginalized--all those considered "nonpersons" by the 
powerful but declared by a great reversal to be God's own 
special children.
At the very least, the rhetoric of apocalyptic 
consciousness involves all persons in the struggle for 
individual, social, political, and religious liberation. 
Flannery O'Connor’s short stories illustrate the apocalyptic 
consciousness of reversal. For example, both "Everything 
That Rises Must Converge" and "Revelation" reverse and 
transgress our ordinary world of values.110 The 
vulnerability of O'Connor offers a stark contrast to the 
secular apocalypticism of Walker Percy; an atonement of love 
not of violence. It is an apocalyptic consciousness of this 
kind that I advocate in a rhetorical homiletics of folly.
Metaphorical Sermons
The combining of Paul Ricoeur's definition of rhetoric 
as the redescription of reality with a stripped-down 
apocalyptic consciousness suggests a rhetorical/metaphorical 
model for preaching. For example, the history of Western 
Christianity requires an acceptance of responsibility for 
the subjugation of women. The patriarchal metaphors of the
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Bible and the Church indicate the depth of the oppression.
The preacher can suggest an entirely different way of
perceiving the world, and a whole new world, a world where
women are equal, by changing the dominant metaphor for God
from father to mother.
From this perspective I develop a metaphorical sermon
combining the metaphor of Jesus as a mother hen with
apocalyptic consciousness. For example, in Luke 13:31-35,
Jesus refers to himself as a mother hen, but he calls Herod
an "old fox." I have juxtaposed antithetical metaphors to
set up a contrast between powerlessness and power:
Oh, how easy it is to pin all our hopes on the power we 
can see. Maybe that's the attraction of television 
preachers. The rich, powerful, charismatic preacher 
exudes power to people without power. Or, perhaps, 
that's why we donate so much money to political 
candidates because we believe POLITICS IS POWER. Even 
in church we buy the illusions that MONEY IS POWER or 
POLITICS IS POWER or STATUS IS POWER. Even in the 
church we choose the FOX over the HEN. Move over old 
fox: There's some more folks wanting in the hen house.
And with all the power-grabbing and oppression going 
on, we fail to see a different-order reality; a reality 
of Jesus that claims Herod power is not power at 
all.111
The sermon evokes metaphors that structure our everyday 
concepts as well as metaphors that violate our status quo. 
For example, MONEY IS POWER is a metaphorical concept 
structuring the consumption ethic of our culture.
The metaphorical concept, MONEY IS POWER, is expressed 
in such everyday sayings as "money talks" and "he who has
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the gold makes the rules." Brown maintains, "The decline of 
the Church relative to the marketplace involved a decline of 
religious vocabularies in favor of commercial ones."112 
Likewise, greed has become, not a deadly sin, but a 
capitalist virtue, so much so that the antagonist in the 
movie Wall Street tells a meeting of his corporation's 
stockholders, "Greed is good."
Another example of a metaphor capable of structuring 
everyday concepts is the metaphorical concept POLITICS IS 
POWER. One common expression indicative of the POLITICS IS 
POWER metaphor: "It's not what you know but who you know."
A more involved acting out of the POLITICS IS POWER metaphor 
is the Church's frequent forays into the political arena, 
liberals and fundamentalists alike. Current political 
debates enlivened by religious political involvements 
include abortion, school prayer, creationism, nuclear 
disarmament, and pornography. As I suggest in my sermon 
sample, "Even in the Church we choose the FOX over the HEN."
The metaphor which violates the status quo and offers a 
new description of the reality is the JESUS IS A MOTHER HEN 
metaphorical concept. The preacher offers a metaphor of 
folly, the powerlessness of a hen overcoming the power of 
Herod. The preacher offers hope through the vision of a 
different-order world.
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A variation on the power vs. powerlessness model is the 
contrast between the Pharaoh of Egypt and two unknown, low- 
status Hebrew midwives (Exodus 1:6-19 and 1:22-2:10). When 
the opportunity came to disclose opposition to the oppres­
sive power of Pharaoh, the no-status, no-power women step 
forward. A sample paragraph from one of my sermons suggests 
the metaphorical treatment of the text:
Of all things, the Hebrew nannies stood up to the 
oppressor. Not the Hebrew army. Not some biblical 
Rambo or Terminator. Not even Dick Tracy or Superman. 
But two slave women refused to bow down and cave in to 
Pharaoh. Face it, somebody has to stand up. Funny 
thing about power-brokers. Sometimes it doesn't take 
much to back them down. And there have always been 
those brave souls from the past who have stood tall. 
There's Shiprah and Puah, our Hebrew nannies; and 
Gideon, the poor man who thought he was the least 
person in the least tribe of all Israel; and Rahab, the 
whore of Jericho who helped the spies. And there are 
others. Dietrich Bonnheoffer praying before his 
execution by the Gestapo, and Gandhi in India, and Rosa 
Parks in Birmingham (Actually she sat down but her act 
caused a whole people to stand tall).113
The deliberate choice of the contemporary metaphor,
"nannies," to describe the Hebrew midwives, accentuates the
awful gap between the powers that be in our own racist
society and the treatment that blacks receive. Perhaps
remembering that to be a white American is also to belong to
a history that nearly destroyed one people (the North
American Indians), and enslaved and discriminated against
another people (the blacks) will be a disturbing metaphor
that remakes a whole new world, i.e., a world free of racial
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prejudice. This is not, however, a denial of the "is" and 
"is not" tension of the metaphor, or the harshness of the 
status quo.
Conclusion
I have identified the principal language of a "rhetoric 
of folly" as metaphor. I have also applied selected 
theories and sub-theories of metaphor to the preaching 
event. I have argued that the distinction of literal 
language or truth is an illusion, and that metaphor is not 
reducible to some literal paraphrase. I have accepted the 
concept of "limit", and in particular the limit-language of 
metaphor as a way of redescribing reality. In the sense of 
disclosing new worlds and new meanings, we consider metaphor 
to have epistemic value. Using these premises, we can now 
demonstrate how metaphor conceptualizes the Christian view 
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CHAPTER SIX
THE CREATIVE POWER OF METAPHOR IN HOMILETICS 
Thus far I have argued that a rhetoric for homiletics 
should be a "rhetoric of folly." Also, I have insisted that 
metaphor, as a redescription of reality, is one possible 
language for a "rhetoric of folly." There remains one step 
in the movement toward a rhetorical/metaphorical model for 
homiletics: a discussion of the possible epistemic value of 
metaphor. Therefore, in Chapter Six I shall examine recent 
philosophical and rhetorical discussions concerning the 
cognitive force of metaphor. The basis of my work is a 
chastened homiletic realism that combines aspects of Richard 
Rorty's pragmatism with James W. Hikins and Kenneth 
Zagacki's "minimal objectivism." I then make three basic 
claims: 1) Metaphor creates character and authority, 2) 
Metaphor creates community, and 3) Metaphor creates concepts 
by which we live. The work of George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson will be extended to the discipline of homiletics in 
the discussion of claim number three.
The philosophical and rhetorical research on metaphor 
has asserted that there is a certain tension involved in 
metaphor, that metaphor is indispensable to all disciplines, 
that metaphor occurs in the relation of the utterance to the 
total speech situation in which it occurs, that metaphor
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"permeates all discourse," that metaphor is a fundamental 
principle of thought and action, and that metaphor is 
irreducible to any supposed literal meaning. I will argue 
that these assertions concerning metaphor have particular 
practical value for the preacher as rhetorician.
A number of scholars have insisted on the positive, 
creative value of metaphor. Binkley maintains that there is 
no pure core of literal meaning, and, therefore, there is no 
reason to treat the literal as an ideal against which the 
metaphor is to be measured.1 R. H. Brown insists that all 
knowledge is metaphorical.2 Gerald W. Casenave claims that 
metaphor is fundamentally a world-structuring discourse.3 
Ted Cohen points to the aesthetic, cognitive, ethical, and 
intimate values of metaphor. He maintains that community is 
a necessary precondition for metaphor.4 I believe the 
converse also to be true: metaphor is a necessary condition 
for community. Loewenberg asserts that metaphor can be 
creative in changing our world.5 Also, metaphor enables us 
to see old concepts in terms of new insights. Such a 
concept of metaphor could be valuable for the preacher 
attempting to resurrect "dead" metaphors in biblical texts. 
S. I. Hayakawa suggests that language changes and grows 
through metaphor.6 Paul deMan asserts that metaphor can be
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seen as operating in the shaping and extending of our 
understanding.7 Earl R. MacCormac, in Metaphor and Myth in 
Science and Religion, argues that both science and religion 
are erected upon hypothetical root metaphors about the 
nature of the world and human experience.8 Also, both use 
metaphors to convey ideas about the known, thus science and 
religion both have metaphorical bases.
In a similar argument, Casenave suggests that the 
fundamental nature of language is discourse: "The cognitive 
significance of metaphor is grounded in the cognitive nature 
of language. In radical metaphor the very fabric of the 
world order, the rules of comparison and collection, is 
being reworked . . . Metaphor is a response to an opening of 
a new vista of what is. It is the holding open of a 
different perspective which has been discovered."9 A 
similar view of metaphor as perspective or point-of-view has 
been argued by R. H. Brown, in his A Poetics for 
Sociology.10
C. 0. Hartman, in "Cognitive Metaphor," poses the 
question, "How does the bric-a-brac of things we call ’the 
world' become a world, a cosmos, a system?"; and suggests 
the answer, "that our minds, our senses, and our language 
create that system by a process one ought to call 
metaphorical."11 Hartman bases his conclusion on Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason and the work of gestalt psychol-
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ogists: "Cognitive metaphor is analogical . . . Metaphor not 
only lets us know, it helps us know what we know: to 
understand. "12
The epistemological issue of metaphor is due partly to 
the enduring influence of Max Black's "Metaphor." Black 
argued that there were insights expressible metaphorically 
but not literally, and that interaction metaphors are not 
reducible to literal language without loss of cognitive 
content. He also claimed that "It would be more 
illuminating in some of these cases to say that the metaphor 
creates the similarity rather than to say that it formulates 
some similarity antecedently existing."13
Given this account of metaphor, scholars have 
attributed creative power to metaphor as it appears in 
science, philosophy, religion, sociology, or other forms of 
discourse. Black's claim that metaphor is not reducible to 
literal speech means there must be a distinctive cognitive 
function for metaphor beyond mere representation. In this 
sense metaphor allows us to see what previously was not 
seen, and to say what previously could not be said. 
Metaphor's "is/is not" quality shows remarkable affinity to 
the rhetorical qualities of secrecy/disclosure.14 Metaphor 
creates a new organization among our concepts by bringing 
together what has not previously been associated. "Speech 
is creative in its metaphorical aspect, by virtue of
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metaphor's power to restructure our conceptual 
framework. "15
Take an example. Suppose I am asked to describe 
preaching in words drawn as much as possible from the 
vocabulary of agriculture. These latter terms determine a 
system of implications which will proceed to control my 
description of preaching the gospel. To paraphrase Black, 
the agriculture vocabulary filters and transforms: it not 
only selects, it brings forward aspects of preaching that 
might not be seen at all through another medium.16 To 
describe preaching as if it were the planting of a crop is 
to exclude, by the choice of metaphor, all the more negative 
understandings of preaching as "harangue" or "manipulation" 
or "emotionalism."
In sum, every version of the irreducibility and 
creative, cognitive value of metaphor claims that metaphor 
performs a unique function, and, therefore, cannot be 
replaced by a paraphrase, literal language or conceptual 
language without losing the distinctive cognitive content. 
There is, however, a problem rooted in the epistemology and 
ontology of language. The background for this problem, at 
least in rhetoric, has been the debates revolving around the 
claim, "rhetoric is epistemic." Neither the objectivists 
nor the relativists have made much genuine progress in this 
inconclusive debate. In reviewing the literature that has
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made up the debate about the nature of knowledge, reality, 
and truth, I believe the opposite sides are closer than they 
may appear. I detect a movement toward a middle ground. 
Indeed, a number of scholars, among them Richard Crable, 
Richard J. Bernstein, Stanley Deetz, Mark Johnson, Keith 
Erickson, and Walter Fisher, have proposed alternatives to 
the current deadlock within the system of Cartesian 
dualism.17 While some have attempted to solve the problem 
by not dealing with epistemology at all, others have tried 
to move beyond objectivism and subjectivism, and Rorty has 
put forth an anti-epistemology. I will argue, however, for 
a third view which incorporates objectivism and relativism.
I attempt to combine the insights of both while avoiding the 
common error of each.
There is something beyond the subject to which language 
must conform (this is the truth of objectivism). This 
something is not the objects, because they are within the 
sway of the subject (the truth of intellectualism). With 
Johnson and Erickson I argue that metaphors are not merely 
the product of the ego's power of imagination, but are 
generated by beings outside the subject.18
The attempt to incorporate portions of objectivism with 
portions of relativism I have labelled as a "chastened 
homiletical realism." Chasten is a theological word meaning 
punishment for wrong doing. I use the term as a metaphor
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for the need of homiletics to move away from a belief in 
possession of certain truth to a less authoritarian 
position.
A Chastened Homiletic Realism
Earlier, I employed arguments from the "rhetoric of 
inquiry" to critique the Cartesian starting point of 
traditional homiletics. I did not, however, accept the 
ontological claims made by, among others, Rorty and Schrag. 
While I do reject the literalist, positivist Christian 
fundamentalism, I support what I label as a "husk theory" of 
foundationalism. In short, in agreement with James W.
Hikins and Kenneth S. Zagacki, I propose "rhetorical 
realism" as the philosophical base of my homiletical model. 
As already stressed, I am not authorizing rhetoric with the 
power of certainty. As Hikins and Zagacki assert: "We
. . . contend that aspects of the world exist independent of
human knowers and can, at least potentially, be discovered, 
described accurately, and known through communication."19
Hikins and Zagacki affirm some aspects of the rhetoric 
of inquiry movement: specifically, " . . .  Nelson and 
Megill's proclivity to see 'every enterprise of research as 
a rhetorical project,' and, importantly, Schrag's concern 
that the new view be sensitive to communicative praxis, to 
pedestrian affairs as well as specialized concerns, and that 
it accommodate 'the contingency of social practices and the
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conversational voice of mankind.'"20 In an extension of 
the acceptance of these three claims, I want to demonstrate 
how the rhetorical principles of Richard Rorty, as an 
example of the rhetoric of inquiry, applies to homiletical 
realism.
Rorty's attempt to undermine traditional philosophical 
assumptions has already been employed in this work as part 
of the attack on rationalist, Cartesian certainty. Now, I 
want to turn to a more explicit critique of Rorty's anti- 
epistemological stance. Janet Horne has offered the 
following summary of Rorty's position:
1. Knowledge is discursive, not absolute.
2. What constitutes knowledge is determined by one's 
community, rather than by correspondence to truth.
3. Since knowledge is discursive and ethnocentric, it 
is enhanced by diversity of participation in the 
conversation.
4. Competing views of knowledge emerge in the form of 
competing, or alternative vocabularies which gain 
acceptance in a variety of ways--ways primarily 
related to their discursive nature.21
Knowledge is not absolute. Any revisionist homiletical 
model will of necessity accept this proposition. Dogmatism, 
intolerance, claims of certainty, even for objectivists like 
Hikins and Zagacki, are simply unacceptable. Pluralism is 
embraced as the only way to move forward. Rorty's " . . .  
somebody may come up with a better idea,"22 is matched with 
Dorothy Van Ghent's "something else might be the case."23
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Hikins and Zagacki, for example, repeatedly deny that their
epistemology is positivist in nature: " . . .  we are not
suggesting that one correct perspective can ultimately be
determined . . .  1,24 We do not " . . .  authorize rhetoric
with the power to determine ultimate, objective truth."25
Again, " . . .  arguers are often guilty of entering debate
with the assumption that since they possess objective truth,
all disputants should, therefore, defer to their authority.
But advocating rhetorical realism does not necessarily
commit one to this sort of dogmatism."26 "While making
claims to know objectively at least some things [rhetorical
realists] recognize that any given item of knowledge may be
cast aside tomorrow as better theories and methods for
approximating reality develop."27
Hikins and Zagacki compare favorably in these examples
to Rorty's pragmatist position:
From a pragmatist point of view . . . there is always 
room for improved belief, since new evidence, or new 
hypotheses, or a whole new vocabulary, may come 
along.28
To suggest that knowledge is not absolute, however, 
does not of necessity commit one to a rejection of all 
objective reality. As David Tracy asserts, "Only the 
mindless would want to rid our culture of the emancipatory 
discoveries of Western reason.1,29 In accord with Hikins 
and Zagacki, I claim at least a minimal objectivism and
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foundationalism even for the rhetorical preacher. To be 
clear, such a claim is not synonymous with the naive realism 
of fundamentalists or the positivism of biblical 
literalists. For example, to continue to hold a literal 
interpretation of the Genesis account of creation is 
impossible for anyone who accepts the findings of modern 
science. By the same token, a literalist theory of 
scriptural interpretation seems no longer a viable option in 
light of the results of modern historical study of the 
scriptures.30
Thus, while granting Rorty's insistence that knowledge 
is never absolute, I maintain a basic rhetorical realism. I 
contend that while all knowledge is partial and inadequate, 
the rhetor discovers as well as creates. Even though all 
Christian truth-claims, beliefs, attitudes, values, and 
symbols are indirect and hence relative, reality does exist 
in objective ways and "is such as to bear description in 
some ways and not others."31
On this view, an ultimate reality exists independent of 
human belief or unbelief. Among the various names ascribed 
to the Christian reality, I choose to use the most common-- 
God. Accordingly I am expressing my belief (not ultimate, 
dogmatic, certain, or objective truth) that God exists now, 
existed before there were any humans to debate his/her 
existence, and will exist long after humans are extinct.
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While the rhetoric employed to describe or disclose or 
mediate God cannot ever be proven to be accurate, "rhetoric 
is not herein defined by the accuracy of the claims about 
reality.1,32 I am asserting claims about reality from a 
Christian perspective: a pre-existent Being that has not 
been, and perhaps cannot be adequately explained, accounted 
for, described, or disclosed by any of the traditional 
Christian rhetoric. The pre-existent Logos is above and 
beyond all human words.
I am not, however, suggesting that my beliefs serve as 
warrants for my arguments. What I am presenting has much in 
common with the critical rationalism of C. Jack Orr. An 
important contention of Orr is that knowledge claims are 
"criticized in the name of absolute truth."33 What Orr 
offers is the possibility of an objective reality that can 
be and should be pursued but cannot be comprehended. 
"Objective reality, then, is beyond human apprehension, but 
exists in an independent and objective manner and is useful 
for the critique of socially constructed symbolic 
universes."34 The paradox of an epistemology based upon 
contingent knowledge and an ontology predicated on objective 
truth raises issues that are difficult, but not 
insurmountable.
To claim that Orr's objective reality is a delusion is 
of little value when the same criticism can be made of all
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knowledge-claims. Besides, Orr also denies the existence of 
any certain knowledge. To live with doubt does not in and 
of itself predict or produce chaos. What is at stake here 
is a Christian limit-experience and limit-language that 
posits a mode of being-in-the-world with explicit faith in, 
complete trust in, and unrestricted commitment to the 
ultimate worthwhileness of human existence. An explicit and 
full recognition of this faith, trust, and commitment as the 
common property shared by secularists and modern Christians 
is perhaps the key to this discussion. In making the 
connection between secular and Christian faith as the belief 
in ultimate significance of our lives in this world, I am 
not attempting to constitute traditional Christian cognitive 
beliefs as evidence to be endorsed by everyone. Rather, my 
fundamental attitude toward reality is the same attitude 
shared implicitly or explicitly by secular contemporaries.
No more than they am I insisting on pie-in-the-sky super­
naturalism or positivist Christian fundamentalism. I am, 
however, suggesting that the Christian thinker holds that a 
proper understanding of the explicitly Christian faith can 
render intellectually coherent and symbolically powerful 
that common secular faith in worthwileness that we share.35
Therefore, I uphold a minimal objectivism based upon 
the independent reality manifested in the Logos mysticism of 
St. John. Furthermore, I believe that the Christian
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preacher can proclaim a message to Christians and non-
Christians that gives credibility to the meaning and truth
of the central Christian metaphors. In the words of Tracy:
Neither supernaturalism nor pure secularism, neither 
classical theism nor atheism, neither an exclusivist 
christology nor the rejection of Jesus the Christ can 
allow us to reflect appropriately or to represent 
adequately our fundamental faith in the ultimate 
worthwhileness of our present action.36
More specifically, I wish to deny the secular negation of 
any real ground of meaning outside ourselves which assures 
that faith is not mere illusion. To deny the truth of 
Christianity is not to prove it false. "I have come to 
believe," admits Barry Brummett, "that philosophies are not 
directly arguable, that they are matters of faith, grounded 
in basic premises and belief systems."37 On this reading 
Christian preaching has the same invitation to the conver­
sation as all other truth-claims.
To summarize this section, I contend that while all 
knowledge is partial and inadequate, the rhetor discovers as 
well as creates. Metaphor is the principal component in 
this creative, inventive process. We are now aware that 
metaphors and other tropes are "necessary and not just 
nice," since they are indispensable to constituting the 
basic subject matter of preaching and to forming theories 
about it. Metaphor is our fundamental way of noting 
similarity and difference, of illuminating the unknown by
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the known.38 As a minimal objectivist who utilizes 
metaphor, I claim that while all beliefs, attitudes, values 
and symbolic interactions are indirect and thus relative, 
reality does exist in objective ways and can be partially 
described and structured through metaphor. Now, we can 
examine specific ways in which metaphor is creative.
Metaphor Creates Character 
Character as used in this discussion is an extension of 
the rhetorical concept of ethos, to include the notion of 
character as well as the concept of character in metaphor. 
Cal Logue expresses credibility as "speaker status."39 As 
Andrew King explains, "Speakers exhibit visual and verbal 
signs that prompt their listeners to make judgments about 
their right to communicate.1,40 Speaker credibility, I will 
argue, depends partially upon whether or not the speaker's 
metaphors are accepted. While members of a congregation 
tend to share root metaphors as well as common attitudes, 
beliefs, or expectations, their homogeneity cannot be taken 
for granted. The preacher still has an ethical responsi­
bility to choose her metaphors with care. Wayne Booth 
cautions that "to understand a metaphor is by its very 
nature to decide whether to join the metaphorist or reject 
him, and that is simultaneously to decide either to be 
shaped in the shape his metaphor requires or to resist."41
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A preacher, in the sense of one who tells the story of 
the gospel through the use of selected metaphors, derives 
authority in ways different from other kinds of speakers.
For example, a preacher who depends for authority upon the 
"inerrant" Bible is asking his/her congregation to accept 
his/her proposition or theory that the Bible is inerrant and 
authoritative.42 The metaphorist, on the other hand, does 
not ask for any external authority to provide a prop for 
his/her proclamation. He/She offers metaphors for the 
consideration of the audience and wins or loses assent 
accordingly.
The preacher, on this reading, is not demanding
allegiance to a certain proposition, i.e., an inerrant
Bible, but inviting participation in a certain vision of
life, a metaphor for reality. As Booth maintains:
All the great poets seem to be saying something like 
this: my vision of what stands for human happiness is 
itself the activity of sharing pictures of what human 
life is or can be. Metaphor in this view is not a 
means to other ends, but one of the main ends of life; 
sharing metaphors becomes one of the experiences we 
live for.43
Booth recognized that the existence of a small group of 
great religions can be traced to the clash of hundreds of 
metaphors for the relationship of humans to God.44 Most of 
these metaphors "have been tested in the great philoso- 
phical--that is, critical--wars and found wanting."45
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The preacher, therefore, faces the choice of 
accepting traditional Christian metaphors or the risk of 
presenting, without any credibility, alternative metaphors. 
Perhaps I should make a distinction here between initial 
credibility and derived credibility. Obviously, a preacher 
has a substantial amount of initial credibility within 
his/her own denominational structure. This initial 
credibility is wrapped in twenty centuries of Christianity, 
the accepted authority of God, the Bible, and the Church. A 
preacher may decide to always proclaim a message consistent 
with this tradition. For example, take Kathleen Hall 
Jamieson's evaluation of the metaphors of Pope Paul VI: "By 
employing the metaphors in which Christ, the apostles, and 
nineteen centuries of popes have expressed Catholicism, Paul 
VI implies that he has preserved the tradition of the Church 
and, hence, is a legitimate heir of Peter . . . Paul's 
metaphors endorse ancestral doctrine."46
In the example of Pope Paul, we observe a preacher 
embracing both an established rhetorical repertoire and a 
pre-existent initial authority. Of course, one could argue 
that the Pope's credibility is of such a status as to 
trivialize my distinctions. Place the Pope, however, in the 
pulpit of a country Baptist church in the deep South, and 
initial credibility is lost, and only that which he can 
derive will count.
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My major concern in this section is to illustrate that 
the preacher may derive credibility from his/her choice of 
metaphors. Even Pope Paul receives additional derived 
authority by the traditional metaphors he employs. "As a 
result, it is unlikely," argues Jamieson, "that Paul's 
metaphors will tantalize with their freshness, but likely 
that the audience will assign intended referents."47 For 
example, Paul's metaphor of the Church as a body will be 
naturally accepted by a Catholic audience with extended 
meanings: Christ is the head of the body. The Pope is 
Christ's vicar; the faithful are members of the body, the 
faithful, by sinning, can sever themselves from the body.
The metaphor, "the church is the body of Christ " 
sustains a traditional ethos for the preacher, building and 
sustaining his character as someone to be trusted. There 
is, however, a more risky and perhaps potentially more 
rewarding channel for the preacher: The quest of metaphors 
that would improve our culture, even at the expense of 
denominational loyalties. From my perspective the various 
denominations have each gathered around a favored cluster of 
metaphors and worship these idols (symbols) as the whole 
truth. To transcend these metaphorical wars in pursuit of a 
true ecumenicity and the end of all denominationalism would 
be a noble goal for any creator of metaphors (as well as a 
personal risk). The point is, to paraphrase Booth, that the
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quality of Christianity will in part be measured both by the 
quality of the metaphors it induces or allows and the 
quality of the judges of metaphor that it educates and 
rewards.48
In Susan Lanser's discussion of the status of a 
narrator, she suggests that narrators may have both diegetic 
and mimetic authority.49 Diegetic authority is related to 
initial credibility in that it refers to the narrator's 
personality and reputation. Mimetic authority refers to the 
speaker's ability to tell a story. In other words, the 
narrator has a derived credibility which rises from the text 
or speech itself. All preachers "are subject to judgments 
about their mimetic authority, how well they tell the 
story."50 I would extend mimetic authority beyond how well 
the preacher tells the story to how well he/she chooses and 
employs metaphors. The preacher who does not make the 
arrogant assumption that everyone accepts the authority of 
the Church or the Bible, will, of necessity, attend to 
establishing the right to speak as well as the right to 
claim our attention.
Richard Sennett outlines two major schools of thought 
on the nature of authority.51 Max Weber views authority as 
based on how a person is perceived by subordinates. If a 
person is perceived as having legitimacy, that person 
possesses authority. There are three categories of
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authority according to Weber: traditional authority, legal- 
rational authority, and charismatic authority.52 
The second school, based on the thought of Sigmund Freud, 
emphasizes believability. In other words, people have a 
need to believe that someone has credibility. Sennett 
criticizes this approach as making authority static. As 
Gerard A. Hauser notes, "Rather than thinking of authority 
as a thing, Sennett suggests it is a social construct. It 
exists as an event in social time and space, the product of 
an interaction.1153
The preacher may profit from Sennett1s observation 
concerning ethos. As a social construct, ethos does not 
depend on an audience believing that the speaker 
legitimately possesses certain attributes of character, nor 
does it rest on the needs of the audience. Ethos is a 
result of a dialogical partnership formed between the 
speaker and the audience. "Ethos is not a thing or a 
quality but an interpretation that is the by-product of 
speaker-audience interaction.1,54
Hauser suggests that ethos has several significant 
features: 1) It is developed in the message " . . .  and is 
the resulting product of choices about what to express and 
to omit . . 2) It is dynamic in that ethos changes by
the moment, and 3) It is a caused response. In other words,
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we can guide interpretations of our credibility by the ways 
we argue, and this includes the metaphors we use.55
The implications of ethos as a social construct are 
significant. The preacher is free to create authority 
within the text of the sermon rather than having total 
dependence upon an external authority. Also, the preacher 
has the opportunity to develop trust of his/her vision of 
reality through the metaphoric worlds he/she creates. 
Aristotle's advice still rings true at this point: ". . .as 
a rule we trust men of probity more, . . . and . . .  on 
points outside the realm of exact knowledge, where opinion 
is divided, we trust them absolutely. This trust, however, 
should be created by the speech itself, and not left to 
depend upon an antecedent impression that the speaker is 
this or that kind of man. "56
As I argued in Chapter One, the preacher is not engaged 
in the stating of propositions of certainty, but in claims 
that are probable, i.e., outside the realm of exact 
knowledge. Therefore, the preacher's task is to win 
allegiance to his metaphoric vision. Unless the audience 
grants the metaphor, there is no credibility or authority.
In this interaction between preacher and congregation, there 
seems to be an epistemic authority which the audience can 
grant or refuse. Despite all claims of external authority, 
charismatic appeal, and the power of tradition, and
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position, "the audience may refuse to mobilize its power, to 
withhold its power, or to extend its mandate to a 
spokesman.1157
I have already noted that the preacher has traditional 
authority by virtue of a connection with twenty centuries of 
Christian tradition. Since legal-rational authority is 
often that of position, the example of the Pope illustrates 
that the preacher enjoys legal-rational authority. Also, 
the charisma of the preacher is an important factor. Mary 
F. Hopkins notes, "We are inclined to heed people we find 
charming. A narrator who seduces us by the force of his or 
her personality is likely to win our credence, a narrator we 
can admire--for honesty, for cheerfulness in adversity, for 
generous attitudes toward others, for example. Narrators 
who demonstrate characteristics to which most of us aspire 
will also succeed in getting us to accept their stories."58
The preacher may also establish credibility with a 
demonstration of metaphoric competence. When a preacher 
offers a metaphor, the congregation must judge on the basis 
of metaphoric authority. No physical evidence is relevant. 
Metaphorical proclamation offers a new vision, a different 
reality. There is no certainty based on an examination of 
the evidence. The audience can only decide whether or not 
to accept the vision, perspective, or reality of the 
metaphor, that is, the context that allows the metaphor to
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exist. As Booth insists, metaphor can be judged with 
reference to a context. And as he argues, "The metaphors we 
care for most are always embedded in metaphorical structures 
that finally both depend on and constitute selves and 
societies. . . . "59
The context of the metaphor is the status quo or 
essential agreement on what constitutes the existing state 
of affairs or reality and the introduction of the counter 
status-quo metaphor. Take, for example, one of the parables 
of Jesus, i.e., the parable of the workers in the field. In 
utilizing the example of a parable, I am accepting the 
prevailing view of New Testament scholars that the parables 
of Jesus are metaphors.60 The parable opens with the world 
as we know it: workers, wages, jobs, and economics. The 
foreman agrees to pay the workers a denarius a day. Then 
other workers are hired to work for nine, six, three, and 
one hour. When the foreman pays the workers, everyone 
receives the same pay. The all-day workers received one 
denarius, and one-hour workers received a denarius. Now a 
different kind of world is introduced. No longer are we 
asked to deal in fairness, in a day's work for a day's pay. 
The new world introduced by Jesus is a free grace world 
where God is good rather than fair.
In somewhat less religious terms the audience is asked
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to choose a world where time is not structured as money but
as the generosity of the employer. In any event, what
occurs is a reversal of values, a counter-offer to the
status quo. A literary development of the story can be seen
in C. S. Lewis' The Great Divorce. A large ghost from hell 
is on an excursion to heaven. He is appalled upon meeting a 
solid person in heaven who had been a murderer on earth. He 
demands his rights. The solid person tries to explain that 
it is all a matter of mercy, but the ghost cannot 
comprehend.
In summary, character and culture are both products of 
metaphor. The preacher is granted authority by virtue of 
tradition, position, and charisma. Derived credibility, 
however, is at least partially determined by the metaphors 
the preacher employs. The metaphors are context-dependent 
and the audience must decide whether or not to grant 
legitimacy and authority to the reality offered by the 
metaphor. The preacher may choose, like other rhetors, to 
rely upon traditional and positional authority. She may, on 
the other hand, risk offering new ways of viewing the world. 
As I will explore in the next section, the shared risk in 
offering the metaphor for the audience's unpacking, creates 
the potential of intimacy and community.
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Metaphor Creates Community
Ted Cohen, in "Metaphor and the Cultivation of 
Intimacy," insists that the proper concern with metaphor has 
to do with meaning.61 He agrees with Ricoeur that metaphor 
has a meaning in addition to the literal meaning. Cohen, 
however, goes beyond Ricoeur to define metaphor as 
"peculiarly crystallized works of art."62 For Cohen the 
issue is not so much cognitivity but community. He drops 
the question of metaphor’s cognitivity, and introduces what 
he calls "the achievement of intimacy."63 There are ways 
in which a metaphor-maker and a metaphor-appreciator, Cohen 
claims, are drawn closer to one another: "The speaker issues 
a kind of concealed invitation; the hearer expends a special 
effort to accept the invitation; and this transaction 
constitutes the acknowledgement of a community.1,64
Cohen illustrates his point with an example, "the 
chairman is a bolshevik." He suggests that the listener, in 
this case the chairman, has to realize that the statement is 
a metaphor, and then he has to unpack the figure. "In doing 
this he moves through a network of assumptions, hypotheses, 
and inferences, at the core of which is the literal sense of 
the expression and some part of which overlaps the complex 
gone through earlier in achieving his realization that the 
utterance was a metaphor."65 The rule, according to Cohen,
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is that the metaphor-maker and the chairman "become an 
intimate pair."66 "The sense of close community results 
not only from the shared awareness that a special invitation 
has been given and accepted, but also from the awareness 
that not everyone could make that offer or take it up."67
In the dual process of identification and interpre­
tation, the chairman makes assumptions about what the 
speaker believes and about what the speaker believes about 
what the listener believes. As Cohen points out, "A 
figurative use can be inaccessible to all but those who 
share information about one another's knowledge, beliefs, 
intentions, and attitudes."68 According to this under­
standing, metaphor functions as a boundary which defines the 
community.
Cohen also argues that metaphors are much like jokes. 
The property that jokes share in common with metaphors is 
the capacity to form or acknowledge community and establish 
intimacy between the teller and the hearer. The identifi­
cation and interpretation of a joke is much like the same 
process in metaphor. "This must be related to the fact that 
often a paraphrase fails to do the job of its metaphor in 
much the same way that an explanation fails to replace a 
joke.1,69
While Cohen is right to call our attention to the 
metaphor-joke parallels, I do not believe he is suggesting
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that all metaphors are comic in nature. In fact, 
communication research suggests that on certain occasions 
the use of humor reduces the credibility or status of a 
speaker.70 Cohen does insert a disclaimer in his 
conclusion: "Do not, therefore, suppose that jokes are 
always for shared amusement, or metaphors always for 
communal insight."71 Despite the modest disclaimer, Cohen 
comes out in favor of the idea of intimacy by insisting that 
metaphor creates community.
On the basis of Cohen's concept of metaphorical 
intimacy, I want to claim that the preacher as metaphor- 
maker is a primary player in the game which creates a 
particular church community. The metaphors of the preacher 
are an invitation for a congregation to enter into com­
munity. To demonstrate how completely given churches may 
embrace offered metaphors, consider applying Erving 
Goffman's definition of a total institution. Total 
institutions are those in which "all aspects of life are 
conducted in the same place and under the same single 
authority. They are places in which one's activities are 
always in the company of large batches of similar others, 
where time is tightly scheduled, where there are explicit 
rules and a body of officials, all according to a single 
overall plan. "72
A church, with an authority centered in the pastor, 
meets at least some of the criteria of a total 
institution.73 For example, the autocratic preacher serves 
as the basic authority, and like the Puritans of old, often 
tries to enforce rigid rules upon the church members that 
cover every aspect of life. While church members are free 
to come and go, there are explicit rules and a body of 
officials. It is a narrow and constricted world in which 
the members of the congregation are uniform. At least part 
of the reason for such uniformity lies in the mutual 
acceptance of the preacher's ruling metaphors. Metaphors 
are central to the preacher's ability to shape and control 
the reality of his congregation. For example, a charismatic 
preacher insisting on the metaphor, THE HOLY SPIRIT IS A 
TONGUE OF FIRE, creates a situation in which the faithful 
can be validated only by speaking in tongues. The 
literalizing of the metaphor becomes the sign that a person 
is a genuine believer. The point is that metaphor helps to 
create community. Once accepted by the congregation, the 
metaphors become the reality of the particular community.
Metaphors allow us to know and experience reality by 
constructing a particular reality for us. Thus metaphors 
affect our thought and experience of reality. Metaphors 
prescribe how we are to act. In other words, we act out or 
perform our metaphors. For example, a Christian who has
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accepted the metaphoric concept, THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A 
WAR, will perform differently from the Christian who 
perceives the Christian LIFE AS A WEDDING.
Thus, metaphor is a way of knowing. The preacher can 
use metaphor to construct a different reality for his 
audience. But the focus is on the invitation to partici­
pate: An invitation to intimacy, a shared view of reality, 
the making of a community. Metaphor possesses the power to 
form community and intimacy between the preacher and the 
congregation. A preacher becomes responsible for the 
metaphors he/she uses, and is given or refused authority on 
the basis of the audience's response to those metaphors.
Metaphor Creates Concepts 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson claim that metaphor is 
"pervasive in everyday life . . . thought and action."74 
Also, they claim, "Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms 
of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphori­
cal in nature."75 In homiletical tradition, a preacher 
always needs a text. Therefore, my text76 for the last 
section of Chapter Six is the claim of Lakoff and Johnson: 
our conceptual system is largely metaphorical. Lakoff and 
Johnson insist with Ricoeur and Richards and others that all 
language is essentially metaphoric. It puts into tensional
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relationships words and the objects to which those words 
refer, thereby structuring our world.
Our conceptual system, however, is not usually a part 
of everyday awareness. In order to create awareness, Lakoff 
and Johnson offer a series of examples to give some idea of 
what it means for a concept to be metaphorical. One example 
is the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR:
Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms were right on target.77
Lakoff and Johnson are not implying that 
arguments and wars are the same. "The essence of metaphor 
is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms 
of another."78 Therefore, argument is partially struc­
tured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of 
war. Lakoff and Johnson make an important connection about 
arguments and war at this point: We talk about arguments as 
wars "because we conceive of them that way--and we act 
according to the way we conceive of things."79 In short, 
we perform our metaphors. We are actors and our metaphors 
are our lines, but as such, our metaphors also structure our 
performance.
Combining Lakoff and Johnson's claim that human thought 
processes are largely metaphorical with the consensus that 
Christianity consists of root and archetypal metaphors, we
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arrive at the contention that Christian preaching by its 
very nature is metaphorical and not literal.
As David Tracy asserts, "That all major religions are 
grounded in certain root metaphors has become a commonplace 
in modern religious studies."80 Despite the emphasis on 
metaphor in theology, however, homiletics has virtually 
ignored metaphor. This work is a partial beginning toward 
correcting the oversight in homiletics of the significance 
of metaphor.
To get an idea of how metaphoric concepts are crucial 
to preaching, let us consider the metaphorical concept THE 
CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A WAR.81 I have chosen the WAR metaphor 
because violence is so much a part of the everyday life of 
our planet, and because the metaphor of war is prevalent in 
the Bible and Christian preaching in general. The metaphor 
allows us to conceptualize the Christian life in terms of 
something that we understand more readily, namely, physical 
conflict.
First, in a general sense fighting and war are 
commonplace on our planet. Our prospects of survival are 
partially related to our concepts of fighting and conflict. 
In a more specific sense, those of us who live in the South 
are the by-products of a violent spirit. The violent spirit 
of the South mixed with the military images of the Bible 
makes for a volatile religious experience.
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According to historian Thomas L. Connelly, "Violence 
appears intrinsic to the Southern soul and the sheer mention 
of it can produce a host of images."82 Violence as used in 
this discussion is passion, strong feeling, the worship of 
physical force. "All of this is central to the Southern 
soul--and its religion."83 Dixie idolizes force and power 
in many forms: the football mythological hero, Paul "Bear" 
Bryant; NASCAR race-car drivers; the adoration for a high 
school football coach in a small Southern town; the 
proverbial Good Ole Boy with his pick-up truck, 30.06 rifle, 
NRA membership card, and bumper sticker, "Get your heart in 
Dixie or get your ass out." In Connelly's words, "It is an 
idolatry of bigness, strength, force, extremism, and a mild 
disrespect for authority."84
The shaping of the Southern self-image, still trapped 
in the enigma of losing the Civil War, gravitated toward 
power, bigness, and showy excess. As Connelly insists, 
"There is too much bravado in Dixie and its music, too much 
bluster and reinforcement of the male ego. Violence is an 
exercise of power."85 For our purposes, the point of this 
excursion into the soul of the South is that the religion of 
the South has imbibed at this same cup of violence.
Churches compete with one another to be the biggest as they 
count their members in the thousands and spend millions of 
dollars on huge worship centers.
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The battle metaphor, then, has deep affinities for 
Southern Christians rooted as it is in Bible, Gospel music, 
church, and culture. The performance of this metaphor has 
far-reaching implications: antagonism toward other Christian 
groups, dogmatic extremism, combative anti-ecumenical 
stances, and so forth.
In the second place, the Bible and the language of 
Christianity are replete with battle metaphors. The 
Christian experience is conceptualized with words like 
"war," "fight," "battle," "powers and principalities," 
"weapons," and "sword." The most obvious New Testament 
example of a battle metaphor is Ephesians 6:10-17, "Put on 
the whole armor of God, that you may be able to stand 
against the wiles of the devil. For we are not contending 
against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against 
the powers, against the world rulers of this present 
darkness, against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the 
heavenly places. Therefore, take the whole armor of 
God . . .”86
In addition to the language of the Bible, Christian 
hymns contain numerous WAR metaphors. Examples could be 
cited in the hundreds, but a few of the more prominent 
metaphors should suffice:
A mighty fortress is our God.
Though hosts encamp around me,
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firm in the fight I stand.
Am I a soldier of the cross?
Stand up, stand up for Jesus, 
ye soldiers of the cross.
The Son of God goes forth to war.
Mine eyes have seen the coming of
the Lord.87 (You can sing this song
in Atlanta, but don't try to take an offering).
The most prominent and controversial of the battle
hymns is "Onward Christian Soldiers." When the United
Methodist hymnal committee voted to exclude the song from
the proposed new hymnal, a holy war was declared. After
months of strident rhetoric and threats, the war hymn was
restored. "Onward Christian Soldiers" can be found on page
305 of the new United Methodist Hymnal, prominent evidence
of the power of the WAR metaphor in Protestant Christianity.
The CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A WAR metaphor crosses
theological spectrums. Sermons by mainline Protestant
preachers are as likely to employ a cluster of war metaphors
as the harangues of a fundamentalist Bible thumper. For
example, Bruce W. Thielmann, senior minister of the First
Presbyterian Church in Pittsburgh, concludes his sermon,
"Christus Imperator," with apocalyptic imagery from the
Bible and an extended WAR metaphor:
How do you see Jesus? I see him as the Book of 
Revelation sees him, riding on a white horse. His 
vesture is dipped in blood, and on that vesture . . .
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is a name so holy that none of us can know it. And 
behind him are riding the legions of heaven . . .
They come regiment by regiment and army by army and 
legion by legion--all behind this One who wears crowns 
and crowns and whose Word is of such power that it is 
like a two-edged sword from his mouth.88
Christians who accept the war metaphor as their
dominant concept do not just talk about Christian living in
terms of war. They see certain forces as their enemies,
especially Satan. Battles are won or lost against the Evil
One. The enemy's positions are attacked while Christian
positions are defended. Many of the actions these
Christians take are partially structured by the concept of
war. Though there is no physical battle, there is a verbal
and spiritual battle, and the structure of war reflects this
reality.
In this sense the CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A WAR metaphor is 
one that many Christians live by in this culture; it 
structures the actions they perform in daily life. It also
* « r
structures their perception of the world as an evil place 
dominated by Satan. The rhetoric of Christian apocalyp- 
ticists can offer an example of how the war metaphor 
structures reality. Hal Lindsey, in The Liberation of 
Planet Earth, claims, "Satan calls the shots over this 
present world system.1189 Lindsey produces a scenario based 
on the CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A WAR METAPHOR. Satan is the real, 
literal enemy, while God is the liberator. Lindsey asserts:
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"With Satan as the legal ruler of this planet, it became one 
great big slave market and everyone born into it of Adam's 
seed is born a slave of Satan. This was clearly taught by 
Jesus and his disciples."90
Another example of the war metaphor is a denominational 
quarrel. Both sides are trying to get what each of them 
wants, such as getting the other to accept a certain 
viewpoint on the Bible. Each sees itself as having 
something to win or lose, territory to establish and 
territory to defend. Both sides use whatever verbal means 
at their disposal-~intimidation, threat, invoking authority, 
insult, belittling, challenging authority, evading issues, 
and even "rational reasons." But all these tactics are 
presented as reasons; for example:
Because the Bible says so (authority)
Because if you don't I'll fire you (threat) 
Fundamentalist Southern Baptists have won a twelve year 
"holy war" for control of the denomination through the 
creation of a powerful symbol that does not even exist.
Using biblical metaphors of THE BIBLE IS A SWORD type, the 
fundamentalists have forged a weapon that has proven 
unassailable: the inerrant Bible. In the course of the 
debate, fundamentalists have changed their weapon to an 
invisible one: only the original autographs are inerrant. 
According to theologian Martin Marty, "Biblical inerrancy is
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not a doctrine, it's a weapon."91 Since there are no 
extant originals, the document is a prime example of 
socially created reality. For moderates who inject 
inerancy, the only recourse appears as a frontal assault on 
the authority of the Bible, and such an attack is likely to 
be misunderstood or turned against the moderates.
Conservative Baptists have staked their claim to the 
high and holy ground. In addition, they have surrounded 
their invisible weapon--the inerrant Bible--with literalized 
biblical metaphors like substitutionary atonement and 
creationism. The point here is that not only the conception 
of the Christian life but also the way certain Christians 
carry it out is grounded in knowledge and experience of 
physical combat. In short, when a preacher conceives of, 
carries out, and describes the Christian life as a battle, 
his experience is grounded in the CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A WAR 
metaphor.
In general, then, the metaphor THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A 
WAR is prevalent in the Bible, Christian hymnody, sermons, 
and culture. The concept of life as a war structures 
everyday activity and understanding for those Christians who 
accept the metaphor. "The concept is metaphorically 
structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, and, 
consequently, the language is metaphorically structured. 1192
By no means is THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A WAR the only 
metaphorical concept available for the preacher. Use of 
such a metaphor may be less ethical than imagining a church 
where Christian living is not viewed in terms of war, where 
there is no great enemy, where no one wins or loses, where 
there is no call to battle. Imagine alternative 
metaphorical concepts: THE CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A PARTY, THE 
CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A MARATHON RACE, or the CHRISTIAN LIFE IS 
A JOURNEY. As with the WAR metaphor there is ample support 
for each of these metaphorical concepts in Scripture, 
Christian history, and culture. In each of the metaphors 
suggested, the Christians would view life differently, 
experience it differently, and perform it differently. For 
example, to perform the PARTY metaphor would be far less a 
paranoid style than the WAR metaphor which perceives of the 
world under the control of dark and sinister forces. In 
short, the Christian life becomes a different (and perhaps 
more expansive and spiritually meaningful) reality in each 
metaphorical concept. Herein lies at least part of the 
potential of metaphorical preaching. Also it is possible to 
imagine contexts in which the WAR metaphor would be as 
appropriate as it appears to have been for St. Paul.
The preacher as rhetor attempts to structure a 
particular reality, i.e., a reality considered as "folly" in 
the real world, a reversal of the status quo. We have
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demonstrated that particular metaphors can dramatically 
change our thought and experience of reality. Now, I would 
like to consider how the preacher can offer a metaphor that 
radically alters a given status-quo metaphorical concept.
Let us consider the metaphorical concept TIME IS MONEY as it 
is part of our everyday status-quo.
This metaphor, reflected in our culture by such 
expressions as, "You're wasting my time," "You're running 
out of time," and "He's living on borrowed time," has led us 
to experience the reality of time as MONEY, as a LIMITED 
RESOURCE, and as a VALUABLE COMMODITY. To perceive of time 
as something that can be spent, budgeted, wasted, and saved, 
is the normal status-quo way of conceptualizing time in our 
culture.
Lakoff and Johnson almost as an aside indicate that 
"this isn't a necessary way for human beings to concep­
tualize time; it is tied to our culture. There are cultures 
where time is none of these things."93 The preacher, as 
the maker of a reality counter to the status-quo, has an 
opening here. In other words, time can be conceptualized in 
other ways. To consider another alternative, what if the 
proper Christian understanding of time is the metaphor TIME 
IS ETERNAL or TIME IS PLAY? Either of these metaphors would 
create a reality radically different from the usual 
Christian understanding of time. As a matter of fact, a
popular Christian concept of time is the same as the concept
of time in the TIME IS MONEY metaphor. For example, a major
appeal of evangelists who employ conversion rhetoric is
"You're running out of time." The preacher, playing on the
supposed fear of the congregation, suggests that there is
only a limited period of time available for the persons to
"be saved" or "accept Jesus Christ." I have often heard
revival preachers implore their congregations to make a
decision. "This may be your last chance. Do it now." "We
are going to sing one last verse of 'Just As I Am' [a
typical hymn of invitation]. If no one comes you will close
the invitation. Someone coming forward may extend the time
that some poor lost sinner has to accept Christ." The
urgency and the creation of a reality based on the metaphor
TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE, supplied for centuries a
reliable technique for conversions. An example of a
Christian use of the TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE is the
gospel hymn, "0 Why Not To-Night?":
0 do not let the Word depart, And close thine eyes 
against the light; Poor sinner, harden not your heart, 
Be saved, 0 to-night.
Tomorrow's sun may never rise To bless thy long deluded 
sight; This is the time, 0 then be wise, Be saved, 0 
to-night.94
Other frequently used invitational hymns of the same genre 
include "Jesus Is Calling," "Let Him In," "Only Trust Him," 
"Pass Me Not," and "Whosoever Will."95
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TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE is a metaphorical concept.
It is metaphorical because the preacher uses everyday 
experiences with limited resources to conceptualize time. 
Those who act on the basis of the TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE 
metaphor conceive of time that way. Since those persons 
"walking the aisle" understand and experience time as the 
kind of thing that can be wasted or lost, they perform the 
metaphorical concept. In other words, these converts no 
longer delay their decision. They come forward to receive 
the offered salvation because "tomorrow's sun may never 
rise." The disappearance of this particular evangelistic 
appeal may be, in part, the result of the gradual 
realization of church-goers, that no matter how often the 
preacher warned of their last chance, the sun did come up 
again the next morning. Thus, the preacher's created 
metaphorical reality no longer cohered with the experience 
of the audience. As a result, the preacher lost credi­
bility. When no one in the audience performs the metaphor, 
the metaphor fails, and the preacher, as metaphor-maker, is 
not given status or authority. As with most metaphors, the 
negative extension of the limited time metaphor could be 
expressed in a positive light.
The preacher can, however, offer different concepts of 
time. For example, the preacher can turn to the New 
Testament for a concept of time as Kaipog, i.e., "the
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opportune time" or the right time.96 Now, time is no 
longer perceived of as a limited resource. The urgency, the 
sense of time running out is replaced by a more relaxed 
concept. Time is ongoing and the emphasis changes from a 
negative threat to a positive opportunity. Time no longer 
acts as a potential adversary on the verge of snatching away 
the life of the unbeliever, but now acts as a potential 
ally. By changing the metaphor from the normal way we 
conceptualize time, the preacher creates a new reality. The 
audience is invited to understand and experience time as 
something other than TIME IS MONEY, TIME IS A LIMITED 
RESOURCE, or TIME IS A VALUABLE COMMODITY.
An even more radical departure from the usual metaphor 
TIME IS A LIMITED RESOURCE would be to conceive of time as 
eternal. In the TIME IS AN UNLIMITED RESOURCE metaphor, the 
usual Christian understanding of salvation is completely 
changed. Death does not mean the end of time or of 
opportunities to be "saved." Death is, on the new reading, 
a passage to life on a different level. In this new world, 
the person can and will be "saved." There is thus no hell, 
no place of eternal punishment. There is no such thing as a 
person's last chance to relate to God. Life does not end 
but continues on in new and unexpected ways. The theolog­
ical concept that attempts to explain the metaphor TIME IS 
AN UNLIMITED RESOURCE is called "universalism." The point I
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am attempting to make is that the preacher can radically 
alter the concept of time by using different metaphors. The 
choice of metaphor is a significant part of the preacher's 
rhetorical task. What I have offered are examples of the 
way in which metaphors can be used to conceptualize our 
everyday experience like TIME.
Conclusion
I have identified metaphor as a creative power for the 
preacher. I have also illustrated three ways in which 
metaphor is creative and thus has epistemic power in a given 
Christian community: 1) Metaphor creates character; 2) 
Metaphor creates community; and 3) Metaphor creates concepts 
by which we live. I have argued that the preacher can offer 
alternative worlds, i.e., ways of being-in-the-world through 
the use of different metaphors. Thus, the preacher as 
rhetorician becomes a metaphor for Christian communication 
far different from other metaphors such as the preacher as 
herald or the preacher as prince of the pulpit. Although 
the preacher as rhetorician forfeits the security of status 
quo authority, the irony is that by so risking herself, the 
preacher may gain an enhanced, derived authority as the 
maker of a new world.
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After the seas are all cross'd,
(as they seem already cross'd)
After the great captains and engineers have 
accomplish'd their work,
After the noble inventors, after the scientists, 
the chemist, the geologist, the enthnologist,
Finally shall come the poet worthy that name,
The true son of God shall come singing his songs.
-Walt Whitman 
The rhetorical/metaphorical homiletics presented in 
this study, I am assuming, is a model which outlines the 
changes which take place in our concept of reality by means 
of metaphor. These changes, when embraced by a particular 
community of believers, become the new reality of the 
community. In the creation of this new reality, one may 
give meaning to the assertion, "Metaphor is epistemic." The 
metaphors, offered up by the preacher-rhetorician, may 
present a better understanding of experience than the status 
quo metaphoric concepts, and if accepted by the community, 
be granted epistemic authority.
Throughout this work I have endorsed the view of 
Richards and others that all language is essentially 
metaphoric. The preacher, by utilizing rhetoric, may depict 
a new world for her congregation. In other words, the 
metaphors of the preacher as rhetorician cross the boundary 
of the old world and offer a new world. Such an adventure
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moves the proclamation of the Christian message beyond 
rigidism, reductionism, and rationalism.
In arriving at a rhetorical/metaphorical grounding for 
homiletics, I developed a series of moves. First, I moved 
rhetoric from its traditional position of exile back into 
the heart of the homiletical experience. Such a move was a 
necessary prerequisite to granting epistemic authority to 
metaphor. By combining the insights of rhetorical theory 
with the discipline of homiletics, I have attempted to 
restore the synthesis of Augustine. Without this prelim­
inary move, rhetoric and philosophy would have remained 
subordinate to theology. Rhetoric would have been merely 
the art of presenting truths and values already established. 
Whenever truth is an already established certainty, all 
disputed alternative methods are attacked as "mere" 
rhetoric, i.e., mere opinions based on prejudices, passions, 
and ornamental language. As long as the rhetoric of 
homiletics was that of sophistic handbooks, it was deni­
grated as a devil term. The only acceptable task of such a 
rhetoric was as a technique for presenting ideas and putting 
them in the proper form. The preacher as rhetorician served 
only a reductionistic method. He/She presented the truth, 
organized the truth in three or more propositions, and 
decorated the truth with appropriate ornaments.
Second, I deconstructed the traditional homiletic 
method as a copy machine version of Cartesian certainty 
without the benefit of scientific, empirical verification. 
The method of homiletics was shown to be antithetical to the 
metaphoric language of the Bible, the metaphoric nature of 
everyday language, and the metaphoric nature of the 
homiletic experience. By taking rhetoric seriously as a 
context-giving tradition for homiletics, I could no longer 
embrace certainty or literal truth for the preacher as 
rhetorician. The move from a supposed certainty to the 
ambiguity and probabilities of rhetoric made me aware that 
there are alternative ways of truth telling. No longer 
hemmed in by the paranoia about certainty, the preacher as 
rhetorician is free to respond to the Cartesian question, 
"How can I be certain," with a definite rhetorical response, 
"You can't." Contrary to the insistence of some Christian 
thinkers, such a move from certainty to probability does not 
eliminate Christianity from serious consideration or from 
the ongoing conversation of humanity. On the contrary, such 
a move enables the Christian spokesperson to come to the 
party without the baggage of dogmatism that frequently 
causes Christianity embarrassment. The preacher as rhetori­
cian thus endorses a pluralistic method.
My third move involved the presentation, of an 
alternative method of homiletics. I labelled this method
•the rhetoric of folly. The defining characteristics of the 
rhetoric of folly are identification, direct semantic 
speech, empathic communication, dialectical irony, and 
metaphor. I do not pretend that all public problems will be 
solved through reliance on the rhetoric of folly and its 
creative metaphorical power, but I do hope I have demon­
strated that such discourse deserves a new hearing in a 
world where technology and rationality have not produced 
adequate answers to our problems. I contend further, and 
perhaps this reveals my hidden agenda, that by accepting the 
rhetorical/metaphorical nature of Christian preaching, the 
preacher has a word which offers positive hope for a new 
humanity and for our survival. The elements of what may be 
a naive construct are the rhetoric of folly, the creative 
power of metaphor, a chastened homiletic realism, and an 
apocalyptic consciousness.
Preaching, by its very nature, is rhetorical. Through­
out this work I have tried to present the significance of 
rhetoric and metaphor to homiletics. Future research could 
expand the preliminary model of a rhetoric of homiletics. 
Rhetorical critics could produce a rhetorical history of 
preaching that concentrates on the dominant metaphors of 
preachers, churches, and religious movements. Metaphoric 
criticism could offer insight into the great periods of 
religious awakening in our world. For example, the
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metaphors of Jonathan Edwards and the Puritans may hold 
clues to a better understanding of the continued influence 
of these early American Christians upon the American psyche.
In addition, a pragmatic model of homiletics could be 
developed from this study. Utilizing the model of 
conversation, imagination, and metaphor, the preacher could 
create an alternative method for preaching. The potential 
value of rhetoric for homiletics perhaps awaits the coming 
of the poet worthy of the name.
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